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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the development of cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. It considers 
transnational organised crime as a phenomenon that calls for a comprehensive regional 
mechanism to coordinate national responses, especially since the freedom of movement 
provided by the EAC Common Market Protocol opens the door to criminals who take advantage 
of this right to frustrate justice and to find safe havens in the Partner States. The thesis draws on 
the experience of the EU to evaluate the relevance to the EAC of some of the legal and 
institutional mechanisms which have been developed in Europe. 
Using a regionalism theoretical approach, the thesis views the re-establishment of the EAC in 
1999 as a response to the pressure of economic globalisation, the worldwide emergence of the 
new regionalism after the end of the Cold War and consecutive resurgence of regional 
organisations in Africa, Asia, and South America. The example of the flourishing of European 
cooperation, and a clear global preference for multilateralism over bilateralism in issues such as 
trade and economy, security and environment were also significant issues. 
Based on various reports on the types of crimes, the criminal networks involved and their routes, 
the thesis argues that transnational organised crime is a serious threat in the EAC that needs to 
be addressed urgently. The thesis also draws on interviews and other qualitative data collected 
at the EAC institutions and recommends a simplified and expeditious cooperation model freed 
from diplomatic and political interference and channelled directly between national authorities 
responsible for the subject matters of cooperation in the Partner States. 
Furthermore, the thesis argues that the freedom of movement enshrined in the EAC Common 
Market Protocol should be extended to legal cooperation to allow mutual recognition of national 
courts’ decisions and judgments for the surrender of suspected offenders and accused between 
the Partner States as well as the collection of evidence across national borders. More 
importantly, the thesis calls for the creation of a supranational East African criminal law 
applicable in transnational criminal proceedings, to ensure effective investigation of 
viii 
 
transnational organised crimes and other serious offences as well as the prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators in the region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Rationale for the research 
The EAC is a regional organization that is comprised of six countries –Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda- with a combined population of about 177 million people 
and a land area of 2.5 million Square Kilometres.1 The Community was established by a treaty 
signed on 30th November 1999, which entered into force on 7th July 2000 following its ratification 
by the three original Partner States Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The Republic of Rwanda and 
the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18th June 2007 and became full members 
of the Community with effect from 1st July 2007, while the Republic of South Sudan acceded to 
the Treaty on 15th April 2016 and became a full member on 15th August 2016.2  
The EAC aims at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States.3 The regional 
integration process is currently at a high level, with a customs union in process and a common 
market4 with free movement of persons, labour, goods, services and capital, and the right of 
establishment.  
As regional integration progresses, criminal offenders who are citizens or residents of the EAC 
are now more free to move from one country to another, and to settle in the country of their 
choice within the Community. At the same time, the EAC Partner States are at different levels of 
economic and social development, including in their legal systems. These factors influence an 
offender’s choice of moving to or settling in an EAC Partner State. 
The EAC is likely to grow bigger as Sudan and Somalia formally applied to join it, and the DRC too 
expressed interest in joining the Community.  Therefore, criminal matters in the EAC would be 
much more complex in the coming years.  
 
1 https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac, last accessed on 10th August 2020.   
2 Ibid 
3 Article 5 EAC Treaty 
4 https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac, last accessed on 10th August 2020. 
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Like other many global justice systems confronted by the emergence and expansion of 
transnational crime,5 those of the EAC are not spared. A report commissioned by the EAC in 20156 
identifies the following as major and common transnational crimes in the EAC: drug trafficking, 
human trafficking and smuggling, terrorism, corruption, motor vehicle theft, wildlife related 
crimes (specifically poaching and illegal trade), cattle rustling, illicit trade in counterfeit goods 
and other illegal commodities, money laundering, racketeering, and trade and smuggling of small 
arms and light weapons.7 The report also discusses the issue of terrorism financing in East Africa. 
It describes East Africa as a source, transit and destination of certain transnational organised 
crimes.8 The report examines the factors that make the EAC region favourable to transnational  
organised crime, specifically criminal gangs, increased radicalization, corruption, the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons, and terrorism amongst others, and the threat they pose to 
peace and security in the region.9 Furthermore, the report examines mechanisms addressing 
transnational organised crimes in East Africa, firstly, national laws, policies, strategies and 
institutions, secondly, regional mechanisms including initiatives in other regional organisations 
to which the EAC Partner States belong. It discusses the effectiveness of the national 
mechanisms, their weaknesses and existing gaps between the Partner states’ responses to 
transnational crimes. Lastly, the report identifies the challenges and opportunities of fighting 
transnational organised crimes under the framework of the EAC.  
The EAC’s response to transnational crime currently consists of loose policy frameworks that 
essentially encourage inter-states cooperation, as opposed to a common approach through 
regional cooperation. Partner States cooperate on the basis of bilateral treaties, for instance in 
matters of extradition. Some of the extradition treaties are relatively old and they need to be 
updated in order to cope with the expansion of crimes in the region. For example, the extradition 
treaty between Rwanda and Tanzania was ratified in 1965. A treaty between Rwanda and 
Burundi too was ratified in 1976. The only existing mechanism against transnational organized 
 
5 UNODC (2006). International Cooperation. Cross – Cutting issues., p.1. 
6 East African Community (2015). Study to assess transnational organised crime and terrorism in the EAC region , 
59p. 
7 Ibid., p.5-34. 
8 Ibid., p.vii. 
9 Ibid., p.48-52. 
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crime in the region, the EAPCCO, which came into force in August 200210, is not affiliated with 
the EAC.  
This thesis is set against the current situation in the EAC, to examine the response of the EU to 
transnational crime, as a criminal justice system that successfully established effective 
mechanisms for cooperation in criminal matters, and their relevance for the EAC.  
2. Objectives of the research 
International cooperation in criminal matters has been recognised by the international 
community as an urgent necessity.11 The EU has developed a unique form of international 
cooperation in response to organized crime,12 which this thesis examines in search for a model 
suitable for handling transnational crime in the EAC. In this regard, the present thesis aims at: 
- Analysing transnational organized crimes in the EAC and their effects in the region. 
- Proposing legal and institutional mechanisms for cooperation in criminal matters adapted 
to the EAC, drawing upon the experience of the EU. 
- Influencing the EAC legislator to adopt mechanisms for cooperation in criminal matters. 
- Demonstrating the reasons law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system 
actors in the EAC need to cooperate. 
- Analysing the national legal systems in the EAC and understanding their specificities. 
- Demonstrating the inefficiency of current bilateral mechanisms of cooperation among the 
EAC Partner States. 
- Understanding the decision-making system of the EAC. 
- Analysing the impact of globalization and transnationalization of the law on the EAC. 
 
 
 
10 UNODC (2008). Toolkit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, New York, p.169. 
11 UNODC (2006). Op.Cit. p.1. 
12 Joutsen, M. (2006). The European Union and cooperation in Criminal Matters: the Search for Balance. The 
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, p.7, 8. Accessed at 
www.heuni.fi/material/attachments/heuni/papers/.../HEUNI_papers,_on 10 July 2014. 
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3. The significance of the study 
As an economic and trade regional cooperation organization, the EAC attracts economic and 
trade research mostly. All legal researches on the EAC that I have come across are related to 
human rights. This research is the first of its kind. The topic is unknow or perhaps ignored, 
mostly because of the failure to understand transnational crime and the implications of the 
policies of the EAC on the expansion of transnational crimes in the region. The research is the 
first thesis to generate knowledge about transnational crime in the EAC and to propose a 
cooperation model applicable to the EAC. This was specifically commended by the 
respondents to the interviews conducted for the research at the EAC, as illustrated in the 
following three quotes: “This is very important area of research that may be has very few 
scholars or researchers”;13  “This study of cooperation in criminal matters is very important 
study for us as a region today, is reality we are living in, … we encourage our own citizens to 
do deep interrogation and help those of us in the service of the Community to gain 
knowledge…”;14  “This is a very unique opportunity … to have someone looking at another 
area which no one talks about but which actually would play  a major role to securing this 
region…”.15 The thesis contributes to the literature on transnational crime, a field in which so 
little or nothing has been written in the EAC and certainly no major legal research published. 
The thesis gives a more comprehensive narrative of transnational crime in the EAC, the 
criminal networks involved, their methods, means and routes, unlike various reports that 
either focus on specific transnational crimes or examine the wider eastern Africa region. Also, 
the 2015 report on transnational crimes commissioned by the EAC did not include South 
Sudan as the latter had not yet been admitted as a Partner State. 
The thesis is the first research to examine cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC and the 
implications, for the Community, of the cooperation system of the EU. It establishes, from 
interviews conducted with officials at the Secretariat, the Parliament and the Court of Justice 
of the EAC, that the Community needs to develop a regional mechanism in response to 
 
13 Interview with Respondent 1. 
14 Interview with Respondent 5. 
15 Interview with Respondent 7. 
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transnational crime. Whereas reports on transnational crime in the EAC examine cooperation 
from an interstate perspective, this thesis is the first research to propose a regional 
cooperation mechanism in criminal matters and the adoption of mechanisms that operate 
above the states’ level. In that sense, it is the first research to break into a field in which 
nothing has been examined so far in the EAC. The research will influence the leadership and 
the decision-making organs of the EAC to expand cooperation to criminal matters as a matter 
of urgency, based on the provisions of the Treaty. To quote a respondent to the interviews, 
who encouraged me to share the research with the leadership of the EAC, in particular the 
Secretariat, and to make sure it informs policy, “research … must be able to get towards 
influencing certain positions and decisions”.16 This research engages the policymaking and 
the judiciary of the Community on cooperation in criminal matters and it informs them on 
models and mechanisms developed in other regional contexts, specifically the EU, and the 
extent to which they could be adapted to the EAC. It also informs the EAC and the wider 
public about the dynamics of a regional governance and its effects on the expansion of 
transnational crime in the region but also the duty and the capability of the Community to 
address these and other similar issues affecting its interests and those of the Partner States.  
The thesis studies the EAC as one of the six RECs composing the AU17 and a sui generis 
organization, being the only one in the world with the aim for a political federation. As such, 
the thesis contributes to the awareness of the EAC, locally and globally, and the problems of 
transnational crime in the region. The thesis will inspire other African RECs that may 
experience the same challenges as the EAC and wish to fight their own crime problems, 
transnational or otherwise. All EAC Partner States are members of other RECs in Africa. The 
proposals and recommendations contained in this research will have a great impact beyond  
the EAC. 
The expansion of transnational crime in the EAC in worrying proportions, since the re-
establishment of the Community in 1999, was unexpected. It was not anticipated that the 
 
16 Interview with Respondent 1. 
17 Article 130(2) EAC Treaty provides that ‘the Partner States regard the Community as a step towards the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community’.  
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EAC would become a hub for transnational crime, comparable to the Balkans in Europe, or a 
strategic location for transnational criminal networks. What distinguishes this thesis from 
reports and studies on transnational crime in the EAC is its theoretical explanation, 
particularly regionalism as a policy response to global and regional challenges such as 
transnational crime.18 
4. Research questions 
Research questions indicate gaps in the scope or the certainty of the knowledge.19  In order to 
achieve the proposed objectives defined in this thesis, the following questions will be addressed:  
- Why should the EAC develop cooperation in in criminal matters? 
- How can the EAC achieve effective cooperation in criminal matters? 
- Which model of cooperation is suitable for the EAC? 
- What principles should determine an appropriate model of cooperation in criminal 
matters in the EAC? 
- What are the effects of transnational crimes on the EAC Partner States and on the 
Community? 
- What are the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC? 
 
5. Theoretical framework 
The thesis applies the theory of regionalism to understand the reasons that motivate states, 
including those of the EAC, to cooperate. The EAC being a regional integration organization, it 
seemed logical, in the thesis, to find out what regionalism is, as a mode of governance that guides 
states belonging to a specific geographical area or grouped around a specific issue in their 
endeavor to form a new polity. Applying regionalism as a theoretical framework helps 
understand its various descriptions in order to identify its manifestations in the EAC. More 
importantly, the thesis applied regionalism to establish to what extent criminal matters may 
 
18 Heine, J. (2012). ‟Regional integration and political cooperation in Latin America”. Latin America Research 
Review 47(3), p.217. 
19 Brewer, J. and A. Hunter (2006). Foundations of Multimethod Research. Thousand Oaks, Sage, p.39. 
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constitute a possible area for cooperation in the EAC which is primarily an economic integration 
organization. Economic pursuit and security imperatives have characterized regionalism 
worldwide since its early manifestations.20 Even when states cooperated in criminal matters, as 
within the Council of Europe, it has always been essentially an inter-states cooperation, 
compared to more advanced and binding forms of cooperation, such as supranationalism, in 
trade. It is not until the rise of constructivism in the 1980s and the resurgence of issues of identity 
and belonging in many parts of the world, after the end of the Cold War, that regionalism 
expanded its range of activities and missions to other issues. These included global and regional 
challenges, such as transnational crimes, climate change, natural disasters, environmental 
protection, pandemics, social and cultural development, poverty, inequality, etc.21 In this thesis, 
transnational crime is the starting point for arguing for the extension of cooperation in the EAC 
to criminal matters. The thesis considers transnational crime as a regional challenge in the EAC 
that calls for a regional response in accordance with regionalism’s spillover effect which, the 
thesis argues, requires extending cooperation to transnational crimes. Such expansion is 
attributed to the economic policies of the Community, specifically the Common Market’s free 
movement of persons, goods, and factors of production. This line of argument is made possible  
only by taking into account constructivism’s view of regionalism as a policy that incorporates 
formal organizational processes at states’ level as well as informal processes across national 
borders, such as transnational crimes.22 This new regionalism recognizes both top – down and 
bottom – up processes, meaning the policies of states as well as the activities of grassroot 
participants such as informal traders, smugglers or the civil society,23 in contrast to the old 
regionalism which was essentially states – led and excluded non – state actors. 
In order to understand the functions of the EAC as an institution, the thesis applies 
institutionalism too as a complementary theory, largely because it is the most well-developed 
 
20 See Acharya, A. (2012). “Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time has Come”. The International Spectator. 
47(1), p.11.  
21 Ibid. Also, Heine, J. (2012). Op.Cit., p.217.  
22 See Kitipov, J. (2012). “African integration and inter – regionalism: The regional economic communities and their 
relationship with the European Union”. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 34(1), p.24. 
23 See Staeger, U. (2015). The European Union’s Regionalism Diplomacy in Africa: An English School Approach. 
UNU-CRIS. Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Paper 2/2015, p.5. 
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literature in the study of international institutions. The thesis focuses on the influence of 
constructivism, as a theory that has dominated the study of international organisations since the 
end of the Cold War.24 The reason for this choice is the capacity of constructivist – institutionalism 
to explain institutional change, in contrast to all other institutionalism variants (rational, 
sociological and historical) that basically conceive institutions as static.25 This is important 
considering the thesis’ proposal that the EAC should extend cooperation from trade and economy 
to criminal matters and  adopt the various implementation mechanisms which are proposed. 
Constructivist institutionalism manages to explain institutional change, unlike older 
institutionalisms, by shifting the centre of its attention from institution to individuals or actors.26  
It is widely accepted among institutionalists that institutions matter because they structure 
strategic incentives and constraints. All other institutionalism variants tend to see agents or 
individuals as deeply embedded or constrained by their institutional environments and they 
attribute institutional change to exogenous shocks or crisis,27 while constructivist – 
institutionalists argue instead that actors create, recreate or maintain institutions in a dialectic 
process of interaction.28 The proponents of constructivist – institutionalism also argue that it is 
important to understand individuals or actors’ perception of their institutional norms and rul es. 
Hence, interviews were conducted as part of this thesis, to capture the views of the EAC’s officials 
on the thesis’ proposed changes to the Community. The views expressed in the interviews 
informed the proposals put forward in the thesis and they were incorporated to make sure that 
they exert a causal influence in the adoption, by the Community, of the very proposals. It was 
fundamental in the thesis to consider the ideas of those at the heart of policy formulation and 
communication in the EAC, not only for shaping the various mechanisms proposed in support of 
 
24 Hurrel, A. (1995). “Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics”. Review of International Studies 21, 
p.349-350., 
25 Bell, S. (2011). ‟Do we really need a New ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ to Explain Institutional Change?”. 
British Journal of Political Science 41(4), p.885. 
26 See Snaith, H. (2013). Constructivist institutionalism, (multi – level) governance, and the Euro crisis. Paper 
presented to BISA annual conference (Draft), Birmingham, p.2,10 and 15. 
27 Sterling – Folker, J. (2000). ‟Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism Compared”. International Studies Quarterly 44, p.103, 104. 
28 See Schmidt, A. V. (2008). ‟Bringing ideas and discourse back into the explanation of change in varieties of 
capitalism and welfare states”. Centre for Global Political Economy. University of Sussex, p.6.  
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cooperation in criminal matters in the Community, but also for facilitating legitimacy and gaining 
approval. 
6. Methodology 
The thesis is document based in order to generate knowledge about international cooperation in 
criminal matters. It focuses on the use and analysis of relevant documents.29 Thus, library and 
Internet constitute the main source for the research. Data were collected through interviews30, 
to address the thesis’s research questions.31 The interviews were designed as a standard set of 
questions. They consisted of face to face meeting with each respondent although skype interview 
too was considered an option.32 The thesis applied structured interview with a standard 
questionnaire for all respondents.33 This type of interview generated insightful information on 
the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. It also helped to 
address the views of the participants on the cooperation model that the thesis proposes. All 
interviews were recorded on a digital tape recorder and subsequently transcribed verbatim. They 
were analysed and interpreted for the purpose of drawing conclusions regarding the research 
questions. The thesis used qualitative content analysis of data from interview transcripts, to 
interpret the opinions expressed in the interviews34 and to identify the main themes that 
emerged from the responses given by the respondents.35 
The plan for the interviews included a total of ten respondents as follows: 
- The President of the Appellate Division of the EACJ 
- The Principal Judge of the First Instance of the EACJ 
- The Speaker of the EALA 
- 5 members of the EALA representing each EAC Partner State 
 
29 Hammond, M. and J. Wellington (2012). Research Methods: The Key Concepts. Oxon,Taylor and Francis. p.55. 
30 Schensul, J.J. ‟Methodology, Methods, and Tools in Qualitative Research”. In: Lapan, S.T., Quartarolli, M.T et. al. 
(Eds). (2012). Qualitative Research: An Introduction to Methods and designs. San Francisco, Wiley 
31 Bhattacherjee, A. (2012). ‟ Social Sciences Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices”. Florida. USA, p.22. 
Accessed at www.scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context, on 17 July 2014. 
32 Hammond, M. and J. Wellington (2012). Op.Cit., p.91.  
33 Brinkmann, S. (2013). Qualitative Interviewing. Oxford. Oxford University Press, p.19. 
34 Bhattacherjee, A., op.cit., p.116. 
35 Hammond, M. and J. Wellington (2012). Op.Cit., p. 34. 
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- The Secretary General of the EAC 
- The Counsel and Legal Advisor of EAC 
One of the objectives of the research being to influence the EAC’s decision- making, the 
respondents to the interviews were selected on the basis of their high profile in the EAC, that 
makes them the most suitable for an elite interview.36 
 Elite interviewing is a key qualitative research method in the social sciences.37   It is a data 
collection technique used to access the views and interpretations of subjects under 
investigations.38   The concept originated from the study of politics and policy – making.39  It is 
used in this thesis to understand the consequences of the EAC’s regional economic integration 
policies, specifically a possible correlation between the freedoms of movement provided by the 
Common Market Protocol and the expansion of transnational crime in the region. 
The term ‘elite’ refers to individuals generally considered to be well known, famous, distinctive 
or important.40  However, it does not necessarily connote socio – economic class, but rather 
elevated decision – making authority within formal or informal organisations such as government 
agencies, NGOs or businesses.41  As such, it refers to individuals in powerful positions, for 
example, those in senior elected political and executive government roles or those who hold 
positions of professional prestige such as high-level bankers.42  The rationale for using elite 
interviewing in this thesis is its purpose as defined in section 2 above, particularly influencing the 
EAC’s legislator to adopt mechanisms for cooperation in criminal matters. The nature of the 
 
36 Moyser, G. (2006). The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods. Elite Interviewing. London, Sage 
Publications, p.4. 
37 Boucher, A. (2017). “Power in elite interviewing: Lessons from feminist studies for political science ”. Women’s 
studies International Forum 62, p.99. 
38 McEvoy, J. (2006). “Elite Interviewing in a Divided Society: Lessons from Northern Ireland”. Politics 26(3), p.184. 
39 Kofi Darbi, W.P. and C.M., Hall (2014). “Elite interviews: critical practice and tourism”. Current Issues in Tourism 
17(9), p.832.   
40 Moore, N. and P. Stokes (2012). “Elite interviewing and the role of sector context: an organisational case from 
the football industry”. QMRIJ 15(4), p.439. 
41 Morse, Y.L. (2019). “Elite interviews in the developing world: finding anchors in weak institutional 
environments”. Qualitative Research 19(3), p.278. 
42 Boucher, A. (2017). Op.Cit., p.100. 
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thesis and the questions it seeks to answer justified considering elite interviewing worthwhile 
exercise. 
Elite interviewing presents enormous advantages for this thesis. It provided it with valuable and 
unique data and prospective that could not be obtained through other data collection methods. 
In addition to wielding power in different settings, the participants to the interviews were 
knowledgeable and they showed excellent communication skills, which enhanced the quality and 
quantity of data collected.   
Elite interviewing helped understanding the context and setting the tone of the subject matter 
of this thesis, cooperation in criminal matters, in the EAC. While it gave an opportunity to the 
interviewees to be heard, it also enabled understanding their perceptions and beliefs in relation 
to transnational crimes in the EAC and the prospect of expanding cooperation to criminal 
matters. 
Elite interviewing is not a precise skill. It presents considerable methodological, interpretational, 
operational, and ethical challenges that this thesis wishes to recognize. Generally, accessing 
prospective participants to the interviews is a challenging process.43  Elites are, by definition, less 
accessible and more conscious of their own importance,44 which exacerbates problems of access 
compared to non – elite interviews. Consequently, elite interview samples tend to be a lot 
smaller.45  The initial interview plan for this thesis targeted thirty-five (35) prospective 
participants, a number which was already small. In the final plan, this number was cut down to 
only ten (10) potential participants, of which eight (8) were interviewed successfully. One of the 
reasons two prospective participants were not interviewed is time constraint, which constitutes 
an important challenge in elite interviewing given elites are often widely sought after.46  
 
43 Nir, E. (2018). “Approaching the bench; accessing elites on the judiciary for qualitative interviews”. International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, p.77. 
44 Richards, D. (1996), “Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls”. Politics 16(3), p.200. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Aderbach, J. and B.A. Rockman (2002). “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews”. PS 35(4), 673. 
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Unrepresentative sampling is not often an issue in elite interviewing.47  Contributions from elite 
may help develop inferences about larger populations.48  However, corroboration of facts and 
additional information are required to make elites’ accounts valuable.49  In order to remedy this 
limitation of elite interviewing, which  arguably cannot be relied upon as the sole methodology,50  
the data collected were reinforced with other forms of empirical data, specifically various reports 
including the study on transnational organised crime and terrorism in the EAC commissioned by 
the Community in 2015 and referred to in section 1 above. 
There are many issues of ethics and openness in elite interviewing, such as confidentiality and 
conflicts of interest51 both with extended professional ramifications. In order to alleviate some 
of these concerns, efforts were made to disclose my identity beforehand in the introduction and 
prior to conducting the interviews. Although the participants to the interviews for this thesis are 
high profile officials whose conducts are typically subject to public scrutiny, they did not express 
any concern over privacy or confidentiality, or any fear for repercussions on their work, or any 
distrust of the research process. Instead, they expressed interest in the study, support, and 
willingness to participate in the interviews. 
This thesis complied with the University of Sussex’ s ethical approval requirements in the planning 
of the interviews. As part of the process, a consent form was made that spelled out clearly the 
conditions under which the interviews were to be conducted and it guaranteed confidentiality 
about the participants’ identity. The interviews were not sensitive in any way and they did not 
present any risk to the participants either personally or professionally. Therefore, no formal 
permission to attribute quotes was sought from the participants. The interviews questions too 
were not contentious. They were reviewed and approved by my supervisors. An information 
sheet too was made, inviting the participants to take part in the interviews and stating, amongst 
others, the purpose of the research project and its benefits to the participants, the study’s topic, 
the anticipated interview duration, further confidentiality guarantees, the university’s approval 
 
47 Richards, D. (1996), Op.Cit., p.200. 
48 Moore, N. and P. Stokes (2012). Op.Cit., p.441. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Lilleker, D.G. (2003). “Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield”. Politics 23(3), p.208. 
51 Woliver, L.R. (2002). “Ethical Dilemmas in Personal Interviewing”. PS 35(4), p.677. 
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as well as the research funding. Both documents, as well a detailed account of the fieldwork and 
the interviews questions are included in the appendix to this thesis. 
7. Data analysis 
The following themes emerged from the interviews: 
1) The threat posed by transnational crime and the relevance of cooperation in criminal 
matters 
The respondents recalled the terror attacks in the Partner States and the existence of terrorist 
groups such as Al Shabaab and others affiliated to Al Qaeda in the EAC.  They pointed out that 
the EAC is vulnerable to transnational crime because of porous borders and increased cross-
border movements. The respondents suggested that criminals have taken advantage of the free 
movement of persons, workers and labour in the EAC Common Market, to cross the national 
borders. They argued that transnational crime is causing damages to the economies of the 
Partner States. They suggested that the EAC, as a region, needs to minimize the occurrence of 
transnational crime and its undesired effects. They further suggested that minimizing 
transnational crime is critical and imperative for the EAC, considering the Community’s political 
federation objective. 
The respondents found that crime is very key issue especially as the EAC moves towards political 
federation. They related the current stage in the integration in the EAC, e.g. the Customs Union, 
with the occurrence of tax crimes, or the Monetary Union with the occurrence of financial crimes. 
They argued that cooperation in criminal matters is as much important as other areas and is 
required to deter crimes in the EAC. They also argued that an integrated cooperation in all aspects 
is very important. They observed that there is a general agreement on the need to cooperate in 
crime matters as on trade. Further, they advanced that regional cooperation in criminal matters 
in the EAC needs due and urgent consideration as well as a framework.  
2) Challenges to cooperation 
The respondents emphasized the lack of a specific law or legal framework on cooperation in 
criminal matters as a challenge. They identified sovereignty as the biggest challenge to 
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cooperation, especially in criminal matters as an area governed by national sovereignty. They 
pointed out the fear and unwillingness of the Partner States to cede some of their power to a 
regional centre or a supranational authority. They recognized the differences in the legal systems 
in the EAC as a challenge to cooperation, particularly the differences in the criminal justice 
systems, for example plea bargaining in common law jurisdictions like Uganda while such 
procedure is not applied in civil law jurisdictions like Burundi. They also mentioned, as an 
example, evidence taped phone text which is allowed in Uganda while it could be unlawful in 
other Partner States. Death penalty too, which is applicable in Uganda or Kenya, unlike in 
Rwanda, is advanced as a challenge to cooperation and a possible motive for turning down 
requests for extradition.  
Other challenges identified include the lack of trust between national agencies (as crime involves 
a lot of other processes such as information and intelligence sharing), rampant corruption and 
the lack of infrastructure and channels for communication in crime matters.  
3) Model of cooperation 
The respondents supported the research’ suggestion for substituting the current bilateral 
cooperation conducted through diplomatic channels with a cooperation conducted directly 
between competent national authorities in the Partner States. They described the proposed 
model as more practical and appropriate to the EAC especially in respect of the Community’s goal 
for political federation and a unitary governance. The respondents advanced that bilateral 
agreements are vote of no confidence to the regional spirit and mean no confidence in the 
institutions of the EAC as a regional system. They also advanced that cooperation through 
diplomatic channels is too long, loose and does not have a proper reprimand mechanism. They 
pointed out that what is needed is a smooth cooperation and a model which adds value such as 
expediting the cooperation process. They suggested that the EAC could learn from other regions 
and how they dealt with the issue.  
The respondents recommended introducing an obligation to cooperate even in the absence of 
an agreement or legal instrument and regardless of the differences in the legal systems, to avoid 
the EAC becoming a hub for fugitives and criminals. Reasons advanced include that crime has no 
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boundary and a criminal in a Partner State must be considered a criminal in the EAC. A caveat 
was advanced for political offences or possible political prosecution disguised under criminal 
offence. The respondents recommended that the requested State is allowed a margin of 
appreciation on the reasonability and appropriateness of a request and must, in return, provide 
explanation, in a spirit of cooperation, about the reason it turns down a request. A requirement 
for human rights guarantees too was recommended. 
4) Human rights issues 
The respondents emphasized that human rights are a treaty matter and a fundamental principle 
of the EAC. They drew attention on the need to translate human rights into a regional framework. 
The respondents expressed the need for a human rights instrument in the EAC, especially as far 
as criminal matters are concerned. They emphasized the need to create human rights standards 
in the EAC and stressed that variations in national standards would not allow a fair trial of 
fugitives at the regional level. The respondents advanced that the EAC, as an international 
organization, must conform to and apply standards that are internationally recognized too, 
although the latter may have a regional character. It was suggested that compliance with human 
rights is so important and human rights so fundamental that they cannot be left to the Partner 
States irrespective of whether the Partner States are signatories of various international 
instruments or not. 
The respondents dismissed the possibility of a refusal to cooperate on human rights ground, 
which they argued create practical problems. They suggested that there could be exceptions 
acceptable within the principle of adherence to human rights, for example in case of death 
penalty that a person may face if extradited, but outright refusal to cooperate should not be 
tolerated or it would be abetting crime when somebody has already violated human rights. They 
emphasized the protection of procedural rights in proceedings related to cooperation in criminal 
matters, particularly fair trial, due process, the presumption of innocence, and the right to not 
be tortured.  
Other relevant themes that emerged from the interviews include: 
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- Guidelines on cooperation issues for national criminal justice agencies and conferences 
to bring together stakeholders to discuss best practices.  
- Harmonisation of laws and minimization of differences in the national criminal justice 
systems.  
- Dialogues between national criminal justice authorities, specifically police, prosecution, 
judiciaries.  Intelligences and offices of Attorney Generals too were mentioned.  
- A regional centre or a mechanism to coordinate the dialogues, facilitate transmission of 
information and settle possible disputes.  
- Mutual trust, as a fundamental principle of the EAC, to apply to cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
8. Structure 
Chapter one discusses the contrast between the early 1960s and 1970s rational and spatial 
conceptualisation of regionalism that emphasized the physical and geographical region with 
recent conceptualisations that consider more subjective meanings such as culture, language, 
identity, or religion. The chapter argues that the early conceptualization of regionalism was based 
on a Westphalian understanding of the global order and failed to account for non-state actors 
and, as such, fell short of a full explanation of regionalism.52 The chapter favours the social 
constructivist approach to regionalism for its understanding of the region as socially constructed, 
politically contested and open to change.53 This is particularly important for understanding the 
making of the EAC and its recreation in 1999 after the first EAC established in 1967 collapsed. It 
is also important for understanding the expansion of the EAC to more countries than the three 
original Partner States who started it. Moreover, the social constructivist approach helps 
understanding the EAC not as a static organization but as an institution open to change and to 
new ideas such as cooperation in criminal matters. The chapter emphasizes the social 
 
52 Fawcett, L. (2008). ‟Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present”. In: Kosler, A. and M. Zimmek (2008). 
Elements of regional integration. A Multidimensional Approach . Baden. Nomos, p.3. 
53 Hurrell, A. (1995). Op.Cit. p.334. Also, Fawn, R. (2009). ‟ ‘Regions’ and Their Study: Where, what for and where 
to?”. Review of International Studies 35, p.31. 
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constructivist’s turn to agency and actors (rather than structure and institutions) as well as  to 
ideas, to explain institutional change. 
The chapter contests the attribution of the origins of regionalism to Europe, unlike most 
Eurocentric explanations of regionalism.54 It refers to manifestations of regionalism in Latin 
America since early nineteenth century.55 The chapter discusses the resurgence of regionalism in 
the 1980s, spurred by the end of the Cold War, globalization and trade liberalization policies.56  
Chapter two traces the historical development of international cooperation in criminal matters 
from the old practices of extradition in the United Kingdom and in France, particularly, and the 
practice of letters of request. It examines the fundamental principles of international cooperation 
in criminal matters, their meaning and their relevance for cooperation today. The chapter also 
discusses the global framework for international cooperation in criminal matters under the 
auspices of the UN. 
Chapter three describes the EAC in terms of geographic proximity of the Partner States and their 
common colonial past that fostered an East African identity with shared languages, religions, 
infrastructures such as railway, harbour, post and telecommunications, airways, and comparable 
governments and legal systems. The chapter argues that regionalism in the EAC is the result of 
both the policies of the Partner States and the actions of the colonial power, Britain, that built 
the common services in transport and telecommunications in its East Africa former colonies.57 
The chapter describes the first iteration of the EAC in 1967 as motivated by the Pan-Africanism 
ideology spearheaded by African leaders, including the former President of Tanzania, late Julius 
K. Nyerere.58 It attributes the collapse of the first EAC to various reasons such as striking opposed 
political ideologies in the region and the reflection of the Cold War and the tensions between 
capitalism and socialism in East Africa, personal rivalries and acrimonious relationships between 
 
54 Acharya, A. (2012). Op.Cit., p.6. 
55 Gardini, G. L. (2012). Latin America in the 21st century. Zeb Books. London, p.53. 
56 Schmitter, P.C. (2007). Regional cooperation and regional integration . Essay. The European University Institute, 
p.6. 
57 Sebalu, P. (1972). ‟The East African Community”. Journal of African Law 16(3), p.345. 
58 Nabudere D. W. (1978). ‟Tanzania and Regional Integration in East Africa. Old and New Patterns”. African Review 
8(1-2), p.124. 
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the leaders, after Idi Amin’s coup in Uganda, and more dysfunctional reasons such as the unequal 
share of the economic benefits and costs of the organization and consequent rise of 
nationalism.59 The chapter views the re-establishment of the EAC in 1999 as connected to the 
global resurgence of the new regionalism and the relaunch of many other regional organisations 
including the EU. It argues that the new regionalism is wider in scope and includes bottom-up 
processes, unlike the first EAC which was essentially a top-down organization that concentrated 
the power in the hands of the head of States.60  
The chapter argues that the current EAC reproduces the EU’s linear model of integration which 
sequence includes a preferential trade area, a free trade area, a customs union, a common 
market (and a monetary union), and a political federation,61 the latter stage exceeding the EU’s 
model and making the EAC a sui generis regional integration organization. The chapter discusses 
shadow regionalism, particularly informal cross-border trade, as the result of intensified 
integration in the EAC and the proliferation of cash-based economies like many parts in Africa, 
with negative impacts such as the spread of organized crime networks involved in illicit 
transactions.62 
Chapter four examines the extent of transnational crime in the EAC. It argues that the EAC is not 
just vulnerable to transnational crime but has also become a hub for transnational criminal 
networks lured by its strategic location that makes it the perfect transit for illicit goods between 
Asia and Europe63 but also a destination and a source for illicit trafficking to different parts of the 
world. The chapter examines other factors that contribute to the vulnerability of the EAC to 
transnational crime, including weak rule of law, corruption, inadequate legal responses, lack of 
awareness, law enforcement poor knowledge and capacity to deal with crimes, conflicts and 
political turmoil in the Community and neighbouring third countries, the presence of non-state 
 
59 Green, R. H. (1978). ‟The East African Community: A Valediction forbidding Mourning”. The African Review 8(1), 
p.19-29. Also, Mngomezulu, B.R. (2013). ‟Why did regional integration fail in East Africa in the 1970s? A historical 
explanation”. History and African Study seminar, p.5-8. 
60 Nabudere D. W. (1978). Op.Cit., p.149. 
61 Article 2 and Article 5(2) EAC Treaty. 
62 Vayrynen, R. (2003). ‟ “Regionalism: Old and New””. International Studies Review. 5, p.42. 
63 Shaw, M. (2005). ‟Organised Crime in Africa”. In: Reichel, P. (Ed.) Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. 
Sage Publications. London, p.385. 
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armed groups and the proliferation of small arms and weapons in the region. The chapter 
examines the nature of transnational criminal networks in the EAC. It argues that they are fluid 
and flexible, involving ethnic groups such as Chinese, Iranians and Pakistani, local communities, 
family networks, loose organisations, local gangs, prominent business people, influential political 
figures, law enforcements, and members of the judiciaries.64 The chapter argues that the modus 
operandi of transnational criminal networks in the EAC includes sea, air and land transportation. 
The chapter examines human trafficking and migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism, 
money laundering, terrorism and environmental crimes. It argues that transnational crime has 
been on the rise in the EAC, based on large scale seizures of illicit goods and multiple arrests of 
transnational criminal networks in the Community. The chapter also argues that although 
transnational crime is widespread in the EAC, Kenya and Tanzania are more affected because of 
their coastal borders along the Indian ocean compared to fellow landlocked Partner States, but 
also Kenya being the financial centre in the region. 
Chapter five argues that the policies of the EAC, specifically the freedom of movement provided 
in the Common Market Protocol, facilitate the expansion of transnational crime in the region and 
engage the Community’s duty to protect the citizens against the abuse of the freedoms and rights 
it provides. It argues that the current framework of the EAC in criminal matters is insufficient, 
promotes bilateral arrangements and is prone to complications where such arrangements do not 
exist. The chapter examines two multilateral models of cooperation that were successively 
developed in the EU: MLA and MR. It argues that MLA is unsuitable to the context of the EAC 
because of the intergovernmental character of the model and its lack of obligation.65 Further, the 
chapter argues that the operationalization of MLA through diplomatic channels exposes it to 
political interference and makes it slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome.66 The chapter argues that 
MR presents more advantages including the simplification and expedition of cooperation by 
 
64 UNODC (2009). Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa , p.13, 40. Also, East African Community (2015). 
Op.Cit., p.5. 
65 Schünemann, B. (2014). ‟Solution Models and Principles Governing the Transnational Evidence Gathering in the 
EU”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. Springer. London, p.166. 
66 Vandebroek, E and F Verbruggen (2013). ‟The EU and the death penalty abolition: The limited prospects of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters as an external policy tool”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4(4), 
p.488. 
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removing political and administrative hindrances, setting strict deadlines and reducing practical 
problems to cooperation among states. The chapter examines legal mechanisms established in 
the EU in respect of extradition and assistance in evidence. It argues that their broad ratione 
materiae scope expose them to misuse for petty offences. Further, the chapter argues that the 
cost of the mechanisms and their effect on individual rights require limiting their application to 
transnational crimes and other serious offences. The chapter also analyses the institutional 
development of cooperation in criminal matters in the EU under both MLA and MR. It 
recommends the establishment, in the EAC, of a regional police agency and a regional criminal 
justice agency modelled on Europol and Eurojust respectively, for supporting the investigations 
of transnational crime and coordinating cooperation actions between competent national 
authorities directly. The chapter proposes the adoption of the principle of MR and the 
establishment of a transnational criminal justice system above the states’ level, with minimum 
rules and principles similar to the EU criminal justice system. It also proposes the harmonization 
of procedural and substantive laws to remedy the lack of a unified body of transnational law67 
and to eliminate legal differences between the national criminal justice systems. The chapter 
argues that the adoption of a human rights instrument and concrete standards is a prerequisite 
for developing cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 See Mann, M. Warren, I and S. Kennedy (2018) ‟The legal geographies of transnational cyber-prosecutions: 
extradition, human rights and forum shifting”. Global Crime 19(2), p.108. 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical framework informing this research takes into consideration two needs. Firstly, 
understanding the context in which states cooperate, and subsequently the reasons that justify 
why states do so. Secondly, analysing the institution that constitutes a case study for this 
research, namely the EAC. Therefore, this chapter considers regionalism and constructivist 
institutionalism in an attempt to grasp the phenomenon of regional cooperation, both formal 
and organisational processes at the states level as well as informal processes across the borders 
of the states, such as organised crime networks. The understanding of the two theories will then 
sustain the arguments in subsequent chapters. 
Whereas the two theories mentioned above are mostly associated with international relations 
and political studies, we have chosen them for two reasons. Firstly, most recent studies of 
regional organisations such as the EU or studies of aspects of regional integration largely apply 
the same theories. Although many authors assert that the theoretical debate is dominated by 
rational and constructivist theories, there is enough evidence that constructivism is increasingly 
taking over rational theories. Thus, this theoretical chapter favours the constructivist insight to 
both regionalism and institutionalism. Secondly, international legal scholars have increasingly 
been using international relations theories in their analysis of international law and institutions. 
The reason of such borrowing is indeed the proliferation of formal institutions for international 
cooperation in the global governance. 
The structure of the chapter gives more space to conceptualising regionalism. The last section 
explains different theoretical approaches to the study of regionalism since its early 
conceptualisation and theorisation to date. The chapter is closed by a brief conclusion. 
1.1. Understanding regionalism 
It is challenging to give a precise definition of regionalism. Although the term ‘regionalism’ seems 
to have a straight-forward and obvious meaning, early academics and contemporary literature 
on regionalism do not provide a precise definition. This is mainly due to the nature of regionalism 
and the flexibility associated with it. Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens, in an early attempt to define 
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regionalism, described it as a regional arrangement that must have an object, the region, a nd 
subject, the parties which must be sovereign states.68 Describing regionalism with reference to a 
geographic region is a characteristic of almost all pioneering studies of regionalism in the 1960s 
and 1970s. While the reference to a geographic region sheds a light on understanding 
regionalism, it actually led to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon, sometimes equating it to 
a region, sometimes used interchangeably with other related terms like regionalisation. This 
resulted in a multitude of definitions, little consensus and a disagreement among scholars on the 
scope of the term. They often defined regionalism as attempts at formal cooperation between 
geographically proximate and interdependent states.69 In the various definitions of the term 
‘regionalism’, the geographic emphasis to some extent characterises most contemporary 
literature of regionalism although most of it has extended its conceptualisation to include new 
elements. Rafal Riedel, for example, defines regionalism as a tendency in internationa l relations 
characterised by the intensification of cooperation through the increased use of institutional and 
non – institutional, formal and informal interrelations among countries belonging to some 
geographical area.70 Regionalism is also presented as a body of ideas promoting an identified 
geographical or social space as the regional project.71 A similar spatial conception of regionalism 
is put forward by Anju Lis Kurian who attributes three dimensions to regionalism: a defined 
geographic area with a significant historical experience in common; a definable geographic area 
with a developed social, cultural, political and economic linkages; and particular groupings of 
geographically proximate countries with an organised management of crucial aspects of their 
collective affairs.72  
 
68 Van Kleffens, E.N. (1949). “Regionalism and politics Pacts”. The American Journal of International law 43(4), 
p.667-668. 
69 Fawcett, L. (2008). "Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present”. In: Kosler, A. and M. Zimmek (2008). 
Elements of regional integration. A Multidimensional Approach. Baden. Nomos, p.3. 
70 Riedel, R. (2004). Regionalism in the context of a political system. 1st Danube Rectors Conference. Summer 
School on Regional cooperation, p.50. 
71 Spindler, M. (2002). New Regionalism and the Construction of Global Order. Centre for the Study of Globalisation 
and Regionalisation. Working Paper No.93/02, p.7. 
72 Kurian, A.L. and C. Vinodan (2013). “Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in International Relations: A 
conceptual Analysis”. Online International Interdisciplinary Research Journal III(VI), p.403-404. 
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The above understandings of regionalism are contested for two reasons. Firstly, they are 
nationalistic, inward looking and casting regionalism to the borders of nation states and thus 
reflecting a purely Westphalian conception of the international or world order.73 Their view of 
regionalism is a state – led project aimed at reorganising a particular regional space along defined 
economic and political lines or particular geo – economic spaces. Most of the literature on 
regionalism acknowledges the need to expand the understanding of regionalism to include non 
– state actors like NGOs and to reflect the character of the changing international order in which 
states are no longer the sole and exclusive players.74 That said, the state is still important and the 
most powerful actor playing the predominant role in most regional arrangements. A successful 
regionalism project today presupposes eventual linkages between state and non - state actors75, 
given the increasing role of the latter in the international order. Non – state actors include not 
only NGOs, but also multinational corporations, the civil society, social movements, media, etc.  
Secondly, the geographical understanding of regionalism is too narrow a view in an increasing 
interdependent and globalised world. It ignores other dynamics of regionalism.76 Most 
geographically based definitions of regionalism are problematic in the sense that they imply a 
certain proximity of states in a regional organisation, yet a region is not determined by geography 
alone and geography is not an objective criterion.77 Although geographical proximity is the cross 
– cutting descriptive term used by many of the studies, it does not fit well with a conception of 
regionalism that ties together states geographically distant from one another. For example, the 
Arab Cooperation Council formed in 1989 (but later on collapsed after the Gulf War) and which 
significantly, consciously and explicitly avoided any geographical limitation of membership. 78 Two 
other examples include Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Trans – Pacific Partnership 
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which final agreement was reached on 5 October 2015 and signed on 4 February 2016, awaiting 
entry into force. Geographical proximity remains controversial defining criterion that does not 
tell whether it means a same geographically specified area or implies contiguity, or even some 
kind of propinquity among the states involved in a regional organisation.  
Louise Fawcett argues that the geographical criteria may be irrelevant since an international 
organisation may bring together states that are not necessarily geographically proximate and still 
deal with issues of a regional level.79 The Asia – Pacific, for example, is sometimes considered as 
a single region, or an amalgamation of two regions, or a combination of more than two regions.80 
Most researchers agree that geographic proximity is not the sole determinant of common 
interests; besides proximity, other concepts need to be considered because a region implies 
more than just close physical proximity among the constituent states.81 Interestingly, Christoph 
Schreuer predicted the decline of the geographic factor as a guiding element for group 
identification.82 It holds a great meaning though since, without some geographical limits, the 
term regionalism becomes diffuse and unmanageable.83  
1.2. Conceptualising regionalism 
This thesis considers a broader conceptualisation of regionalism that includes non – geographical 
accounts. It understands regionalism as a series of interlinked but distinct phenomena that take 
place within a certain geographical area defined as region. Region is not the focus, rather a 
dimension that the thesis needs explaining before articulating the processes that constitute 
regionalism. 
1.2.1. Region 
It is difficult to define a region because it can evolve from objective, but dormant, to subjective 
existence.84 A basic understanding of the term region presents it as a geographical reality. A 
region could be identified with one state or it could be a cluster of states sharing a common 
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space.85  Exactly what constitutes a region remains controversial and a subject of disagreement 
among researchers.86 A region can be defined in many ways depending whether geography, 
economy, history or culture is the defining criterion. The geographical concept of a region is 
usually based on its physical characteristics. From an economic point of view, a region is a zone 
within which there is more intensive cooperation between the countries than their relations with 
the rest of the world.87 The cultural definition of a region may emphasise the similarity of 
historical development in such factors as ethnicity, religion, lifestyle, language, and other 
characteristics of societies.88 A refined conception of regions should incorporate commonality, 
interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation.89 Regions could be seen as units of states or 
territories, whose members display common patterns of behaviour, e.g. the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation.90 They could also be imagined as community of states or peoples held 
together by common experience and identity, custom and practice.91 
Significant common historical experiences, social, cultural, political and economic li nkages, 
common shared organisations to manage crucial aspects of collective affairs are all factors that 
can define a region. Most researchers agree that a region implies more than just a physical 
proximity: social and cultural homogeneity, shared political attitudes, shared perceptions of 
various phenomena, political institutions and economic interdependence across multiple 
dimensions –including economic transactions, communications, and political values.92 
Region is a contested and ambiguous concept. Like states, regions vary in their compositions, 
capabilities and aspirations. They can be formal or informal, institutionalised or not, created and 
recreated, their existence depending on political leaders’ will. Political actors’ perception and 
interpretation of a region is critical: all regions are socially constructed, hence politically 
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contested and open to change.93 Geography is just as much as social construct. Various studies 
define regions largely in terms of non-geographic criteria and place relatively little emphasis on 
physical location.94 For example, the British Commonwealth and the Francophonie, though global 
and physically diffuse, have been considered as regions.95 Social constructivists have argued that 
countries sharing a communal identity comprise a region, regardless of their location.96 This 
research espouses a non-geographic ideational and social constructivist understanding of a 
region, emphasising shared identities among states within a region, cultural, linguistic, economic 
and political ties. This subjective conception of a region is helpful for understating the processes 
of regionalism.  
1.2.2. Regionalisation 
Regionalisation means a concentration of activity –of trade, peoples, ideas, even conflict –at a 
regional level.97 It refers to the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often 
undirected processes of social and economic interaction.98 It is conceived as a multidimensional 
and multilevel process that implies trans-relations of social, political, cultural, security, 
environmental and economic nature between human groups across countries.99 Regionalisation 
involves structural and organisational mechanisms that promote different levels of engagement 
within a particular region.100 It fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence, 
institutional ties and political ties, political trust and cultural belonging in the region.101 The 
process of regionalisation increases homogeneity among groups, in various dimensions such as 
culture, identity, economic policies, development and political regime.102  
Early literature on regionalism describes regionalisation as informal regionalism, which is now 
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also referred to as soft regionalism, in comparison with formal institutionalised regionalism 
referred to as hard regionalism. Regionalization is often conceptualized in terms of “complexes”, 
“flows”, or “mosaics” as it involves increasing flows of people, the development of multiple 
channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes and ways of thinking 
spread from one area to another.103 Regionalisation is not based on the policy of states or groups 
of states although it is often reinforced or influenced by states policies. It is a bottom – up process 
driven by private actors, economic or social forces that develop growth across national borders 
or build high levels of transnational human interpenetration.104 Although regionalisation 
proceeds autonomous and spontaneous, it is not totally detached from politics.105 Regionalisation 
can only be understood in the context of globalisation as a regional expression of global processes 
of economic integration. The most driving forces for economic regionalisation come from 
markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies and decisions of 
companies.106 When regionalisation advances far enough and attains some intrinsic regional 
features, it produces regionness. 
1.2.3. Regionness  
The concept regionness was developed mainly by Björn Hettnne to link the social – political and 
institutional aspects of regional building.107 Björn portrayed regionness in terms of organised 
social, political and economic trans – border relations supported by a manifested sense of 
belonging, common goals and values, and institutions and regulations that enhance the region’s 
ability to interact autonomously in the international arena.108 A region here is essentially seen as 
a social construct and politically contested space less defined by geographic and physical location, 
rather by shared identity. The boundaries of the region are not fixed; the latter can enlarge, 
contract, be fluid and changing in its composition. The region is an imagined and subjective 
community with a distinct identity and a capacity to act. Björn speaks of regionness in analogy 
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with concepts such as stateness and nationness.109   
Regionness involves the capacity of a region to articulate its identity and interests.110 A higher 
degree of regionness implies a higher degree of economic interdependence, communication, 
social, cultural homogeneity, coherence and capacity to act, in particular to resolve conflicts.111 
The description of a region by its level of regionness as expressed by Björn implies an increase of 
regionness from a mere regional space to deeper institutionalised polity with a decision-making 
structure and stronger acting capability as a global actor.112 Regionness can thus be seen a 
process that transforms a region from a passive object to an active subject.113  The term defines 
the position of a particular region in terms of regional cohesion. It has been applied to explain 
social cohesion manifested in a common background and sense of community in Europe, where 
a more developed sense of regionness has been recognised and that transformed the region from 
a mere geographical area and passive object to an active subject capable of articulating its 
transnational interests.114 Identity and actor capability are at the core of regionness.  Regionness 
equates to internal cohesion and identity formation.115 It is difficult to determine identity or to 
elucidate what it consists of. Most explanations of regional identity are informed by social 
constructivist understanding; they view regional identity in terms of regional awareness and 
consciousness, shared values, a common understanding of the region and the common space, of 
its goals, and a sense of belonging and distinction between socials groups. These explanations 
tend to amalgamate the meanings of regional identity in a rather abstract and vague 
understanding, sometimes referring to culture, religion, language, rhetoric discourse, collective 
practices and consensus. A real and systematic conceptualisation of the term is developed by 
Anssi Paasi. The starting point of his conceptualisation is that regions have not only a territorial 
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shape (vague or more explicit boundaries) but also a symbolic shape that manifests in social 
practice that produces and reproduces the region and which is used to construct the narratives 
of identity and to symbolise a region: the name of region, which meaning often results from 
political and cultural struggles, numerous other symbols such as coats of arms, songs, certain 
cultural, natural and institutional features, myths, etc.116 For Björn, regional identity is dependent 
on history and shaped by conflicts.117 It is partly constituted by the social, cultural practices and 
discourses, and symbolic boundaries that distinguish one region from another and partly by the 
personal meaning people attach to regions.118 The regional identity of the inhabitants points out 
to the identification of the people with those practises, discourses and symbolisms that are 
institutionalised as part of the region.119 It is a combined process of individuals’ personal 
experiences with the collective narratives as a discursive form of distinction and categorisation 
between the people of the region and others. Regions and their identities are social and 
discursive constructs.120 A region exists where actors define and promulgate a specific identity. 
Identity is not given; it is built and it changes.  
Regionness per se is not enough to make a region. Institutional capacity is required for the making 
of a sustainable region.  
1.2.4. Regional cooperation 
Regional cooperation is often described as inter - state cooperation across a wide range of issues 
including the social, economic, cultural, security, environmental, political, or military fields. 121 It 
is a form of dialogue that establishes contacts and meetings at the states level. Regional 
cooperation is essentially driven by states and it requires a willingness by states to make a 
minimum concession to gain the trust of others states within the region.122 It can be formal and 
involve the creation of formal institutions, or informal and based on much looser structure 
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involving patterns of regular meetings with some rules attached, together with mechanism for 
preparation and follow up.123 A high level of institutionalisation is not a guarantee of either 
effectiveness or political importance.124 Similarly, how much institutionalisation is necessary for 
effective and sustainable cooperation remains a contested issue, the APEC being a good 
example,125 an organisation that started as an informal dialogue in 1989 and since became the 
premier in the Asia Pacific region. The advantage for regional cooperation through a formal 
institution is that it establishes a legal framework for cooperation that may regulate future needs 
for cooperation.126 A regional institution contributes to setting more order in the relationships 
between the states in the region. It is often designed to enhance and consolidate the position of 
the states in the international system. Cooperation is seen as a means of increasing the influence 
and bargaining power of the region, but also its security and welfare.  
One should understand regional cooperation in light of changes in the structure of the 
international system since the end of the Cold War, and the effect of the growing economic 
interdependence usually termed as globalisation. To start with the latter, regional cooperation 
helps to face challenges posed by globalisation and lay the foundation of sustainable 
development.127 It has been seen as a key policy response to global (and regional) challenges such 
as climate change and environmental degradation, migration, economic and financial crisis, and 
transnational crime.128 A well – developed cooperation as a new polity leads to regional 
integration, the process by which states within a particular region increase their level of 
interaction with regard to economic, security and political issues.129 Integration is often rooted in 
a distinctive organisation, with difference to cooperation which essentially remains contingent 
on the political will of states. Therefore, regional integration is a union of states and the creation 
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of supranational authority.130 It is a process whereby nation states forgo the desire and ability to 
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make 
joint decisions or to delegate the decision – making process to new central organs.131  This idea 
of a central institution with supranational features is put forward by many scholars. It describes 
regional integration as a process in which nations aim at creating a new centre with jurisdiction 
over the national states.132 This implies that national states cede or pool their sovereignty to what 
Philippe C. Schmitter terms as a ‘higher order’ and polity capable of taking initiatives, making 
decisions and implementing rules without unanimous consent of all its member states.133 It is 
only when a regional organisation becomes a regional polity, e.g. when it acquires some 
legitimate capacity, however limited, to act on its own initiating proposals, making decisions, and 
implementing policies that cooperation switches to integration.134 These two terms are thus 
distinct though interconnected. Integration is a process and cooperation the initial stage of the 
process. In that sense, cooperation is the precursor of integration.135 Cooperation is an attempt 
to adjust policies in a way that does not involve any immediate structural impact.136 The theory 
of regional integration suggests that cooperation begins in relatively narrow areas before it 
eventually “spills over” into more areas and turns into integration.137  Adhesion and exit from an 
integrative organisation can be costly with a possible restriction to exit, whereas adhesion and 
exit from a cooperative organisation may be costless. Therefore, the costs and benefits of the 
two processes make states naturally prefer loose cooperation in specific areas before they 
eventually realise the benefit of expanded and deeper cooperation leading to integration. This 
transformation occurs when states realise that cooperation arrangements are what Philippe C. 
Schmitter calls “cheap talks” and what other scholars refer to as “talk shops” or “talking shops”, 
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in their analysis of institutional change.138 In this regard, most scholars argue that transformative 
change is often the result of unexpected events, internal or external, the latter having been 
examined by the theory of externalities and been termed as “inside – out effects” of international 
political, economic, environmental and cultural influences or “outside – in factors” that 
contribute to the expansion of a regional organisation.139 Philippe C. Schmitter argues that the 
extension of cooperation and increase in the scope and authority of an organisation towards a 
more binding structure would essentially be favoured by the smaller or weaker states.140 Indeed 
cooperation has been seen as a way of increasing security, welfare, influence, bargaining power 
in trade negotiation and hence enhancing the position of poor states along the integration 
process and saving them from marginalisation.141 If benefits of a political cooperation are abstract 
and less obvious, those of an economic cooperation are material and apparent in terms of access 
to bigger, regional and global markets, economic growth and development, welfare and 
improved living standards, and poverty reduction. Economic cooperation was perceived as the 
key to achieving peace and consequently reducing, eliminating and preventing future conflic ts 
among states in Europe, after the Second World War.142 In her comparative analysis of the 
motives for cooperation in various regional organisations around the world, Sheila Page notes 
that trade is the most prevalent motive, compared to political cohesion, common history and 
conflicts.143 Trade has been perceived as a means to increase interconnectedness among nations 
and to access global markets.144  
 There has been a proliferation of regional trade agreements, especially after the end of the Cold 
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War, to the extent that today there is perhaps no single state in the world that does not belong 
at least to one regional trade agreement and at least a third of the world’s trade is conducted 
within the framework of regional trade agreements.145 Regional trade agreements often aim at 
eliminating, removing or at least lowering national trade barriers, example customs tariffs and 
duties, and other non – tariff barriers such as regulatory restrictions to the free movement of 
goods, labour, services, capital and investments and manpower across national borders.146 They 
provide states with preferential access to members’ markets. Examples of such agreements 
include EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, or the EAC. A typology of trade arrangements is 
advanced by Thonke and Spliid147 and includes: 
- Preferential trade area where member states apply lower tariffs on imports for their 
products than those of third parties. 
- Free trade area where member states remove tariffs on imports on other member states’ 
products. 
- Customs union as a free trade area with a common external tariff on imports. 
- Common market as a customs union with free movement of factors of production, such 
as labour and capital. 
- Monetary union or single currency with harmonisation of monetary policies. 
- Political union where sovereignty is transferred to a supranational body, with common 
legislation and political structures. 
The typology above reproduces the European linear integration model of sequential phases of 
integrating goods, labour and capital markets, and finally monetary and fiscal integration. 148 In 
this model, a preferential trade area leads to a free trade area, the latter produces a customs 
union, followed by a common market and a monetary and a political union. The European 
integration was built around the idea of economic community, with security and democratic 
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consolidation as the key priorities.149 Economy and security have since emerged as the drivers of 
economic cooperation and the link between neighbouring states.  
1.3. The meaning of regionalism 
The processes explained above inform this thesis’ understanding of regionalism. Taking into 
account the criticisms against early scholars’ nationalistic understanding of regionalism, together 
with the dynamics that constitute it, this thesis views regionalism as a policy and a project that 
can operate both above and below the level of state.150 Three considerations can be made in light 
of the above conception. Firstly, regionalism involves both states and non – state actors such as 
multinational corporations and private and non – governmental organisations. They collaborate 
in the coordination of strategies within the region. Regionalism at this double level is not just 
dictated by states through their leaders but it also takes into account informal social, economic, 
environmental, security practices and processes that are out of the realm of states and that 
transcend national borders.  
Secondly, regionalism is a mode of governance and an approach to world order. Regional 
governance is thus an alternative and significant complementary layer of governance to the 
multiscale world order.151 It may take any form ranging from intergovernmental cooperation, to 
overlapping interstate arrangements, regional federation, confederation or supranational 
organisation.  
It is important, at this stage, to clarify the meaning of ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational’, as 
two recurrent terms throughout this thesis. The two terms refer both to separate decision – 
making logics and procedures and to certain behavioural norms.152 Intergovernmentalism refers 
to governments acting together to tackle collective problems.153 It traditionally indicates the 
decision – making mode typical of important negotiations among heads of states and 
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governments taking place in informal or institutionalised settings.154 In an intergovernmental 
structure, all critical decisions must be agreed by each government.155 It entails a substantial 
amount of unanimous voting.156 When a group of nations creates an organisation or enters any 
other form of international arrangement, they usually expect operational decision – making to 
be unanimous.157  
The concept of supranationalism has a broad and flexible connotation that could encompass 
international, transnational, or even global.158 Supranationalism literally means over and above 
states or nations, suggesting that decisions are made by a process or an institution that is largely 
(but not entirely) independent of national governments.159 It involves in most instances the use 
of majority voting.160 A distinction can be made between normative and decisional 
supranationalism. Normative supranationalism entails the supremacy of the organisation’s laws 
over those of the constituent states.161 Decisional supranationalism relates to the institutional 
framework and decision – making processes by which the organisation’s laws and policies are 
initiated, debated, formulated, promulgated and enforced.162   
Regionalism is a feature of the world order or the international system and an alternative to 
unilateralism and to globalism, universalism or internationalism.163 It sets in as a new way through 
which international cooperation is being organised to deal with regional and global challenges be 
they transnational crime, climate change, or trafficking in drugs and human beings, etc. 164 The 
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end of the Cold War and the removal of superpowers overlay transformed the international 
security environment and made regions more vulnerable.165  
Thirdly, regionalism is a type of world order that provides states with a means for balancing 
against large powers or bandwagoning with them.166 As such, it is an ideological project for the 
construction of a regionalist order in a specific region.167 It enhances the global power and 
influence of the region, as well as its capacity as an actor. Hettne explains this as an extended 
nationalism, a large political structure within which nation states perform specific functions. 168 
The grouping of states in regionalism aims at forming a new polity, a distinct political entity that 
influences developments within their own area and creates norms, rules, values, moral ideas, 
practices and procedures which are informed by the practices of other regional and global 
settings.169 Regional norms are either legal defining dimensions such as universal human rights, 
minority rights, rule of law, democracy, governance, accountability, transparency, or institutional 
and setting periodical consultations, common secretariat, etc. Their institutional embedment 
consolidates the region making it play a defining role in its relationship with the rest of the world 
and form the organising basis for policy within the region and across a range of issues. 170 
Normative regions examples include the EU which promotes universal norms and values 
mentioned above. Other distinctive norm subsidiarity regions include Latin America’s non – 
intervention, Asia’s non – alignment norm, the ASEAN’s consensus approach based upon strict 
observance of sovereignty (also termed ‘ASEAN way’), and Africa’s norm of inviolability of post – 
colonial boundaries and its humanitarian intervention under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act 
of the African union.171 
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1.4. The practice of regionalism worldwide  
In order to understand how regionalism has been operating in different parts of the world, a 
historical account of its origins and development over the years needs to be established.  
1.4.1. Origins of regionalism 
Most scholars assert that the origins of regionalism date back in the 19th century. Many of the 
explanations reflect a rather Eurocentric approach to the phenomenon of regionalism and fail to 
account for what Acharya A. calls ‘the global heritage’ of regionalism.172 The same explanations 
also fail to account for different dimensions, example political and social, than security or 
economic concerns dealt with in Europe in the 19th century. Regionalism in the latter century 
manifested in the form of alliances and leagues that formed the Concert of Europe, an intersta te 
Westphalian balance of power mechanism that preserved peace and regulated regional relations 
in Europe then. Such alliances include the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, 
Russia and France in 1818 and subsequent coalitions that opposed the great powers until the 
first World War: the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria – Hungary and Italy in 1882, the Entente 
Powers linking the Russian Empire, the French Third Republic and Great Britain developed from 
the Franco – Russian Alliance in 1894, the Anglo – French Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the Anglo 
– Russian agreement of 1907 which brought the Triple Entente into existence.173 Another 
manifestation of regionalism in Europe in the same period is the creation of various German 
exclusive economic and political blocks as early as 1818:  the Bavaria Wurttemberg Customs 
Union, the Middle German Commercial Union, the German Zollverein, the North German Tax 
Union, the German Monetary Union and the German Reich.174  Other customs union were 
established by Austrian states in 1850, Switzerland in 1848, Denmark in 1853 and Italy in 1860.175 
Intra – European trade developed dramatically and constituted a considerable portion of global 
trade, supported by the industrial revolution and consequent technology development.176 The 
outbreak of World War I in 1914, sparked by the tensions among the alliances, dismantled the 
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Concert of powers and disrupted the growth of regional trade arrangements in Europe.177  
Early manifestations of regionalism are also described with reference to Latin America where it 
emerged in the 19th century after the newly born South American republics gained independence 
in the early 1800s and through their shared sense of community, history and values.178 The ideas 
of unity, common roots, language, customs, religion, culture and identity as a result of three 
hundred years of colonisation by Spain were advanced by South American leaders and thinkers 
including Simón Bólivar, Juan Bautista Alberdias, Francisco de Miranda, and Francisco Morazan 
and culminated to a series of Congresses from 1826 to 1865, that viewed the signing of a number 
of treaties for achieving cooperation on the basis of federation and confederation.179 If the latter 
attempts to a federated South America did not succeed due to rising nationalism and internal 
rivalries among the states, they constituted the basis for future development. 
1.4.2. Regionalism over the year  
Regionalism’s worldwide progression is often explained in terms of waves or episodes. Whereas 
scholars recognise different waves of regionalism, their descriptions often diverge on the number 
of the waves. This, I noticed, is often because many studies do not provide criteria in their analysis 
of regionalism’s episodes and the correlation between the criteria and the course of regionalism. 
Surely, the progression of regionalism needs to be considered in conjunction with major global 
events that marked the world order. This chapter considers World War I and II, Cold War, the end 
of Cold War and subsequent environment as turning point for the waves of regionalism here 
understood as interstate cooperation. 
1.4.2.1. First regionalism wave 
While the leagues, alliances, federations and customs unions were formed in the 19th century as 
manifestations or expressions of regionalism, the first wave of regionalism in the real sense 
appeared after the First World War. Regionalism is considered to have arisen after the First World 
War and expanded after the Second.180 The establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, in 
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the wake of the First World War represents the first attempt at a universal legal basis for regional 
organisations, at least theoretically, considering the controversial character of the League and its 
poor results. The League’s Covenant expressly recognised the validity of “regional 
understandings … for securing the maintenance of peace.”181 This provision could be interpreted 
as an implicit recognition of the principle of regionalism by the League of Nations.182 Regional 
arrangements created between the World War I and II tended to be highly security partisan, for 
example the Locarno treaties in 1925, the Little Entente between 1920 and 1921, the Four Power 
Pact and the Balkan Union of 1934.183 Some of them aimed at consolidating the empires of major 
powers and were highly discriminatory and preferential, including the customs union France 
formed with members of its empire in 1928 and the Commonwealth system of preferences 
established by Great Britain in 1932.184 There is a widespread consensus that the experience of 
regional arrangements formed in the inter – war period was negative and constituted of closed 
trading blocks that led to the global depression.185 Despite the failure of the League to obtain 
universal acceptance as a global security institution, it has the merit for setting the debate about 
regionalism which will be later on taken up by the UN at the conclusion of the Second World 
War.186                            
1.4.2.2. Second regionalism wave 
The end of the Second World War represents the start of a second wave of regionalism that lasted 
until the sixties. The war demolished the world order and divided it into two spheres competing 
for influence.187 The failure of the League prompted the need to build another international 
organisation for peace and security.188 Thus, the newly created set of institutions, namely the UN 
and the Bretton Woods institutions intended to provide security and some degree of economic 
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stability to sovereign nation – states.189 Whereas, the League of Nations was inspired by idealism 
as an approach to world order with security, peace and economic development on a global scale, 
the dominant thinking at the creation of the UN was realism with its vision of international 
anarchy in which states are in a situation of permanent cold or hot war.190 This characterised the 
debate, at the adoption of the Charter of the UN, between proponents of universalism and those 
of regionalism, in relation to a possible role for regional organisations in the maintenance of 
peace and security, a function predominantly perceived then to be entrusted at the universal 
level with the UN.191 The UN Charter eventually recognised regional arrangements and defined 
their relationship with the UN, giving them a second role to the Security Council and clearly 
establishing a hierarchy in favour of the primacy of the latter to the former.192 Whereas under 
Chapter VIII, article 52 of the Charter establishes the legality of such arrangements if consistent 
with the purposes and principles of the UN, article 53 stipulates that regional enforcement action 
is subject to the prior approval of the Security Council except in cases involving enemy States of 
the Second World War; and article 54 obliges regional arrangements to keep the Security Council 
informed of any action they may contemplate for the maintenance of peace and security. Other 
important references to regional action in the Charter include article 33 exhorting member states 
to resort first to regional agencies in seeking the peaceful settlement of disputes before 
submitting them to the UN; and article 51 establishing the right for (individual and) collective self 
– defence against armed aggression, thus providing a legal basis for the use of force by member 
states, in case of an armed attack, without any requirement for authorisation of the Security 
Council.  
The post – Second World War world order was built on the pillars of multilateralism and 
sovereignty.193 In this period, the concept and practice of regionalism expanded dramatically; it 
entered the vocabulary of international relations and established firmly.194 One important feature 
of post - Second World War regionalism is the rise of formal institutions at the regional level. 
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Among the pioneers in this regard, the LAS is the first institutionalised regional cooperation 
initiative in this period, established in 1945 to advance the economic, political, cultural and 
religious national interests of its members; and the OAS, formally created in 1948, for the 
purposes of regional solidarity and cooperation among the member states. The creation of the 
ECSC in 1951 (intended to revive the coal and steel industries and to link the member states 
across Europe in order to make war not only unthinkable but also impossible) was the first 
attempt to create a supranational organisation, together with the formation of the European 
Economic Community in 1957, considerably prompted regionalism around the world and 
attracted a significant attention from scholars in the Western world.195  
Shortly after the first stage of European regionalism, the Latin America Free Trade Area was 
established in South America, in 1960, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay (reorganised into the ALADI, in 1980). The CACM was established in 1960 by the 
Organisation of Central American States, to facilitate regional economic development through 
free trade and the adoption of a uniform Central American Tariff.  CACM was reformed later on 
in 1991 into the Central American Integration System. The Andean Community of Nations, CAN, 
also referred to as Andean Pact, is another formal institution and regional organisation formed 
in Latin America, in 1969, after the European experience.  
In Asia and in Africa, an array of regional arrangements was set off at the background of 
decolonisation that then expanded the international arena. The ASEAN founded in 1967 
represented a different model of regionalism that was, unlike most regional arrangements born 
after the Second World War and reproducing the European model, built on different approaches 
that were later on called ‘ASEAN way’.196 The OAU, established in 1963 out of the decolonisation 
movement, was considered as a political reaction to colonial rule and apartheid.197 Of the early 
post – war regional arrangements, a distinction is often made between micro – sub regional 
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organisations focusing on economy, such as the EC, ANDEAN, ASEAN, CACM and macro – regional 
political bodies concerned with controlling conflicts.198 The latter category is also described by 
Fawcett as multi – purpose institutions.199 It includes NATO, the OAU, the OAS and the LAS. The 
emergence of these continental regionalist schemes and of many other regional arrangements is 
associated with the formation of ‘pan’ movements and ideologies aimed at strengthening unity 
among the nations and founded on shared conceptions of history and culture.200 Pan – 
Americanism, pan – Africanism, pan – Arabism and pan -  Asianism became institutional 
frameworks to promote cooperation among sovereign states.201 They were advanced by leaders 
such as Kwame Nkrumah in Africa, Nasser in the Arab world, Aung San in Southeast, Nehru in 
India, as well as well as writers, poets, artists, etc.202 
Whatever economic or social underlying rationale of regional schemes after the Second World 
War, regionalism was fundamentally shaped by security imperatives of the Cold War that had 
constrained regional organisations to the dependence of superpowers.203 Peace, security and 
development were delivered regionally by the institutions on both sides of the  East – West 
divide.204 Some states in the developing countries, concerned by the desire to detach themselves 
from the influence of superpowers sought to establish regional arrangements, mostly free trade 
areas, to reduce their dependence on advanced industrialised countries.205 Most of these regional 
arrangements were inherited from the colonial powers and tendered to reproduce the 
fundamental cleavage of the Cold War and subsequent uneven development with political 
tensions as a result.206 Examples include the East African Cooperation, established in 1967 as a 
customs union and built upon colonial infrastructures, which did not survive the ideological 
differences of the leaders of the Partner States and collapsed ten years later ;207 the ECOWAS was 
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established in 1975, the CARICOM, which existence dates back in 1958 with the establishment of 
the West Indies federation, the Caribbean Free trade Association in 1965 and the Eastern 
Caribbean Common market, was founded in 1973 as an economic and trade regional 
organisation. Most regional arrangements in developing countries at the time were protectionist 
of their national industries.208 They grew out of import – substitution policies actively promoted 
by policymakers with the support of the UN Economic Commissions.209 They were judged as trade 
diverting, as opposed to trade creating structures in the developed countries and especially the 
EC.210 Regionalism remained on the political agenda in the bipolar world order, throughout the 
Cold War.211 Beside economic stability, regional integration was shaped by security imperatives, 
reflecting a neo – realist power politics with its view on international anarchy and material 
calculation of power and security..212 A few regional groupings formed with a particular threat in 
mind: South Africa in the SADCC in 1980, Iran for the GCC in 1981 and Iraq for the short – lived 
ACC in 1989.213 In the SAARC formed in 1985, the dominant power, India, was associated with the 
Soviet Union whereas the rest of the countries leaned towards the United States.214 Scholars 
distinguish regional schemes during the Cold War in terms of their potentially benign cast or 
pernicious effects. Regional schemes that promoted international economic stability and peace 
are considered benign; those which malevolent mercantilist objectives degraded economic 
welfare and fostered inter – state conflicts were judged as malign.215 There is a consensus among 
scholars that regional schemes formed between the First and the Second World Wars, especially 
Nazi Germany and Japan’s attempts to establish discriminatory regionally based political orders 
and trade relations were malign forms of regionalism, as opposed to benign nineteenth century’s 
regional arrangements and those after the Second World War.216  
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1.4.2.3. Third wave of regionalism 
A turning – point in the history of regionalism occurred from the 1980s. A new wave of regional 
arrangements was formed against the backdrop of important changes in the world order. Firstly, 
a growing interdependence together with infrastructure development and information 
technology generated increased interconnection between states and rising flows of transactions, 
ideas, values, and knowledge across borders.217 Many regions experienced a resurgence of 
questions of identity and belonging, an increased regional awareness and consciousness that 
induced the need for cooperation.218 In Central Africa, the ECCAS was established in 1983 as a 
common market bringing together members of the Central African Customs and Economic Union 
(UDEAC in French)219 and those of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL 
in French).220 In South Western Asia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, identified as non – Arab states 
with Islam as the predominant religion and with historical ties and cooperation tradition, created 
the ECO in 1985 and expanded it later on in 1992 to include some of the former USSR republics 
among Islamic countries of Central and South Asia. The AMU too, in Northern Africa, was created 
in 1989, essentially as an economic cooperation among the member states.  
Not least, the passing of the Single European Act in 1986 led to a perception of a coming ‘Fortress 
Europe’ with high tariff walls against third states.221 The integration process in Europe was seen 
as a threat to the global trade system and it caused the rise of competitive regional building as a 
reaction elsewhere in the world.222 Explained from another angle, the success of the EC, and later 
on the EU, and its establishment as a powerful international actor not only contributed to the 
expansion of regionalism but also exported and diffused it worldwide as a model for regional 
cooperation. 
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Secondly, the end of the Cold War decentralised the international system and removed the 
influence of superpowers in many parts of the world. The new international scenario set regions 
free from the effects of global security dynamics and incited states within a region to deal with 
their own problems.223 The turn from a pervasive bipolar world order to a multipolar system, the 
interest for regionalism by states such as the United States, China, Japan and Iran that previously 
eschewed it, opened more opportunities to other states to deal with their own foreign policies.224 
In Central East Europe, The CEI formed in 1989 among 18 central Eastern and South Eastern 
European states; the Visegrad Group too was established in 1991 among the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The two organisations essentially aimed at facilitating the 
integration of their members in the EU, an economic growth and human development objective 
having since been added to the CEI’s portfolio. 
A number of regional arrangements were formed among central Asian states too since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The CIS, was established in 1991 by Russia and eleven other 
former Soviet republics as an Economic Union, with a free trade area among a few of them. The 
Central Asian Economic Union created in 1994 was transformed into the CACO in 2002. The 
Eurasian Economic Community established in 2000 was terminated in January 2015 and 
transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014. The CSTO created in 2002 is an 
intergovernmental military organisation among CIS members. 
Thirdly, global economic changes under the GATTs/WTO multilateral trading system, the opening 
and deregulation of market, together with the promotion of competition spurred regional trade 
agreements in the 1990s as an attempt to seize common problems among states with similar 
economy and facing many same economic problems.225 The United States, together with Canada 
and Mexico, established the NAFTA in 1994, expanding a free trade agreement previously 
concluded with Canada in 1989. A notable regional grouping, the APEC was established in 1989 
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by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the United States and the ASEAN states. 
The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), in South America, came to existence in 1991, 
establishing a common market and promoting free movement of goods, services and people 
among the states. Another notable regional organisation is the IORA launched in 1997 with the 
aim of promoting trade liberalisation and cooperation among the members. In Africa, the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA in French) was established in 1994 among seven 
West African French speaking states sharing the same currency, the CFA Franc. The COMESA was 
also established the same year as a free trade area among the members. The proliferation of 
regional arrangements in this last wave is also attributed to a revival of regional ideas following 
the Asian financial crisis and the failure of the universal system of the UN to guarantee peace and 
stability, especially its unsuccessful peace operations in Somalia and Rwanda, all of which 
revealed the need for strengthening economic and security structures and prompted states to 
fill in gaps resorting to regional arrangements worldwide.226 This last wave of regionalism departs 
from the previous waves in many ways. It is more ambitious encompassing not only economic 
and security but also political dimensions.227 It emphasises the interests of regions and is shaped 
by issues of identity and belonging.228 It is referred to as ‘new regionalism’ as opposed to old 
closed and protectionist regional arrangements.229  
The new regionalism is more open and is characterised by an expansion of regional arrangements 
in their number and their membership.230 Not only have new regional arrangements set in 
increased proportion but existing ones have also extended their membership to new participants. 
The new regionalism appears not as a state’s monopoly anymore but as inclusive of the civil 
society’s participation, however marginal role, in matters such as peace and security long 
perceived by states as touching their sovereignty and thus justifying exclusion or at least 
restriction  of non – state actors’ involvement.231 This involvement of the civil society was 
described by Hettne, in his conceptualisation of regionness, as the fourth level of a region or a 
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regional civil society which takes place when the organisational framework promotes social 
communication and convergence of values throughout the region.232  
The last wave of regionalism is also marked by the relaunch of a few old regional schemes that 
had eroded and a change in their names.233 The EC changed into the EU with the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993; the SPF, an economic cooperation organisation founded in 1971 was changed 
to the PIF in 2000 to better reflect the geographic location of its members in the north and south 
Pacific; the OAU became the AU in 2002; the customs union of southern African states, with its 
long history dating back in 1889 as the world oldest customs union, was renegotiated after the 
independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid in 1994 and formally established as the SACU 
in 2002; the SADCC was transformed into the SADC in 1992; the IADD was superseded by the IAD 
in 1996; and the East African Cooperation was renamed the EAC in 1999.  Another characteristic 
of the new regionalism is the wide range of activities and missions covering new issue areas 
including transnational challenges such as climate change, financial volatility, pandemics, natural 
disasters which were not in the realm of old schemes.234 For example, the SCO, founded in 2001, 
extended its primary security alliance objective to amongst others trade and economy, culture, 
energy and environmental protection. A social dimension and an emphasis on development is 
also noticed in a few regional arrangements such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 
America (ALBA in Spanish),235 a bloc of Caribbean and Latin American states formed in 2004 to 
address poverty, inequality, exclusion and climate change; and the Community of Sahel – Saharan 
States (CEN – SAD in Arab), an economic regional organisation of Sahel and Sahara states in 
Africa, established in 1998 and promoting social and cultural development among the members 
and other Arab and African states. 
1.6. Theorising regionalism 
In the words of Francis Baert et al, theories help us make sense of the world around us.236 
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1.6.1. Old regionalism’s theories 
A wide array of theories has been set up to explain regionalism since the early ages of the ECSC 
to date. A glance at the various theoretical stances suggests that regionalism needs to be 
understood in the context of the world order, a view that is essentially put forward by political 
economy structuralist or systemic theories. In that sense, major politico – economic events in the 
last decades, such as the Second World War and the collapse of communism and subsequent end 
of the Cold War have influenced the elaboration of theories explaining regionalism.  
The Second World War divided the world in two conflicting blocs. Realism became the 
predominant paradigm in international relations, with the view that the international system is 
an anarchy and that states live in a permanent situation of conflict.237  Having observed that some 
of the basic functions of the state, such as ensuring security and welfare, were transferred to 
supranational organisations, David Mitrany pioneered regional integration theories devising 
functionalism theory and explaining that such transfer progressively increased interdependence 
among states and made conflict between them a remote possibility.238  The central idea of 
Mitrany functional theory is a break from the realist paradigm that the world order is based solely 
on competition between states and that conflict is a dominant element of international 
relations.239 The creation of the ECSC and, later, the EEC are examples of the functional nature of 
regional cooperation organisations.240  
Mitrany’s functionalism ideas that integration must take place in the economic realm rather than 
political were challenged by Ernst Hass’s neofunctionalism arguing that high levels of economic 
interdependence lead to greater political integration, a mechanism that he termed “spillover 
effect”.241 Neofunctionalists believed that integration in one area expands to other areas in a 
contagious way, for example economic, social, and political integration.242 For neofunctionalists, 
 
237 See. Simma, B. and A.L. Paulus. (1998). “The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of Globalisation”. 
European Journal of International Law 9, p.269. 
238 López Vidal, L. (2008). Op.Cit., p.38.  
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 See, Mattli, W. and A.S. Sweet (2012). “Regional Integration and the Evolution of the European Polity: On the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies”. JCMS 50 (S1), p.5. 
242 See, Mansfield, E. D. and E. Solingen (2010). Op.Cit., p.157. 
49 
 
regional organisations are created to deal with economic issues of common interest, such as coal 
and steel, sometimes take on political functions, such as security and defence.243 
Neofunctionalism, was created specifically to explain the European integration and to apply the 
same assertion to all other regional processes outside Europe. The failure of the European 
Political Community and European Defence Community proposals in 1952, political crisis and the 
absence of tangible results in regionalist processes outside Europe prompted neofunctionalists 
to abandon their theory after Haas acknowledged that the theory was obsolete in Europe and 
obsolescent, though still useful, in the rest of the world.244  
Another theory emerged, intergovernmentalism, propelled by Stanley Hoffmann and challenging 
and rejecting the spillover effect of neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalist theory opposed the 
federal integration model. Its tenet is that nation - states remain the main actors of the 
international system. In that sense, intergovernmentalist theory is close to realism. For 
intergovernmentalist theories though, states create supranational organisations to coordinate 
issues of low politics, such as economic policies, but not to deal with those of high politics, such 
as security and diplomacy.245 Intergovernmentalist theories assert that states supervise the 
decisions made by the same supranational organisations they create and to which they transfer 
some degree of sovereignty.246 Hoffman’s theories were proven right as the EEC increasingly 
moved towards an intergovernmental cooperation.  
1.6.2. New approaches to regionalism 
With the growing interdependence and interconnection among states in the 1980s, Robert 
Keohane introduced neoliberal institutionalism as a model based on the realist theory of the 
centrality of states and assigning an important role to supranational organisations.247 Keohane’s 
neoliberal institutionalism can be understood within the general framework of institutionalism 
in International Relations theories. It is the most well – developed literature on international 
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institutions.248 Arthur Stein asserts that neoliberalism is a scholarly branding product for 
differentiation and a moniker to institutionalism.249 Although institutionalism shares many of 
realism’s assumption about the world order – that it is anarchic, and that states are self – 
interested, rational actors - , it reaches a radically different conclusion : that cooperation between 
nations is possible.250 
Institutionalists define institution as a set of rules, norms, practices and decisions – making 
procedures that shape expectations.251 For institutionalism, states are typically concerned with 
economic gain. Therefore, they create institutions to solve collective problems that result from 
interdependence among them. Accordingly, institutions make communication fluid and 
information more transparent, reducing the perception of mutual threats among states and thus 
reinforcing regional cohesion.252 In institutionalism’s understanding, institutions strengthen 
rather than weaken states, the latter using them to maximise the attainment of their 
objectives.253  Also, Institutions can overcome uncertainty that undermines cooperation, for 
example when neither of trading partners wants to lower tariffs unless it can be sure the other 
will too.254 Finally, institutions ensure compliance with agreements and can greatly increase 
efficiency by reducing transactions costs that bilateral and ad hoc negotiations could engender.255 
1.6.2.1. Brief historical account of institutionalism 
Institutionalism first appeared in the late 19th century and early 20th century as essentially a 
framework describing and mapping the formal institutions of the government.256 This old 
institutionalism emphasised charting the formal legal and administrative arrangements of 
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government and the public sector.257 It is seen as mainly descriptive and not explanatory or theory 
building.  
After the Second World War, the focus of institutionalism shifted from the formal institutions 
and arrangements of states to account for relationships within and beyond the institutions of 
government. This is also called behaviourism. With the proliferation of formal institutions for 
international cooperation and the rise of complex global issues since the 1980s, there has been 
a renewal of interests in institutions and the revival and expansion of institutionalism 
approaches.  
1.6.2.2. Institutionalism’s variants 
Basically, four strands of institutionalism have been established since and recognised as such as 
competing paradigms with different analytical approaches on two main features of inter national 
life: the actors whose decisions and conduct shape outcomes, and the factors and processes that 
cause, influence, or constitute decisions, actions and outcomes, from war, to cooperation, to 
compliance (or non – compliance) with legal rules.258  
1.6.2.2.1. Rational choice 
Rational choice institutionalism borrows from economics and assumes that actors are rational, 
selfish, utility maximising individuals and that preferences are predetermined by the institutional 
context in which selfish motives are pursued.259 Vivien Schmidt argues that rational choice 
institutionalism focuses on rational actors who pursue their preferences following a logic of 
calculation within given structures of incentives.260 Rational choice institutionalism understands 
institutions as incentives - based structures in which interest is objective and material. It tends to 
see institutions as arrangements based on relatively “stable” choice equilibria.261 One important 
argument for rational choice institutionalism is that even if individuals have coherent 
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preferences, there may be a problem in aggregating their preferences into a collective one, thus 
institutions may allow some actors to set the political agenda which amendments are voted on 
first. Such a decision outcome has been termed ‘structured – induced’ equilibrium, as opposed 
to ‘preference – induced’ equilibrium.262 Rational choice institutionalists argue that the relevant 
actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, behave instrumentally so as to maximise the 
attainment of the preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive 
calculation.263 Hall and Taylor emphasise that for rational institutionalism, institutional 
arrangements guarantee collective actions against individual preferences and structure actors’ 
interactions with other actors by guiding their choices in order to reduce uncertainty about other 
actors’ behaviour and to allow ‘gains from exchange’.264 They also explain rational choice’s 
approach to institutional creation as basically the result of voluntary agreement by the actors in 
order to realise institutional functional value often conceptualised in terms of gains for 
cooperation.265 
1.6.2.2.2. Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism is based on a different and totally opposed ontology to rational 
choice’s calculus, cultural approaches.266 Sociological institutionalists define institutions broadly 
to include not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, 
and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action.267 Sociological 
institutionalism emphasises that institutions are all – defining cultural norms or socially 
constituted norms that frame action.268 It is based on cultural norms understood as static 
structures and it focuses on social agents who act according to a logic of appropriateness within 
a given cultural context.269 The logic of appropriateness is shared with constructivist explanations 
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that rely on it in opposition to a ‘logic of consequences’ that they supposedly avoid.270 Sociological 
institutionalism points out that actors react not just to the hard wiring of their institutional 
environment but shape their interactions with institutions and with others through frames of 
reference, moral templates and normative orientations.271  
1.6.2.2.3. Historical institutionalism 
The third approach, Historical Institutionalism, was influenced by political studies. It emphasises 
empirical analysis.272  Historical Institutionalism underscores how institutions emerge from and 
are embedded in temporal processes through path dependence and divergence at critical 
historical junctures.273 It focuses on historically developing structures that follow a logic of path 
– dependence within a given historical context that shapes action.274 Historical institutionalism is 
premised on the idea that history is path – dependent in the sense that the characters of current 
institution depend not only on current conditions but also on the historical path to institutional 
development.275 Historical institutionalism views institutional development not only in terms of 
path – dependence but also unintended consequences or unexplainable critical moments when 
structures ‘shift’. The essence of historical institutionalism approach to path – dependency 
involves critical juncture, that is to say crucial founding moments of institutional formation that 
send countries along broadly different developmental paths; and developmental pathways 
arguments that suggest that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing 
environmental conditions and ongoing political manoeuvring but in ways that are constrained by 
past trajectories.276  
Historical institutionalism understands institutions as historically established patterns that 
constitute continuing and self – reinforcing structures. Historical institutionalism scholars see 
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institutions as intervening or structuring variables, in contrast to rational choice institutionalists’ 
view of institutions as coordinating mechanism that generate or sustain equilibria.  
While historical institutionalism has fully established itself among the three schools that 
constitute institutionalism, it is often depicted almost as lacking originality in the sense that it is 
located between rational choice approaches where institutions provide information that can 
reduce uncertainty for actors who make rational choices, and sociological approaches where 
institutions are considered cognitive templates that frame the choices of an individual.277 
Kathleen Thelen mentions rational choice institutionalists’ criticism that historical 
institutionalists are engaged in something less than theory – building.278 Another criticism points 
that historical institutionalism is an eclectic approach that is not necessarily distinct either in its 
theoretical framework or methodology from other types of new institutionalism.279 Ellen 
Immergut argues that historical institutionalism refers to a rather loose collection of writings by 
authors that tend to mix elements of rationalistic and constructivist explanations, naming 
calculus and cultural approaches.280 Ultimately, the most important criticism against historical 
institutionalism is its incapacity to explain institutional change because of path – dependency 
logic that considers institutional development as constrained by past trajectories. This criticism 
is not limited to historical institutionalism. Indeed, all the three forms of institutionalism 
explained above, namely rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms share the 
same blame for failing to explain institutional change because of their understanding of 
institutions as stable structures that frame actors’ preferences and shape their behaviour. This 
constraining and self – reinforcing understanding of institutions is influenced by the old 
institutionalism of the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries for which change was not a 
pressing problem and that was instead concerned with normative and procedural aspects of 
formal institutions.281 For the three new institutionalisms, institution matters because it shapes 
expectations. Thus, the three new institutionalisms emphasise institution to the detriment of 
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agency. This is exactly where the problem is. Scholars have generally referred to it as the 
structure – agency debate, or the rational – constructivist debate. The point is, if institution 
matters, what about change? Change is not unproblematic for the three new institutionalisms. 
Whereas they recognise institutional development, they attribute it to exogenous factors. The 
latter could be structural changes or socio – economic and political changes in the world order 
that lead institutions to either adopt new functions or to adjust their objectives. In this regard, 
the three new institutionalisms are said to be good at explaining institutional stasis and continuity 
rather than change.282 If institutions are understood as formal and informal structures, there is a 
need to explain change not only in terms of material interests but also other foundational factors 
of institutions such as ideas and perceptions of actors about their institutional norms and values. 
A full account of institutional change needs to consider informal institutions too and how norms 
and values evolve over the time. This implies a turn to endogenous factors in explaining 
institutional change. A fourth strand of institutionalism, informed by constructivism and 
describing institutions as structures and constructs internal to active and sentient agents, has 
since emerged and established itself as a complementary approach to the three older 
institutionalisms. 
1.6.2.2.4. Constructivist – institutionalism 
Constructivist-institutionalism was born from a concern for a full explanation of institutional 
change by emphasising agency rather than structure and by incorporating cognitive dynamics to 
existing material, interest – based explanations of institution and change. For constructivist- 
institutionalism it is important to understand individuals (actors)’ perceptions of institutional 
norms and values. The core of constructivist – institutionalism’s understanding is that actors 
create and recreate or maintain institutions in a dialectic process of interaction, as opposed to 
the shared understanding of the three older institutionalisms that conceive institutions as 
determining and constraining actors’ preferences, interests and expectations.  
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1.6.2.2.4.1. The influence of constructivism 
As the name indicates, constructivist – institutionalism lies at the nexus of the new 
institutionalism and constructivism. Constructivism is understood as an ontology, epistemology, 
methodology or an approach and, as such, it is distinct from rationalism and materialism. 283 It 
came out in opposition to and as a critique of realism.284 Constructivists attribute the origin of 
constructivism essentially to postmodernism but also recognise other social theories such as post 
– structuralism and post - positivism as antecedents.285 Constructivism focuses on the social 
construction of international politics that it considers as intersubjective or social reality as 
opposed to objective material reality.286 Constructivists consider that what actors do in 
international relations, the interests they hold and the structures within which they operate are 
defined by social norms and ideas rather than objective or material conditions.287 For 
constructivist theory, actors do not have objective identities or interests; identities, interests and 
many other attributes of ‘states’, ‘institutions’, ‘agencies’ and ‘non – state agencies’ – indeed 
most interesting features of the world – are ‘constructed’ in the form of shared subjective 
understandings.288 Material attributes may be relevant but what those characteristics mean in 
practice is the product of ideas.289 The analytical scope of constructivism is broad encompassing 
diverse phenomena such as intersubjective meanings, norms, rules, institutions, routinized 
practices, discourse, constitutive or deliberative processes, symbolic politics, imagined epistemic 
communities, communicative action, collective identity formation, and cultures of national 
security.290 A key aspect of constructivism’s usefulness is that it illuminates the relationship 
between individuals and structures. Constructivists are interested in the dynamic construction of 
identities and preferences and the ways in which these attributes can be modified through social 
interaction.291 They insist that actors’ identities and interests are not exogenously given but are 
constituted through interaction on the basis of shared norms such as international law, 
sovereignty and anarchy.292 
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The rise of constructivism in the 1980s challenging the rationalist account of norms has 
influenced the study of international organisations since the end of the Cold War and prompted 
interest in norms, ideas, learnings, and identity formation. Constructivism’s strength lies in 
insisting that ideas and intersubjective meanings inform and shape the interests and choices of 
agents.293 Although it is widely accepted among institutionalists that institutions matter because 
they structure strategic incentives and constraints, Sven Steinmo argues that it is also known that 
institutions do not determine outcomes because humans create and change institutions, also 
that humans have expectations and cognitive biases that affect their understanding of the 
institutions. This reflects the constructivist criticism of institutional theory’s tendency to see 
agents as deeply embedded or constrained by institutional environments.294 Therefore, Sven 
Steinmo argues that bringing agents back into institutional analysis brings ideas into the 
understanding of institutional change.295 In this regard, Gary Herrigel attributes dimensions of 
social action and transformation to constructivism, as opposed to traditional conception of 
institutions as constraints for social action, for example, that actors confront considerable 
uncertainty, which in turn makes the meaning of rules ambiguous, thus making interpretation 
and creativity an inescapable dimension of social action and institutional change. 296 It is this 
interpretive role of agents and an analysis of the interplay between agency and institutional 
context that Stephen Bell calls the ‘missing point’ in the three older institutionalist accounts that 
favoured exogenous shocks or crises in the explanation of institutional change.297 Constructivist 
institutionalism addresses the interplay between institutions and actors as mediated by ideas.298 
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It interrogates the role of ideas and actors in generating endogenous change.299 Constructivism 
institutionalism argues that the way in which actors understand their institutional backdrop is a 
process conditioned through the language they use..300 
 Constructivist institutionalists’ approaches focus upon the affective role of ideas. They 
emphasise ideas as constitutive of institutions, even if shaped by them, rather than institutions 
constitutive of ideas.301  Given the crucial space granted to ideas, constructivist institutionalism 
is variously described as ideational or discursive institutionalism. 
1.6.2.2.4.2. Discursive institutionalism 
This formulation is spearheaded by Vivien Schmidt who claims the distinctiveness of discursive 
institutionalism for its focus not only on ideas as the substantive content of discourse, but also 
on discourse as the interactive process that serves to generate those ideas and communicate 
them to the public.302 In this regard, Schmidt identifies two forms of discourse, coordinative 
discourse among policy actors engaged in creating, arguing, bargaining and reaching agreement 
on public policies in the public sphere, and communicative discourse between political actors and 
the public engaged in presenting, contesting, deliberating and legitimating such policies in the 
political sphere. Discursive institutionalism recognises a multitude forms of ideas such as 
narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios and images.303 Ideas, in 
discursive institutionalism, are located at three levels: policies, programmes and philosophies.304 
Discursive institutionalism identifies two types of ideas: cognitive that serve to justify policies and 
programmes in terms of their interest – based logic and necessity, and normative ideas that serve 
to legitimate policies and programmes in terms of their appropriateness and resonance with the 
more basic principles and values of public life.305 
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Discursive institutionalism’s understanding of discourse includes ideas or text (what is said), 
context (where, when, how and why it was said), structure (what is said, or where and how) and 
agency (who said what to whom).306 In other words, it allows consider not only ‘what is said’ but 
also ‘who said what to whom, where and why’ in the process of policy construction and 
communication.307 Claude Radaelli and Vivien Schmidt argues that discourse is fundamental both 
in giving shape to new institutional structures, as a set of ideas about new rules, values and 
practices, and as a resource used by entrepreneurial actors to produce and legitimate those 
ideas.308  Therefore, discourse assumes that it is necessary not only to explore its ideational 
dimension, that is the ideas and values that represent the cognitive and normative aspects of 
meaning creation –but also the interactive dimension – both the élite processes of policy 
formulation and the mass processes of communication and deliberation with informed and 
general publics.309   
Discursive institutionalism explains institutional change and continuity in a logic of 
communication that combines agents’ background ideational abilities and their foreground 
discursive abilities.310 Discourse matters when it exerts a causal influence by serving to 
reconceptualise or redefine interests as opposed to merely reflecting them, reshape institutions 
and reframe culture.311 In order to understand the transformative power of ideas and discourse 
and to show how they exert a causal influence and engender institutional change, Vivien Schmidt 
explains the criteria that justify why some ideas and discourses succeed and become dominant 
policies, programmes and philosophies in a given institutional setting. Examples include 
relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness, resonance, consistency 
and coherence across sectors.312 The success of discourse is also associated with the institutional 
setting. Schmidt argues that discourse succeeds when speakers ‘get it right’ by addressing their 
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remarks to the ‘right’ audiences at the ‘right’ times in the ‘right’ ways.313 Another factor for the 
success of discourse is that it must be both convincing in cognitive terms (justifiable) and 
persuasive in normative terms (appropriate and legitimate).314  
Vivien Schmidt illustrates the transformative power of ideas and discourse with reference to 
various studies that explained, for example, why industrialised countries in Europe and America 
did or not adopt Keynesian economic ideas; or why EU member states adopted or rejected the 
Euro; or else understanding the economic philosophies that explain the state – led building of 
railroads in France compared to the private – led one in the United States.315 She also recalls the 
effect of former British Prime Minister Thatcher’s discourse on public acceptance of neo – liberal 
reform in the United Kingdom, and that of the former New Zealand Finance Minister Douglas on 
public rejection of the same reform.316 Another relevant example of the transformative power of 
discourse in the context of the European integration and policy change refers to former British 
Prime Minister Blair’s discourse, which unblocked a policy area that had seen little movement 
throughout the post - war period, when Blair argued that a new European security and defence 
initiative was necessary in light of changing United States’ defence priorities with regard to 
NATO.317 Similarly, the EU Commission officials’ discourse is referred to for having produced a 
major shift in trade policy priorities from trade liberalisation to development, and in agricultural 
policy from production support schemes to sustainable development.318 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a global heritage of regionalism as opposed to a certain Euro – centric 
explanation of it. However, it has recognised the European regionalism as an example of a 
successful pioneering and leading model that inspires and influences regional formations globally 
and not necessarily as constituting any universal model of regionalism to be emulated by other 
regions. The chapter has acknowledged the multidimensional character of the new regionalism, 
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for instance that of Africa including the EAC, and its emphasis of bottom – up processes contrary 
to the top – down understanding of old regionalism. The chapter has taken into consideration 
non – material factors such as culture, identity, norms history and ideas for the explanation of 
not only regionalism but also regional organisations or institutions.  
Furthermore, the chapter has explained both the static and determinist older institutionalism’s 
understanding of institutions and the dynamic view of the newest institutionalism and its 
capacity to explain change. It has emphasised the explanatory power of constructivist 
institutionalism, precisely ideas and discourse.  
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2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the development of international cooperation in criminal matters. It 
explains the origins of international cooperation in criminal matters from its two oldest 
mechanisms, extradition and the letter of request, and other mechanisms set up by the UN. The 
chapter also discusses principles that govern international cooperation in criminal matters.  
2.1. Origins of international cooperation in criminal matters 
The roots of international cooperation in criminal matters can be traced through two old 
practices: Extradition and the letter of request. 
2.1.1. Extradition 
Extradition is a formal process by which a person is surrendered by one state to another based 
on a treaty, reciprocity, or comity, or on the basis of national legislation.319 The process concerns 
the transfer to a state, of a person charged with an offence, for trial or a punishment for a person 
convicted of an offence. Extradition comes from the latin word “extradere” which means forceful 
return of a person to his sovereign.320 It is the oldest mechanism of international cooperation in 
criminal matters that originated from ancient Egypt, China, Chaldea and Assyro-Babylonian.321 
Extradition is different from rendition, the surrendering of a person from one state to another or 
to an international tribunal acceding to the legal and administrative requirements of the 
surrendering state.322 In the past, rendition was a gesture of friendship between two states 
resulting in the delivery of persons, the latter being considered as objects of sovereigns.  
The first recorded extradition treaty was signed in 1280 B.C. by the Pharaoh of Egypt Ramses II.323 
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It was a peace treaty with a Hittite king, Hattusili III, for the return of persons sought by each 
sovereign who had taken refuge in the other’s territory.324 Extradition applies only in criminal 
proceedings. It is a form of international cooperation where a state gives assistance to another 
state for the arrest of a person charged with or convicted of an offense.  
Extradition intends to avoid the problem that criminals are able to escape justice by crossing 
national borders. It supposes that states have an interest in cooperating and facilitating the 
punishment of criminal conduct, especially among neighbouring states. Normally extradition is 
subject to an existing treaty between states.  In this regard, there could be a bilateral or a 
multilateral extradition treaty. Bilateral treaties did not begin to emerge until the 1800s, 
particularly in common la jurisdictions.325 While a treaty is a requirement for extradition in 
common law legal systems, this is not necessarily the case in civil law legal systems though the 
latter have also now made it a requirement. A treaty is a requirement and sole basis for 
extradition in most countries, however. The rise of new nations and the development of regional 
organizations engender the need for more extradition treaties. 
Extradition has long been used by States to protect their sovereignty. Until the early 1800s, 
extradition was used for the return of fugitives sought for political or religious offenses.326 In the 
1900s extradition changed its focus to common serious offenses.327 Political offences became a 
ground for refusal in extradition. 
Extradition has experienced a new development in the last 50 years with the advancement of 
technology, globalization and subsequently the development of transport links, the rise of 
criminality and the emergence of a new international legal order.328 Thus, extradition now 
operates not only between states but also between states and international courts. 
In the paragraphs below, I will look at the evolution of extradition in the United Kingdom and in 
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France as two countries representing two different legal systems in Europe. 
2.1.1.1. Extradition in the United Kingdom 
The first modern extradition treaty in the United Kingdom dates back in 1842.329  It was a treaty 
between Great Britain and the United States of America for the surrender of alleged offenders in 
cases of murder, assault with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery and forgery. 330 The 
treaty was known as Webster-Ashburton treaty and was given effect by statute 6 & 7 Vict. C.76 
and enacted in 1843.331 A similar treaty was made with France in 1843, for the offenses of murder, 
attempted murder, forgery and fraudulent bankruptcy.332. The two acts were limited to persons 
accused of the specified offences. 333 They did not include persons tried and convicted.334 Another 
treaty between the United Kingdom and Denmark concluded in 1862 applied to both accused 
and convicted persons.  
Between 1848 and 1868, the United Kingdom made 48 extradition requests to France and 36 to 
the United States.335 In return, France and the United States respectively made 96 and 53 
extradition requests to  the United Kingdom.336 Until then, Great Britain had concluded and given 
effect to extradition treaties with only three foreign states: The United States, France and 
Denmark.337 As the United States and France complained about the limited number of offences 
enumerated in the extradition treaties with England, the latter planned the adoption of a 
permanent and uniform policy on extradition, that lead to a more comprehensive statute, the 
extradition Act 1870.338 
The view of the United Kingdom in that period was that the differences between the common 
law and the civil law jurisdictions of Europe made it impossible for the United Kingdom to engage 
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in civil procedure treaties and conventions.339  The same objections were expressed by the United 
Kingdom towards the 1959 European Convention on MLA in Criminal Matters and recently the 
1985 Schengen Agreement.340 
The Extradition Act 1870, the first modern extradition statute, considered both accusation cases 
and convictions cases.341 Under the 1870 Act, extradition continued to be based on bilateral 
treaties which defined conditions governing the surrender to and from Great Britain. The Act was 
made to apply to any future bilateral treaty.342 Therefore, it was no longer necessary to enact a 
statute for each bilateral extradition treaty, as long as an Order in Council applying the Act has 
been made after an extradition treaty was concluded.343 . 
The Extradition Act 1870 as well as the Fugitive Act 1967 remained in force until they were 
repealed by the Extradition Act 1989.344 The Extradition Act 1989 aimed at providing a uniform 
procedure for extradition to foreign states and Commonwealth countries and to facilitate 
adherence by the United Kingdom to the European Convention on Extradition. It was a 
consolidated statute regime combining the Extradition Act 1870 to 1935 and the 1967 Act.345 The 
Extradition Act 1989 operated only a few years. Its procedure appeared to be too complex, 
technical and had a tendency to lead to delay. The government of the United Kingdom initiated 
a review of the law in 2001, which lead to the enactment of the Extradition Act 2003.346 The 2003 
Act undertook a reform of extradition law in the UK primarily to implement the EAW.347 It sets 
two extradition procedures. Part 1 of the Act (Section 1-68) deals with extradition to ‘Category 1 
territories’, EU member states who are part to the EAW and it gives effect to the FD EAW. Part 2 
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deals with extradition procedures with other countries. The extradition Act 2003 prompted much 
debate on Category 2 extraditions, particularly the agreement with the US that there is no 
requirement for the US to provide prima facie evidence when requesting extradition of US 
residents although that continued to be necessary when the UK sought the on extradition of 
those in the US.348 
The extradition Act 2003 aims to improve the fight against cross-border crime and bring to justice 
offenders who flee to other countries.349 The Act is criticised for not to providing adequate 
protection of rights of persons alleged of suspects and victims of crimes.350 The report of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights in the House of Lords and the House of Commons describes the 
protection of rights in the Extradition Act 2003 as “significantly below the standard which a 
United Kingdom citizen should expect”.351 The report highlights the lack of a specific and detailed 
safeguard for the rights of persons.352 It also deplores the lack of a requirement for prima facie 
as a way to prevent speculative charges in extradition cases.353 The report also observes that 
extradition process would  be more effective only if the Act provides for legal representation in 
both the requested and the requesting country.354 
The report makes criticisms about lack of effective protection of in the European Arrest Warrant 
as well.355 It observes a lack of proportionality principle in the Framework of the European Arrest 
Warrant, which Causes extradition requests for minor offences.356 For example a  Poland  
extradition submission on a charge of “unintentional receiving of stolen property” involving the 
acquisition of 100 Zloty (24 euros), which was rejected by the Divisional Court though on the basis 
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of double criminality and not proportionality.357  
2.1.1.2. Extradition in France 
On 4th March 1376, the French King Charles the VI and Amadeus the VI, The Count of Savoy, 
signed an extradition treaty which is seen as the first modern example of which there is a 
record.358 The treaty related to the exchange of criminals. However, another treaty signed in 1736 
between France and Holland for the extradition of individuals charged with common crimes is 
referred to by Blakesley as much modern.359 France played a significant role in the development 
of extradition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, concluding bilateral extradition 
treaties with almost all her neighbours. Blakesley describes the treaty between France and 
Wurtemberg in 1759 as a prototype extradition treaty of the modern era. Extradition in France 
was politically motivated until a law in 1927 established a procedure of extradition of alleged 
criminals to and from France. The 1927 French law was repealed on 9 March 2004 by the law 
adapting the justice system to crime development. While this 2004 law regulates cooperation in 
criminal matters, it was triggered by the obligation to implement the EAW too, which deadline 
was 31 December 2003. The law changed the political nature of extradition to a judicial control-
oriented procedure by empowering the French judiciary to oversee the surrender of a requested 
person.  
2.1.2. Letter of request 
A letter of request is a formal request from a court to a foreign court for some type of judicial 
assistance.360 It is also known in the United States of America as letter rogatory. Concretely, in a 
letter of request a country requests, through its court, another country through its own court 
and the latter’s control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country. 361 Rolle 
reports a letter of request ordered to issue to the court of Holland in an action for trespass in 
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1295.362 The enactment in 1831 of the Statute 1 William IV, also known as Evidence on 
Commission Act, allowed the courts of common law to take the evidence of a witness beyond 
the British Dominions.363 In 1833, the Order XXXVII, rule 6A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 
established a formal procedure by which the evidence of a witness abroad could be taken by 
letter of request.364   
The letter of request aims at seeking judicial assistance in the form of taking the testimony of a 
witness or securing tangible evidence such as bank records and conducting investigations. The 
legislation of most countries allows parties to the proceedings to apply for the evidence that is in 
a foreign country. Conversely, the legislation of the same countries allows foreign requests for 
evidence that lies within their jurisdiction. A state that gives legal assistance to another state 
would expect a reciprocal assistance in similar situations. The letter of request is used to obtain 
testimony and evidence in a foreign jurisdiction.365 Traditionally, letters of request were 
submitted through diplomatic channels.366  Thus, compliance with a letter of request from a 
foreign requesting country was generally considered a matter of courtesy, unless the state of the 
requesting court and that of the requested court have enacted a treaty that made it mandatory. 
The practice of letter of request was based on the principle of comity.367 Despite the diplomatic 
character of letter of request, a treaty is not a requirement for it to be processed. The law of 
many states provides for the processing of letters of request. The letter of request is mostly used 
in civil matters.  
Letters rogatory were very slow and they were not always effective in helping to obtain evidence 
in a reasonable amount of time. So, states developed a new concept of cooperation regarding 
investigation, namely MLA.368 In the 1960s, many states in Europe and America concluded 
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bilateral treaties on MLA. Also, regional organizations like the Council of Europe, the Organization 
of American States and the League of Arab States promoted regional multilateral treaties based 
on the same concept 369 
2.1.3. International cooperation at the UN 
International cooperation in criminal matters at the UN dates back to the 1970s with the onset 
of the fight against terrorism. The UN developed strong international cooperation mechanisms 
among States, in particular with extradition, MLA, the transfer of criminal proceedings, the 
transfer of convicted persons, recognition of decisions of foreign criminal jurisdictions, the 
freezing or seizure of assets, and cooperation between law enforcement agencies.  
Legal assistance in criminal proceedings on terrorism first appeared in the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970. It also appears in all subsequent criminal 
conventions, except in the Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
detection, of 1991. The conventions on air security370 make an obligation to Contracting States 
where suspects of unlawful seizure of aircraft are to immediately investigate about the facts and 
report findings to the State of registration of the aircraft and the State of which the suspects are 
nationals. They all provide for the extradition of suspects. The Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971 further requires Contracting States to 
disclose any relevant information on offences they believe will be committed. Subsequently, all 
conventions since then require States to adopt measures for the prevention of offences 
committed against other States Parties. For example, article 5 of the Convention against 
Corruption; art 18 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism; article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
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Women; and articles 2 and 16 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), extended the obligation to disclose information and 
provided for the duty to exchange information and to coordinate administrative measures and 
preventive measures. The Convention against the Taking of Hostage of 1979, too,  requires the 
States Parties to cooperate in the prevention of the offences by taking practical prevention 
measures and exchanging information and coordinating administrative and preventive 
measures.371 The obligation to cooperate also appears in the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material of 1979, in relation with systems of physical protection of nuclear 
material in international transport.372  
The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 calls upon States 
Parties to provide one another the greatest measure of assistance in investigation or criminal or 
extradition proceedings, including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal.373 The same 
call is made in the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) in 
article 12. The latter further encourages States Parties to establish mechanisms to share 
information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability. 
In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania in the 
United States of America, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 (2001) at its meeting 
on 28 September 2001, which constitutes a general  basis for international cooperation in 
matters of terrorism.374 It makes it an obligation on all States to afford one another the greatest 
measure of assistance in criminal investigation or criminal proceedings of financing or support of 
terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the 
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proceedings.375 The Resolution emphasizes on international cooperation. It calls for exchange of 
information and increased cooperation through bilateral and multilateral conventions. 
The increase of international narcotics trafficking in the 1980s made governments envisage 
mechanisms to improve international cooperation in the investigation and the prosecution of 
international narcotics trafficking.376 As a result, the General Assembly of the UN adopted 
resolution 39/141 on a draft convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances and Related Activities, which lead later to the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances adopted on 19 December 1988. The UN Convention 
urges signatory parties to provide judicial assistance and to engage in extradition, MLA, transfer 
of proceedings and other forms of cooperation and training. It encourages them to conclude 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of 
international cooperation.377 The Convention prohibits the refusal of MLA on the grounds of bank 
secrecy and set conditions under which refusal of MLA may be considered, such as prejudice to 
the sovereignty of the requested party.378 The Convention should have clarified conditions under 
which the sovereignty motive in response to a request for legal assistance would be considered. 
Sovereignty is a broad theory that, if not clarified, can be used as an excuse to violate justice, 
thus contributing to weaken international law also referred to as soft law.    
The UN also adopted the Model Treaty on Extradition in the General Assembly Resolution No 
45/116 of 14 December 1990 and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in 
the General Assembly Resolution n0 45/117 of 14 December 1990. These two instruments are 
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the major basis for national legislation of states.379  
The growing phenomenon of transnational organized crime in the 1990’s made the UN adopt the 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on 15 November 2000. The Convention 
fosters close international cooperation among State Parties to fight against transnational 
organized crime. It includes detailed provisions on mutual assistance. It also includes provisions 
for freezing of assets, the use of video – conferences and the transmission of information without 
a request. 
The UN also adopted the Convention against Corruption, in 2003, which provides State Parties 
with specific forms of MLA in gathering and transferring evidence for use in court, extradition of 
offenders, tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of corruption. One 
innovation in the Convention is that it requests State Parties to allow legal assistance in the 
absence of dual criminality380 when such assistance does not involve coercive measures.381  
The UN Conventions on organized crime and corruption make mandatory the designation of 
central authority for all incoming and outgoing legal assistance and extradition request.  This 
mechanism may help States Parties to better coordinate requests for assistance and to respond 
expeditiously.382  
2.2. Principles of international cooperation in criminal matters 
International cooperation in criminal matters aims at supporting foreign judicial proceedings. It 
falls under the scope of International law and international cooperation. In view of sovereignty, 
the requested state is normally not under any obligation to satisfy a request for assistance. States 
generally act under the principle of comity. To avoid uncertainty and any complications that may 
result, most states engage in bilateral treaties or agreements to smooth cooperation. Treaties 
create obligation between states to satisfy requests for legal assistance.  International 
cooperation treaties define obligations between states involved and specify requirements, limits 
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and types of assistance that they may request. They apply some legal principles that states in 
practice have been putting forward as conditions for providing legal assistance. 
2.2.1. Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is an international principle of cooperation among states. It requires states to return 
in kind favours, benefits or penalties granted to its citizens or legal entities by other states. 
Essentially reciprocity means that the requesting state will provide the requested state the same 
assistance in the future. Whereas the principle is prevalent in civil law tradition states where it is 
viewed as a binding covenant, it is not an obligatory principle in common law tradition states. 383 
The principle of reciprocity is usually incorporated into treaties, memoranda of understanding 
and domestic law.  For example, Japan provides MLA and extradition on the basis of its domestic 
laws that require a guarantee from the requesting country that it would honour a request of the 
same kind made by Japan.384  In a treaty, reciprocity may concern an aspect of the process. It 
refers to an idea of parallelism between the processes of the requesting state and the requested 
state.385 The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime mentions the principle of 
reciprocity and requests States Parties to afford one another the widest measure of MLA in 
investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings of the offences covered by the Convention.  
The principle of reciprocity can be very useful in the absence of any treaty between states where 
it may consist of a promise that one state will do the same to another state in the future should 
the need arise. Ideally, the requesting state and the requested state should agree on the process 
of assistance, otherwise the requested state may consider an aspect of the requesting state’s 
process not compatible with its process and thus refuse the assistance sought for lack of 
reciprocity. 
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2.2.2. Dual criminality 
Historically, the principle of dual criminality developed as a consequence of reciprocity.386 It is 
associated with the legal principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Dual criminality means 
that a criminal conduct for which extradition or legal assistance is requested is an offense not 
only under the law of the requesting state but also under the law of the requested state.387 
Consequently, the requested state is not under any obligation to grant extradition or any legal 
assistance for a conduct which does not constitute an offence, or which is not punishable under 
its law. Dual criminality has been the procedural foundation of most MLA treaties.388 It can 
impede cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of offences. While some states require 
dual criminality for all requests of assistance, some do for compulsory measures only, some 
others keep discretional power to refuse assistance on the ground of lack of dual criminality, and 
some others do not make any requirement for requests of assistance or any discretional power 
to refuse the assistance sought. 
As noted previously, Article 18(9) UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime allows 
a state to decline MLA in the absence of dual criminality but gives it the option to waive the 
requirements of dual criminality and provide the assistance irrespective of whether the conduct 
would constitute an offence under the law of the requested state. A significant development has 
been made by the UN Convention against Corruption so as to encourage States Parties to grant 
legal assistance in the absence of dual criminality when such assistance does not involve coercive 
measures.389 The Convention calls upon States Parties to consider the dual criminality 
requirement fulfilled whenever it is necessary for international cooperation, if the conduct 
underlying the offence for which assistance is sought is a criminal offence under the laws of both 
States Parties.390  
The principle of dual criminality may lead to serious difficulties mainly because offences may not 
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be the same in the law of the states or criminal conducts for which assistance is sought may not 
correspond to the offences covered by a treaty. For this purpose, the UN Convention against 
Corruption states that it is not necessary for the laws of the requested state and the requesting 
state to place the offence within the same category or denominate the offence by the same 
terminology.391  
2.2.3. Specialty 
Specialty is another principle in international cooperation, in virtue of which the requesting state 
may not prosecute or punish the defendant for any crime other than those included in the 
decision granting legal assistance,392 or the request for extradition. Although this principle does 
not prevent legal assistance, it limits the right to prosecute. It assumes that the requesting state 
shall prosecute or punish the offender only for the offense for which the requested state granted 
legal assistance. The principle protects witnesses or offenders against unexpected prosecution. 
It is violated when the requesting state charges or prosecutes the defendant for an offense that 
was not consented for by the requested state. 
The specialty principle emerged from the French concept of spécialité or particularity.393 It did 
not become a feature of extradition treaties until 1850 when its modern form appeared for the 
first time in an extradition treaty between France and Saxony.394 As the practice of extradition 
shifted from the return of political enemies to obtaining jurisdiction over criminals, the rule of 
specialty developed in order to ensure that extraditions were not sham political renditions,395 
also in an effort to maintain cooperation and good faith between the parties of extradition 
treaties.396 Specialty serves as a safeguard against not only prosecutions for political offences but 
violations of all other substantive rules of extradition law, such as dual criminality, the protection 
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against double jeopardy, or death penalty exception. The protection of the rights of the person 
subject to extradition is an important function of the rule of specialty. The rule requires, in 
respect of all crimes for which an extradited person might be tried, compliance with all 
guarantees of the extradition process. It is motivated by the protection of state sovereignty.397 
The rationale underlying the rule is that extradition is a contractual arrangement between the 
requested and the requesting sovereign states.398  
While the status of specialty in customary international law is undefined399, it is included in 
various international instruments, such as the Rome Statute of the ICC (Article 101), the European 
Convention on extradition of 1957 (Article 14), and the Inter – American Convention on 
extradition of 1981 (Article 13). The UN Model Treaty on Extradition too includes a suggested 
provision on specialty (Article 14).   
2.2.4. Exclusion of political offence 
Political offences exception is a potential ground for refusal of extradition and MLA.400 In the past, 
persons who acted against the state and were pursued and punished sought for asylum. Asylum 
was then an exception to extradition, and it was usually granted only if it benefited the requested 
state. As the world order developed with time, asylum was very limited, and extradition became 
the norm. With the political uprising mentality and change of attitude towards political offence 
after the eighteenth century, European democracies opposed the extradition of political 
offenders and refugees. As a matter of principle, the states denied extradition if the offence for 
which it is requested is regarded by the requested state as an offence of a political nature. This 
principle originated from the political philosophy of the social contract theorists and the French 
Revolution and it was first formalized by a statute in 1833 in Belgium.401 The French incorporated 
into their Constitution of 1793 a provision guaranteeing asylum to all those exiled for the 
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contribution in the fight for democratic government. This was first time a difference was made 
between political and common offences.402  
The principle was reinforced in the last century with the growing concern and expansion of 
human rights.403 One problem with political offence exception globally is that the term “political 
offense” is not defined in many countries. There is no international consensus to what constitutes 
a political offence. Its appreciation varies from the motive, the effect and the purpose of the 
offence, the identity of the victim, democracy, human rights and the immediate circumstances 
of political conflicts in a country. Some political offences are perpetrated directly against the 
government, such as treason and espionage. They are also named pure political offences. Some 
others are violent crimes in connection with political uprisings, also named relative political 
offences.  
It was not until 1870 that the United Kingdom first formally recognized the political offence in 
the Extradition Act.404 Thus, all extradition treaties since then contained the exception. The 
Extradition Act 1870 stated that “a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in 
respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character…”.405 It did not define 
such an offense and therefore different interpretations were adopted by courts. Mr Justice 
Stephen, for example, said that a political offence was one committed during a political 
disturbance, and was incidental to and formed a part of such a disturbance.406 All subsequent 
treaties and legislations in the United Kingdom, for example the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 used 
the same wording “offence of a political character”. There is no statutory or generally accepted 
definition of relative political offence in the United Kingdom.407 The English system uses an 
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incident- test which requires that the act must be incidental to and forming part of political 
disturbances.408 The French objective- test considers the direct injury to the rights of the state 
and the irrelevancy of the motives of the accused.409 More interesting, the Swiss proportionality 
test examines the political motivation of the offender and the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime, analysing the proportionality between the means and the political ends 
or the predominance of the political elements over the common crimes elements.410 I find the 
Swiss approach more comprehensive. Indeed, the political motivation of the offender is 
important to establish in the appreciation of a political offence. The English approach seems to 
examine the offence in the opposite way, looking at it as incidental to political disturbances. Thus, 
the context of the offence seems to be the criteria for the British approach whereas the Swiss 
approach looks at the motivation of the offender in addition to the context.  
2.2.5. Double jeopardy 
The double jeopardy rule, commonly known as ne bis in idem, is a well-known principle both in 
civil and common law legal systems around the world.  It means that a person should not be 
prosecuted repeatedly on the basis of the same offence, acts or facts. The principle has a long 
history and is rooted in ancient Greek and Roman literature.411 It has a twofold rationale. Firstly, 
ne bis in idem protects the individual against possible abuses of the state’s ius puniendi.412 Even 
when repeated prosecutions do not involve any abuse from the state, the defendant suffers 
additional burdens including duplicated costs of legal representation, coercive measures and 
psychological burdens associated with the extended procedures and the absence of finality.413 
Secondly, ne bis in idem is a guarantee of legal certainty in upholding the finality of judicial 
decisions or protecting the authority of a judgment.414 It applies both in case of conviction and 
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acquittal decisions. 
Ne bis in idem exists in many forms and it is deemed a constitutional and a procedural right in 
the legislation of many states. The principle is established as a human right protected under the 
ICCPR (Article 14 (7)), the Protocol 7 to the ECHR (Article 4(1)), the American Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 8(4)), the CISA (Article 54), and the CFREU (Article 50). Ne bis in idem 
features in extradition law too. It constitutes a ground for refusal to cooperate in the framework 
of international cooperation in criminal matters.415 The principle appears in bilateral or 
multilateral conventions as either mandatory or optional ground for refusal.  Examples of 
mandatory refusal include Article 9 of the 1957 European Convention on extradition, Article 53 
of the 1970 European Convention on the international validity of criminal judgments, and Article 
35 of the 1972 European Convention on the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters. An 
example of optional ground for refusal is Article 18 of the 1990 European Convention on 
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Where a convention is 
silent, states are entitled to make a declaration on their refusal to cooperate in case it would 
result in a breach of ne bis in idem rule. 
Traditionally, ne bis in idem has been elaborated as a principle that only applies nationally.416 It is 
not binding as a general principle of international law.417 Article 14(7) of the ICCPR and Article 
4(1) of the Protocol 7 to the ECHR as referred to above acknowledge the principle from a 
domestic perspective. This means that, unless the rule is foreseen in an international convention, 
the prohibition to prosecute a person already acquitted or convicted for the same fact in a 
previous trial is binding only for the judges in the same national legal system; without a specific 
rule, judicial authorities are not bound by decisions taken in another state on the same fact 
committed by the same person.418 In practice, if most states would not accept a request for 
assistance or an extradition request in relation with an offence for which the suspect is facing 
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trial under their jurisdiction, they would still accept it for foreign proceedings. However, many 
countries do not fully recognize the validity of foreign criminal matters judgments for 
enforcement in their legal order in the absence of a treaty. Most countries would subject it to 
the requirement that the facts judged by a foreign court were not committed, in whole or in part, 
within their territory. In an era of globalization where offenders can be easily reached and where 
more bilateral treaties are being made, states should increase recognition of foreign judgments 
in criminal matters which is less extended compared to civil and commercial matters.419  
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of international cooperation in 
criminal matters in modern time and its practice. It emphasises the conventional nature of 
extradition and its reliance on comity and reciprocity among states. The chapter points out recent 
developments in the practice of extradition, such as the possibility of rendition between states 
and international courts.  It discusses the impact of global terrorism and transnational criminality 
in transforming extradition. This preliminary discussion on international cooperation in criminal 
matters globally and related principles is important since the thesis will reflect on them later 
when discussing cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC.    
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3. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the EAC both in geographic terms and shared social factors, such as 
language, culture, identity, religion. It argues that the integration spirit embraced by EAC states 
was forged by the British colonial power to ease the administration of acquired East Afr ican 
territories. The chapter contextualises the establishment of the EAC with regard to the rise of 
regionalism, firstly after the manifestation of the first generation regionalism spearheaded by the 
European Community, secondly with the worldwide expansion of the new regionalism after the 
end of the Cold War and the search for new ways to respond to the impact of globalisation. In 
particular, the second iteration of the EAC, twenty-two years after the demise of the first EAC, 
corresponds with the resuscitation of regionalism at the continental level in the form of the AU 
and the plan for establishing an African Economic Community by 2028.  
The chapter suggests that various social, economic and political factors contributed to the 
collapse of the first EAC in 1977, ten year only after its launch, some of them dated before the 
formal establishment of the Community and were rooted in the British colonial administration.  
The chapter discusses the integration plan of the new EAC. It argues that although the 
Community has established a customs union and a common market and launched the process 
for a monetary union and a political federation, the attainment of a full integration is seriously 
undermined by the unfinished work of each stage of integration, for example, the customs union, 
the common market, and by the lack of sufficient political will and commitment of the EAC 
Partner States in fulfilling their treaty obligations. 
3.1. Contextual background  
This section discusses the making of the EAC from a historical point of view. In accordance with 
the criteria for defining a region, established in the theoretical chapter, the section emphasizes 
both geography and similar factors among the region’s constituent states, such as ethnicity, 
religion, language, political and governance systems, and shared culture and historical 
experiences to describe the EAC. 
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3.1.1. East African countries 
East Africa is often described as a group of countries that lie on the East coast of Africa. If one 
considers the Indian Ocean and the coastal geographic location of these countries, it would be 
more accurate to speak of Eastern Africa, including a larger number of countries including 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, Comoros, Seychelles and Mauritius. The first four 
countries constitute what is often named the Horn of Africa. The last three are islands in the 
Indian Ocean. Burundi and Rwanda are literally at the borderline of East and Central Africa. At 
the moment, six of the Eastern Africa countries above, namely Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan, constitute the EAC. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are 
considered as the original founding members of the EAC, both in its first creation in 1967 and its 
relaunch in 1999. Burundi and Rwanda joined the Community in 2007 while South Sudan was 
admitted in 2016.  
The geographical description of East Africa is important in the sense that it determined the 
history of the constituent countries since their creation; it also reveals an important 
characteristic: the divide between coastal countries (E.g. Kenya and Tanzania) and landlocked 
ones (E.g. Uganda, Rwanda). The coasts of Kenya and Tanzania were a gateway for merchants 
and explorers who conquered East Africa as early as the fourth century.420 Some accounts of East 
Africa make reference to the Romans’ expeditions in East Africa, ordered by Nero, as far back as 
the first century.421 However, a more informed historical account of East Africa considers the 
seventh century, more precisely the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, as a time reference 
for early interactions of East Africa with the outside world. It is reported that following disputes 
for the succession of the Prophet, and indeed for the Caliph or the successor, two Omani 
dissidents, Suleiman and Said, fled to and established themselves in the coast of East Africa, 
precisely in Zanzibar.422 This signalled the start of hundreds years of Arab rule in East Africa. 
East Africa remained unknown to Europeans until the famous voyage to India of the Portuguese 
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explorer, Vasco da Gama, who landed in Mombasa in 1498.423 His discovery of the East African 
coast opened up two hundred years of the Portuguese domination of East Africa, which is said to 
not have had a significant impact except a few buildings, notably Fort Jesus in Mombasa, Fort 
Kilwa and a little chapel at Malindi.424 The Portuguese were deposed by the Arab Sultan after a 
popular insurrection and the fall of Fort Jesus in the hands of Omani forces in 1698.425 For the 
following a hundred and seventy years, the Sultan ruled East Africa until the arrival of European 
missionaries and merchants. The Berlin Conference in 1885 and the consequent Scramble for 
Africa sealed the future of East Africa and divided the territories of what is known now as Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda between Germany and Britain by two Treaties of 1886 and 1890.426 
According to the latter partition treaties, German East Africa comprised the territory of 
Tanganyika, which is today mainland Tanzania, as well as the territories of Ruanda and Urundi, 
currently the Republics of Rwanda and Burundi.427 British East Africa consisted of the territories 
of present-day Uganda and Kenya and Zanzibar, the latter being declared a Protectorate in 1890 
with a ten miles inland strip in which the Sultan retained his sovereignty.428 
Despite Britain’s growing interest in trade with the East in the 17th and 18th centuries, at first it 
entrusted chattered companies for the development of its protectorates in India, in South, West 
and East Africa.429 The IBEA, created by Sir William Mackinnon in 1887 initially as the British East 
Africa Association to trade in the mainland dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, before it was 
reconstructed and given a royal charter under the new name, was thus entrusted with the 
administration of British territories in East Africa.430 However IBEA faced enormous difficulties 
between 1891 and 1893 and became bankrupt before surrendering its charter to the British 
Government.431 This move prompted the British Government to declare Uganda a Protectorate 
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in 1894432 and Kenya in 1895.433 After Germany’s defeat in the first World War, Britain captured 
the German Protectorate of Tanganyika, entirely establishing its power in the four territories until 
their independence in the early sixties. 
The historical background of East Africa helps to understand the external impact of various 
powers and civilisations on the three states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and how it 
contributed to making East Africa a homogenous region in which social, cultural, economic and 
political divergences progressively converged towards a unified bloc with which people across 
territorial boundaries identify themselves.  
3.1.2. The people of East Africa: Ethnicities, cultures and languages 
East Africa is home to 150 million people. Its multi-ethnic population is characterised by an 
intermixing of natives and sets of peoples that established themselves throughout the region as 
a result of years of conquest and colonisation. There are varying theories about original people 
of East Africa. What matters in this research is not so much an ethnographic presentation of EAC, 
rather pointing out the diverse ethnic faces of East Africa that include Bantu, Nilotic, as well as 
Hamitic and Semitic people. East Africa is a plural and culturally heterogeneous society in which 
people of Indian, Arab, Persian and European origins live along native indigenous. The European 
settlement in East Africa is obviously a result of the long British, Belgium and Portuguese ruling 
of the states of East Africa. The British settlement was conducted in two instances: direct and 
indirect.434 There were Indians who settled in East Africa at a time when India was already a 
British colony.435 Then there were also British settlers who came straight from Britain.436 Colonial 
powers did not consciously pursue policies of nation-building in the political units they carved 
out of Africa.437 Their main motive was purely economic: finding new markets for their products 
and extracting raw materials for the industries in Europe.438 Like many regions in Africa, East 
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Africa suffered an artificial separation of people and a fragmentation of societies along ethnic 
and tribalistic lines.439 African leaders, prompted by Pan Africanism ideology against colonialism 
and national oppression and exploitation, soon felt the urge to build common bonds of solidarity 
between people of Africa and to forge a sense of belonging and therefore a new African 
identity.440 Among the prominent leaders, Presidents Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana in West Africa 
and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in East Africa, advocated two paths of the same vision: the unity 
of African people.441 The latter President’s commitment to the cause of freedom and unity of 
East African people was so strong that he once offered to delay Tanganyika’s independence for 
a year if Britain would grant independence to Kenya and Uganda at the same time so that they 
could form a federation.442 In a way, the common colonial past of the three states of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda contributed to foster a sense of East African identity. Not only did they 
speak the same language, English, they also inherited economic structures that had been put in 
place by the colonial power: an East African railway, harbour, post and telecommunications, and 
airways services. Thus, these common services increased a sense of East Africanism among the 
inhabitants of the region and constantly reminded East Africans who used them that they shared 
a common vision and values, such as solidarity and unity.  
Another crucial characteristic of the people of East Africa is a shared language, Kiswahili, as well 
as Swahili culture, that is a Bantu language much modified by contact with Arabic and which Arab 
and Swahili traders and slavers carried it across East Africa as far as the eastern DRC and it has 
become the lingua franca.443 As such, Kiswahili is used by the EAC to foster a regional identity, 
prompting Partner States such as Rwanda to adopt it as an official language beside English, 
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French and Kinyarwanda.444 East Africa is an intricately multilingual region.445 Over 310 
indigenous and immigrant languages are spoken in East Africa, of which about 128 in Tanzania, 
70 in Kenya, 73 in South Sudan, 43 in Uganda and 3 in Burundi and Rwanda.446 Some of the East 
African languages have a cross-border character, presumably due to the artificial colonial 
partition of the states.  
Two more defining elements need to be mentioned in relation to East African people. First is 
cultural diversity. This has been recognised by the EAC which objective, amongst others, is 
cooperation in the cultural realm.447 Also, non – economic dimensions such as culture, religion 
and environment have been recognised as essential for the sustainability of regional cooperation 
schemes.448 The second element is religion. Like culture, religion plays a considerable role in East 
African societies and is reflected in the societal organisation of the communities in the region. 
The main religions, Islam and Christianity, were acquired from colonial rulers and they have since 
been constituted an integral part of East Africans’ customs. Whereas the two religions were 
brought in through the same gateway, the coastal land, Islam firmly established itself along the 
coasts as a result of Omani Sultan and Arab rulers who built the first mosques in the region and 
the settlement of Arabs in the region ever since. The predominance of Islam in the coastal areas 
does not obscure the fact that it is expanded in inland areas too. Christianity spread further inland 
compared to the coasts but there are extensive Christian communities in East African coastal 
areas too. The entrenchment of the two religions amongst East Africans should not hide the fact 
that since before the arrival of colonial rulers, East Africans had their own traditional religious 
practices and beliefs ranging from animism to spiritual gods or divinities.  
The colonial legacy of East African people is not only linguistic or religious, but it includes similar 
government systems and comparable legal systems. 
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3.1.3. Political systems and governance 
Despite relatively minor differences in the colonial history among the East African countries, with 
the original three founding members of the EAC, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, with South 
Sudan being former British colonies on the one hand and Burundi and Rwanda being former 
Belgian colonies on the other hand, their political systems display more similarities than 
divergences. They are all predominantly presidential political systems in which the Presidents 
hold broad power, including appointing members of government and, in some cases appointing 
certain members of Parliament, like in Rwanda.449 Generally speaking, Presidents in these 
countries are also commanders in chief of the armies. 
The 6 East African states are also constitutional republics with legislatures chosen through 
periodic multi-party elections.450 They mostly achieved independence in the 1960’s, like many 
African states, except South Sudan which is the youngest independent nation in the world, 
achieving independence in 2011 after a long fight which spanned two civil wars from 1955 to 
1972 and from 1983 to 2005.451 Chief among the EAC states, the United Republic of Tanzania, a 
union of the Republic of Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of Zanzibar on 26 April 1964 and 
renamed as such in October of the same year, gained its independence in 1961 as Tanganyika. 
Burundi and Rwanda obtained independence concurrently on 1st July 1962; Uganda achieved 
independence on 9 October of the same year. Kenya and Zanzibar were granted independence 
in 1963. 
Unlike the former colonial power, Britain, each East African state individually adopted a written 
Constitution considered as the supreme and overarching law. Incidentally, it can be argued that 
East African states have entered a new order in which new Constitutions have been adopted and 
have brought considerable changes in their political landscape. Except for Tanzania, which is 
praised for its exemplary social stability and political democracy in the region, all other East 
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African states in a relatively recent past witnessed serious political turmoil and civil wars that 
culminated, in some cases like Rwanda, in Genocide and crimes against humanity, and in mass 
killings and serious violations of human rights particularly in Kenya, Burundi and South Sudan.  
The new Constitutions were adopted in the aftermath of these troubling situations. In Kenya, 
after the 2008 electoral contestations and subsequent violence, a new Constitution was adopted 
in 2010, with transitional provisions for three years after which the Constitution was fully 
implemented in 2013.452 Significant changes brought by the Kenyan Constitution include the 
exclusion of the Executive, including the President and Cabinet Secretaries, from membership in 
the Parliament.453 One innovation of the Kenyan new Constitution is the creation of a second 
chamber of the Parliament, the Senate.454 The 2003 Rwandan Constitution too created the 
Senate as an upper chamber of the Parliament. However, the Rwandan Constitution is overall a 
response to the many tribulations the country suffered from divisionism and sectarian politics 
that resulted in the Genocide against the Tutsi and the loss of a million Rwandan lives.455 Thus, 
the greatest novelty of the Rwandan Constitution is the establishment of a number of 
institutional structures for rebuilding the nation. They include a National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission, a National Commission for the Fight against Genocide, a National Commission for 
Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, etc. In Burundi too, a new Constitution was 
adopted in 2005, at the end of a brutal civil war. The Constitution established a quota system of 
power sharing among the two main ethnic groups, with sixty percent of Hutu and 40 percent of 
Tutsi in the army, the government, the Parliament, the local administration as well as the public 
service.456 In South Sudan, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and 
ultimately the referendum on self-determination in January 2011 and consecutive independence 
on 9 July 2011 represented a new order for the South-Sudanese nation.  
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The structures of local administration in the East African states are similar too. They can be said 
to be unitary states, with some exceptions, such as South Sudan and Kenya. The Kenyan 2010 
Constitution introduced county governments with their own system of elected representation 
and the power to make laws in matters related to agriculture, county health, education, air and 
noise pollution, cultural and entertainment activities, animal control, firefighting and control of 
drugs.457 South Sudan applies a similar principle of decentralised government and devolution of 
powers. It is a federal state divided into ten states each of which has its own Constitution and a 
legislative assembly with the power to pass legislation subject to the supremacy of national laws, 
in case of conflict.458 At the moment, the state is applying a Transitional Constitution pending a 
definitive Constitution that the National Constitution Review Commission established in January 
2012 is entrusted to produce.459 
East African countries hold elections regularly. The presidential office term in all of them is 5 
years, except in South Sudan where the presidential office term is 4 years. South Sudan’s situation 
is an exception though as elections have never been held in the country since its independence 
from Sudan in 2011. Generally speaking, East African states are democracies, at least from the 
perspective of holding regular elections, although democracy is a much complex theory than 
elections which freedom and fairness are often contested in East Africa, except Tanzania. 
Assessing democracy in a wider dimension in 167 countries in the world, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s ‘Democracy Index’ 2019 classifies Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as hybrid 
regimes and Burundi and Rwanda as authoritarian regimes.460 The Democracy Index recognises 
four regimes types as follows: Authoritarian, hybrid, flawed democracy and full democracy, the 
latter category comprising a limited number of countries of which Australia, New-Zealand, 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Switzerland.461 It is based on 
60 indicators grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the 
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functioning of government, political participation, and political culture.462 
A last element of convergence of the political systems of EAC states is the doctrine of separation 
of powers enshrined in their Constitutions, to prevent abuse of power and to ensure checks and 
balances in the governance.  In general terms, the legislatures of EAC states are either 
unicameral, precisely in Uganda, Tanzania and South Sudan, or bicameral like in Burundi, Rwanda 
and Kenya where the lower house, a Parliament, shares legislative powers with an upper house, 
a Senate. A discussion of the states’ legal systems is more relevant to this research, beyond the 
mere judiciaries which in fact constitute a part of them.  
3.1.4. Legal systems  
The main reason for this section is essentially to describe the similarities and divergences among 
the legal systems of the EAC states. To a considerable extent the legal systems of the EAC states 
are similar, despite their different origins that we may classify as common law legal systems on 
the one hand and civil law or romano-germanic legal systems, on the other hand. This 
classification means that four of the EAC Partner States, namely Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan 
and Uganda apply common law, the core of which is the doctrine of judicial precedent or stare 
decisis that obliges judges to follow the rulings and determinations set by higher courts when a 
case involves similar facts and issues; and two other EAC states, Burundi and Rwanda apply civil 
law, the core of which is that laws and legal principles are codified and thus serve as source of 
law.  
The nature of the legal systems of EAC derives from their colonial past. Britain applied common 
law, a tradition that emerged in England during the Middle Ages, in its East African colonies as it 
did in all its colonies across the continents.463 Thus, the East African states of common law 
tradition adopted it as a consequence of their colonisation by Britain. Similarly, Belgium applied 
civil law in Burundi and Rwanda, a legal tradition that developed in the Middle Ages too and 
which origins date back to the Justinian Code in the sixth century and later influences of Canon 
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law and Germanic traditions throughout the medieval times and the Renaissance.464 The 
adoption of this body of legal system by Burundi and Rwanda is undoubtedly the product of their 
Belgian colonial past, given the minimal impact of prior colonisation of East Africa by Germany 
and her indirect rule governance of German East Africa. 
The analysis below will focus on the structures and the laws of the national legal systems in the 
EAC.  
3.1.4.1. The structure of EAC legal systems 
There are striking similarities in the structures of the legal systems across EAC states. First, their 
judiciaries are established by a Constitution that formally bestows them independence and 
autonomy through the establishment, for example, of judicial service commissions or councils 
with the power to appoint or remove judges from office as well as promoting them. In practice, 
however, their independence is not uniformly guaranteed in the EAC states. In Kenya, for 
instance, judges’ salaries and benefits and the Judiciary Fund overall are charged on a Consolidate 
Fund to protect them from any manipulative attempt.465 In Rwanda, they are charged on the 
same fund as the public service.  
A major common feature of the organisational structures of the judiciaries in EAC states is a sharp 
distinction between higher courts and lower courts. With the exception of Tanzania whose 
highest court is the Court of Appeal of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Supreme Court is the 
highest court in all other EAC states. The higher courts comprise of a Supreme Court, a Court of 
Appeal and a High Court. The High Courts have original and unlimited jurisdiction in all the 
systems. Constitutional matters are within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Burundi, 
Rwanda and South Sudan, within that of the Court of Appeal in Tanzania and within the High 
Court in Kenya and Uganda.  
Mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution, such as conciliation and arbitration are also 
present in the legal systems of the EAC states, often inspired or imbued by local customs and 
involving lay people. In Burundi, the Abashingantahe, literally ‘elders’, and some other elected 
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citizens at the lowest level of the justice system are empowered to determine certain cases and 
conciliate the parties; they cannot impose sentences.466 A similar institution exists in Rwanda 
where Abunzi, ‘Conciliators’, practice conciliation in sorting out certain matters with a legally 
defined jurisdiction. 
The lower courts in the EAC states’ legal systems comprise most of the following structures 
depending on each system: Magistrate courts, Court Martial, Primary courts, customary courts, 
Khadi’s courts and tribunals and other specialised bodies. Magistrate courts in these EAC states’ 
legal systems possess broad jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters, as well as an appeal 
jurisdiction. Their denominations vary according to each system. A quick glance at the lower 
courts clearly shows more similarities amongst the four Common Law jurisdictions in the EAC as 
a bloc, distinguishing them from the two Civil Law jurisdictions. The first element of convergence 
among the Common Law jurisdictions in the EAC is the existence of customary courts for the 
determination of cases of customary nature by traditional chiefs, within their jurisdictions and 
based on the customs, traditions, norms and ethics of the communities. The customary courts 
do not have jurisdiction to hear criminal cases. In South Sudan, they are granted concurrent 
jurisdiction with statutory courts along which they often operate.467  
The second element of convergence among the Common Law jurisdictions in the EAC relates to 
their use of Kadhi’s courts for the adjudication of matters of Islamic persona l law, such as divorce 
and distribution of matrimonial assets, children guardianship and custody, succession and 
inheritance, between people who profess Islamic faith or in communities that follow Islamic 
law.468 The use of Kadhi’s courts for the administration of justice in accordance to Islamic legal 
system dates back to the establishment of the Sultanate Empire along the East African coasts at 
the beginning of the nineteen century.469 The English tolerated their existence alongside the 
English styled courts system, with a jurisdiction confined to Muslim personal matters.470 Kadhi’s 
courts, as well as customary courts, survived attempts to sweep them away after independence, 
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as part of an effort to integrate the legal systems, a process that started way befor e 
independence and which dominated the agenda of the Judicial Advisors’ Conference held in 
Kampala, Uganda, in 1953.471 However, an agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom, the Government of Kenya and Sultan of Zanzibar about the Coastal Strip, in October 
1963, ensured the protection of the Muslim faith at all times and the preservation of Khadi’s 
courts.472 The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda by virtue of which states must fulfil in good faith 
their commitments under international law, obliges Kenya to observe the agreement, hence the 
inclusion of Kadhi’s courts in the Kenyan 2010 Constitution.473 Overall, the survival of Kadhi’s 
courts, and of customary courts too, in the EAC states has been the result of numerous legal 
reforms by the decision-makers, taking into account the wishes and aspirations of their peoples 
and adopting laws that reflect various existing traditions in the region.  
3.1.4.2. The laws 
The laws of the EAC states too reflect the complexity of their national legal systems and the 
various influences that affected them. At first, they were mainly imported by the colonial powers 
for ease of administration.474  In Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgian colonial power implemented 
Belgian law that was then codified for use in the two territories. Whereas Rwanda and Burundi 
have significantly reformed their legal systems during the transition and after the Genocide 
against Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 and a decade of civil war that lasted until mid-2000 in Burundi, 
some of the colonial era Belgian civil codes are still used in the two countries while customary 
law has gradually and by and large been scrapped in an effort to ensure equality of citizens and 
between men and women in personal matters such as inheritance and matrimonial assets, land, 
marriage, etc. 
In the EAC common law jurisdictions, the laws are largely based not only on British common law, 
but on Islamic law too and on customary law for personal or family matters.475 The British settlers 
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imported laws from Britain and British laws which had been codified in India, to apply to the East 
African protectorates.476  
Overall, the laws of the EAC Common law jurisdictions are composed of statutes and acts of 
national Parliaments as well as received laws, that is to say specific acts of Parliament of the 
United Kingdom, English statutes of General Application in force in England  on 12th August 1897 
for Kenya, and on 22nd July 1920 for Tanzania, deemed to be the reception date for English law 
in the two countries, unless the statutes have been repealed by those of the receiving countries 
or by a latter English statute made applicable in the countries.477 Treaties and International law 
too constitute a part of the laws of these jurisdictions as well as for their civil law counterparts. 
As for customary law, it is applied only in civil cases of personal or family matters and is in effect 
when it does not conflict with statutory law; Islamic law remains applicable to Muslims and in 
communities that follow Islamic law in matters of personal status. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, the laws of South Sudan do not include Islamic law. South Sudan’s legal system  is built 
on a combination of statutory and customary laws.478 Whereas written law is the primary source 
of law in the EAC civil law jurisdictions, the doctrine of precedents or stare decisis is strongly 
applied in the EAC common law jurisdictions though Rwanda recently formalised the doctrine 
too.479 
The Constitutions of all EAC jurisdictions assert human right and provide for a bill of rights. The 
Constitution of Burundi, unlike that of her peers, incorporates human rights instruments 
specifically, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ACHPR, the 
Convention on Elimination of all Forms of discrimination against Women and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, therefore making the legal system potentially monistic, at least with 
regard to these very specific instruments.480 Otherwise, the legal systems of EAC jurisdictions are 
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dualistic and treaties need to be ratified and domesticated before they come into force.  
3.2. The establishment of the EAC 
In order to understand the present-day EAC, it is important to understand the historical process 
of the formation of the Community since the colonial period, the East African cooperation having 
emerged first as a British colonial administration project for a federation of its East African 
territories. This view corresponds to Historical Institutionalism’s path dependence logic that 
submits the character of current institution to both current circumstances and the historical path 
to institutional development. 
3.2.1. British administration of East Africa 
The beginning of British administration of East Africa in the mid-1890s ignited the idea of a united 
East Africa.481 The British colonial administration entertained the idea of a federation of the East 
African territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, for ensuring uniformity and reducing the 
administrative costs of the British Exchequer’s subsidies.482 In 1898, Lord Lugard predicted that 
there would come a time when East African territories would be administered as a single unit.483 
Similarly, the Special Commissioner to Uganda, Sir Harry Johnson, recommended after visiting 
East Africa that the territories of Uganda, Kenya and Zanzibar and British Somaliland should be 
replaced under one administration.484 The British attempt to amalgamate the three East African 
territories into a single administration resulted in the establishment of a number of common 
services and institutional mechanisms to promote and institutionalise the colonial project. The 
common services were to operate in all British East Africa territories. They included the East 
African Railway, the East African Harbours, the East African Post and Telegraphs, and the East 
African Airways corporations, all established at different times between the 1890s and 1946. The 
institutions included, amongst others, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa created in 1902 and 
restructured in 1910485, the East African Currency Board established in 1905, the East African 
Meteorological Department, the East African Income Tax Board established in 1940, the 
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Directorate of Civil Aviation in 1946 and research institutions such as the Central Veterinary 
research organisation established in 1939 and the East African Industrial Research Organisation.  
The quest for East African regional integration gained momentum when a White Paper was 
published in 1927 emphasising the importance of closer union in East Africa.486 Several 
Commissions were appointed to explore the possibilities of East African federation and to make 
concrete resolutions. They included the Ormsby-Gore Commission in 1924, the Hilton Young 
Commission in 1927 and the Joint Selection Committee of both houses of the British Parliament 
in 1931.487 The findings of the Commissions were not particularly exciting. The Ormsby-Gore 
Commission reported that there was little support and definite hostility for the idea of federation 
in East Africa.488 The Hilton Young Commission drew attention to the nationalism entrenched 
among East Africans.489 It mentioned the urgent need for coordination of policy on ‘native affairs’ 
and all matters concerning the relations between natives and immigrants.490 
The creation of the East African Governors’ Conference in 1926, marked a decisive step towards 
strengthening cooperation between the territories. The Governors’ Conference was the first 
executive organ of the common services.491 At its first meeting in 1926, in Nairobi, the Governors’ 
Conference discussed the future of the region.492 It was in part to remedy to the lack of a legal 
basis of the Governors’ Conference that Britain created, by Order in Council, the East African High 
Commission that came into being on 1st January 1948, as a body corporate.493  
3.2.1.1. The East African High Commission 
The EAHC provided a constitutional framework for the common services.494 It was organised 
around three institutions: The Authority, the Central Legislative Assembly and the Executive. 
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The Authority consisted of the Governors of the three territories sitting in a conference. Its 
Secretariat was headed by an Administrator and it was responsible for the administration of the 
common services.495 The Central legislative Assembly enacted the laws providing legal authority 
to the services and voted their financial provisions.496 It consisted of ex-officio members 
nominated and unofficial members elected by the Legislative Council of each territory.497 The 
Executive was in charge of implementing the decisions of the Governors and to interpret the laws 
enacted by the Parliament.498 The EAHC was limited by the lack of independent sources of 
revenue and by the scope of its competence.499 In addition, Britain had a final verdict in case of 
disagreement on any contentious matter and the EAC was served by expatriates who viewed 
themselves as accountable to the Secretary for the colonies.500 
As a result of Tanganyika’s independence and the overall aspiration of all other territories to the 
same status, it became necessary to review the Order-in-Council of 1947.501 At a conference 
convened in London to consider the future of the EAHC, delegates from the three territories and 
Zanzibar, Britain and the EAHC agreed to keep a joint administration of the services but to replace 
the EAHC by a new organisation.502 In December 1961, the EAHC was replaced by the East African 
Common Services (EACS).503  
3.2.1.2. The East African Common Services  
Unlike the EAHC, the EACSO was the product of mutual consent and not of a foreign legal 
instrument.504   It was more locally oriented and had a much firmer local base of operation.505 
The EACSO, like its predecessor the EAHC, consisted of the Common Service Authority, the 
Executive and the Central Legislative Assembly. The Authority was at first composed of the 
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President of Tanganyika and Governors of Kenya and Uganda.506 After the independence of 
Uganda and Kenya, it became composed of the Presidents of the three territories.507 The EACSO 
was given a broader scope for the administration and operationalisation of the common services 
including, in addition to the services provided by the EAHC, the common currency, customs 
regulations, tariffs and taxes for the region.508 However, it soon become confronted by a series 
of challenges, amongst which an imbalance in the industrial development between the three 
countries as well as an uneven economic development, quantitative restrictions in inter -
territorial trade and a structural challenge caused by the concentration of the common services 
in Kenya.509 The concentration of the institutions of the EACSO in Nairobi was a source of constant 
irritation to Uganda and Tanzania and caused considerable dissatisfaction and disagreement over 
division of gains from cooperation and a perception by the latter two countries of a 
disproportionate share of the benefits of the Organisation.510 The enduring challenges faced by 
the EACSO necessitated it being reconceptualised and restructured. The states’ leadership 
perceived that the breakup of the EACSO, which had been built over forty years, would be 
expensive.511 They sought to prevent its collapse and to compromise on certain issues. In order 
to find ways and means of strengthening East African economic cooperation, the Philip 
Commission was then appointed.512  The Commission reviewed the whole integration 
arrangement and recommended the introduction of a new order to redress the economic and 
industrial imbalances and the reallocation of the headquarters of the various institutions of the 
EACSO to the three countries.513 The treaty for East African Cooperation proposed by the Philip 
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Commission was signed by the Presidents of the three Partner States on 6th June 1967 and it 
became effective on 1st December 1967.514 
3.2.2. The East African Cooperation 
The Treaty for East African Cooperation was signed at a time of overall enthusiasm for 
regionalism by the newly independent African States who considered it as a vehicle for economic 
development.  
3.2.2.1. Rationale for East African cooperation 
The Charter of the OAU, established in 1963, envisaged that African states would gradually work 
towards regional and interregional cooperation as a means towards achieving accelerated 
economic progress and continental unity.515 This same economic purposes encouraged the 
leaders of East Africa to harness regional cooperation for the unity of their people. East African 
leaders were also influenced by the Pan African ideology that advocated the unity of African 
people. Originally, Pan Africanism was connected to anti-imperialism and the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialist oppression and exploitation of African people.516 However, the Pan 
Africanism that emerged in East and Central Africa in the late 50s strived not only for political 
independence but for economic independence too, a Pan African grand dream in which a united 
Africa would become an economic giant with a large market to withstand global competition.517 
In East Africa, the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, was a proponent of Pan Africanism. His 
vision of regionalism in Africa was labelled the ‘gradualist approach’, since he argued that Africa 
had to unite at the regional level before a continental union could be realised.518 A competing 
‘maximist’ approach was advanced by the first President of Ghana, Kwameh Nkrumah, who 
advocated a continental political federation in the form of a common government with politico-
military and economic decision-making powers.519 Although this plan was defended vigorously 
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by many states at the Constitutive Assembly of the OAU in 1963, it was rejected in favour of the 
gradualist functional plan of progressive stages as the best road to economic and political 
integration.520 The EAC established by the Treaty for East African Cooperation on 6 June 1967 
which entered into force on 1st December 1967 was established in the same perspective and it 
aimed essentially at economic integration of the three states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
Article 1 of the Treaty provided that ‘the Contracting Parties establish among themselves an East 
African Community, and, as an integral part of such Community, an East African Common 
Market’. The Community was built on three pillars: The Common Market, the General Fund 
services and the Corporations. The Corporations consisted of the East African Railway, the East 
African Harbour, the East African Posts and Telecommunications, and the East African Airways. 
The General Fund services comprised all other twenty-seven services specified in Part A of Annex 
IX. They include, for example, the Secretariat of the Community, and different technical and 
research institutions established at different times during the history of the EAC.  
3.2.2.3. Achievements  
The first concrete manifestation of the economic integration plan of the Treaty for East African 
Cooperation was the establishment of a customs union with a CET for all goods imported outside 
the Community and the removal of trade restrictions among the Partner States521. Scholars 
unanimously argue that the removal of trade restrictions increased intra-trade, that is, trade 
within the Community, though not significantly.522 It is argued that the Partner States traded 
more with third countries, especially European countries and the former colonial power Britain, 
than amongst themselves. The reason for that contrast in the total trade in East Africa in the mid-
1970s was the imbalanced trade patterns inherited from colonisation which created a certain 
dependency on manufactures from the European market.523 Scholars also point out a sharp 
increase in the Partner States’ trade with their immediate neighbours, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zambia 
and Rwanda and Burundi triggering their interest in the Community and their formal application 
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to be members.524 As part of its external trade, the Community entered into association with the 
European Economic Community in 1968.525 The five year association trade agreement, often 
referred to as the Arusha Agreement, was signed on 26 July 1968.526 It gave privileges to the 
Community allowing East African products to enter the European common market freely on a 
basis of a reciprocity for European products in East Africa.527 
Considering the concentration of the common services in Kenya and the resulting uneven 
distribution of benefits among East African States,  the Treaty for East African Cooper ation  
redistributed the headquarters  of the six important institutions of the Community on the basis 
of two institutions per state, as follows: the headquarters of the Community, including the 
Tribunal and the Central secretariat as well as the EAHC in Tanzania,  in Arusha and Dar es Salaam 
respectively; the EADB and the EAPT in Kampala, Uganda; the EARC and the EAAC in Nairobi, 
Kenya.528 Despite the redistribution, tensions persisted over the gains in addition to other strains 
and stresses that led to the collapse of the EAC in 1977. 
3.2.2.4. The disintegration of the EAC 
Like its formation, the demise of the first EAC can be understood in terms of Historical 
Institutionalism’s path dependence logic. Some scholars have argued that the demise of the first 
iteration of the EAC needs to be considered in retrospective and to include the Community’s 
formative period. Mngomezulu argues that the EAC died a slow death and fell apart as it was 
constituted.529 He also argues that the rift among East African territories was already evident by 
the mid-1960s.530 Similarly, Green suggests that the EAC might have been doomed from the 
start.531  
Generally speaking, the factors that led to the dissolution of the EAC in 1977 can be said to be of 
a political, economic and social nature. Among the political reasons, there was a sharp contrast 
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in the political economy of the East African states and opposed ideologies. Kenya and Uganda 
practised capitalism with state interventionism.532 Uganda followed the ‘Common Man’s Charter’ 
and moved towards revolutionary Africanisation of its business sector.533 Tanzania was officially 
committed to African agrarian socialism, Ujamaa (family-hood).534 The Cold War and the foreign 
influence added to the political divergences between the three Partner States. In a capitalist 
world, western countries opposed Tanzania’s socialism. Kenya was assisted by the western bloc 
while Tanzania was linked to the eastern bloc and Uganda was assisted particularly by the Soviet 
Union.535  
The ideological differences undermined the EAC and affected its future. Tanzania perceived 
Kenya as pursuing inegalitarianism at home and exploitation regionally.536 Both Kenya and 
Uganda perceived Tanzania as dangerously leftist.537 The ideological differences aggravated the 
dissimilarity of interests in East Africa. The attempt by the Ugandan President Milton Obote to 
move to the left led to a coup d’état by Idi Amin, on 25 January 1971.538  
The overthrow of Obote by Amin engendered personal acrimony between the heads of state and 
political retaliations in East Africa, affecting decision-making in the Community. This incident had 
a negative impact and strained cooperation. The presidents of Tanzania and Kenya did not 
recognise the new military government in Uganda and they resented Idi Amin.539 President 
Nyerere of Tanzania entertained a strong personal relationship with President Obote and 
provided him political asylum in Tanzania.540 He opposed any Amin appointment to leadership 
positions in the EAC and refused to convene the meetings of the East African Authority as long 
as Amin was in power.541 Subsequently, there were clashes at the border of Uganda and Tanzania 
as well as constant political squabbles and armed border confrontations between Uganda and 
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Kenya.542 The political and military hostility between the Amin regime and Tanzania first, then 
with Kenya, did not augur well for regional integration. It affected economic negotiations on road 
transport, tourism, standard, industrial allocation and the economic growth of the three 
countries.543  
In the economic sphere, structural challenges were so intense that the Partner States did not 
agree on the full coordination of their national monetary policies, their respective national 
income, their employment policies or on location of industries.544 Differences in economic 
development and the inability of the Community to bridge the gap in their industrial 
development worsened the situation. Inadequate funding and financial problems surfaced when 
Kenya announced her withdrawal on refusing to pay its contribution of 800 million Shillings to 
the General Fund services.545  
The global economic crisis in the 1970s provided a contextual factor which weakened the EAC. 
With increasing global foreign exchange stringency, Kenya came to perceive its EAC corporation 
headquarters’ external payments as a foreign exchange drain and tried to compensate by slowing 
or halting transfers to EAC Corporate in Tanzania.546 The foreign exchange crisis between the two 
countries led Kenya to claim 200 million Shillings from the EA Airways for hosting it on its soil.547 
Tanzania retaliated by refusing to allow Kenya’s heavy transport to use its motorways.548 
Imperialism too played a vital role in the collapse of the Community. The exploitative and 
oppressive relationships introduced by imperialist monopolies ruined the Community. 
Transnational corporations battled for the monopoly over capital export outlets, markets and 
sources of raw materials in the newly independent states.549 The decision by the United States 
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and the United Kingdom to recall their aircraft which had been used by the region, unless they 
were paid substantial amounts by the EAA, aggravated the situation.550  
The world economic crisis reduced the gains and raised perceived costs of the EAC. The 
perception of an unfair sharing of economic benefits accruing from regional markets and a lack 
of formula to deal with the problem irritated Uganda and Tanzania and led to fears and 
resentments against Kenya.551 The compensatory and corrective measure taken to rectify the 
economic imbalance among the three states were not adequate.552 As a result, Kenya 
experienced economic growth at the expense of Tanzania and Uganda, whose economies 
stagnated. The inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the Partner States meant 
that the EAC produced trade diversion and higher costs for Tanzania and Uganda.553 
Consequently, there was a rise of economic nationalism, with national interests prevailing over 
regional sentiments.554 
The rise of economic nationalism affected regionalism in East Africa. Political leaders were not 
prepared to cede their newfound political and economic sovereignty in favour of a successful 
Community. In addition, there was almost no involvement of the people, manifested in the 
concentration of the powers in the hands of the Heads of state through the Summit. The 
Community depended on their goodwill to resolve issues, rather than upon strong institutions.  
3.2.2.5. The revival (revitalisation) of the East African cooperation 
After the dissolution of the EAC in 1977, the three states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
negotiated a Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities, which was signed in 
1984.555 One of the terms of the Mediation agreement provided that the three states agreed to 
explore areas of and make concrete arrangements for future cooperation.556 Subsequently, the 
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Heads of state of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda held a meeting in Harare, in 1991, and reached an 
agreement for the establishment of a Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African 
Cooperation, signed on 30 November 1993.557 Full cooperation officially started on 14 March 
1993 with the launching of the Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission at the 
headquarters of the EAC in Arusha and a proviso that the cooperation will be upgraded at a later 
stage.558 Hence, the three Heads of state, at their second Summit in Arusha on 29 April 1997, 
directed the Permanent Tripartite Commission to start upgrading the agreement establishing the 
Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation into a treaty.559 On 2nd January 
1999, the EAC Summit resolved to establish the EAC in its original form by the end of July of the 
same year.560 One can see here a Constructivist Institutionalism’s important tenet: that actors 
create, recreate or maintain institutions, and their preferences are not constrained by 
institutions. Subsequently, the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC was signed in Arusha, 
Tanzania, on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 2000, following ratification and 
deposit of the instruments of ratification with the Secretary General by all the three Partner 
States. The new EAC considered the possibility for expanding it to include countries like 
Rwanda.561 Kenya and Tanzania’s opposition to such development which they considered as 
premature prevailed over Uganda’s favourable view.562 Thus, the reinvigorated EAC started with 
the three original Partner States, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda 
acceded to the Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full members of the Community on 1st July 
2007. South Sudan acceded to the Treaty on 15th April 2016 and became full member on 15 
August 2016. 
3.3. The new EAC 
This section puts the revived EAC in perspective at global and continental levels. It presents 
salient features of the EAC and examines the achievements of the Community with regard to the 
objectives set in its constitutive treaty. 
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3.3.1. Context 
The rebirth of the EAC is associated with the worldwide trend and expansion of the new 
regionalism, triggered partly by the end of the Cold War and partly by the poor performance of 
multilateral trade arrangements under the auspices of the WTO.563 Regional integration schemes 
flourished around the world, such as the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and many other bilateral 
preferential arrangements.564 Africa has not been an exception; numerous regional integration 
arrangements were established, the EAC being one of them. 
African countries embraced regional integration as a key strategy in their economic development 
and increased trade and investment.565 Having realised that Africa’s problems of poverty, disease 
and lack of education can only be solved through a rational and systematic approach based on 
the people’s unity and determination, the former OAU adopted the Lagos plan of Action for the 
Economic Development of Africa in 1980, with the objective of establishing the AEC. 
Consequently, the treaty establishing the AEC was adopted in Abuja, in June 1991, and entered 
into force on 12 May 1994. The AEC was established as an integral part of the OAU, with the 
objective of forming an economic and monetary union by 2028.566 The integration strategy of the 
AEC identifies RECs as building blocks for the gradual establishment of a continental economic 
integration.567 The EAC constitutes one of the eight RECs recognised by the AEC , alongside the 
AMU, the ECOWAS, the ECCAS, the CENSAD, the IGAD, the SADC and the COMESA.568 The 
disintegration of the first EAC did not bury the integration spirit in East Africa. The incorporation, 
in the Mediation Agreement amongst the EAC Partners States in 1984, of a provision for possible 
future cooperation among the Partner States was likely motivated by the economic integration 
aspiration of the OAU’s 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. Hence, the current revived EAC is essentially 
an economic integration scheme with the overall duty of the RECs for establishing a customs 
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union and a common market.  
3.3.2. Objectives and principles 
The main objective of the renewed EAC is the attainment of economic, social and political 
integration in East Africa. This aim of the Community, as articulated in Article 5 of the EAC Treaty, 
is ‘to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among 
partner states in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, in research and technology, 
defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit’. Accordingly, the EAC 
aims at ever closer integration among the Partner States. Integration is certainly deepening in 
terms of the expanding scope of the laws, policies and regulations that are giving effect to the 
commitment to closer economic, social and political cooperation.569 The deepening of integration 
is manifested in the progression towards the various stages of integration, for example from 
customs union to common market and to monetary union, and through the signing of relevant 
protocols which clarify the individual stages of integration and constitute, with treaties, the legal 
anchor of integration scheme.  
As a regional trade agreement, the EAC treaty was notified to the WTO. It could be argued that 
this notification and the recognition ,by the AEC, of a REC status to the EAC transforms the 
Community from a passive object to an active subject, or enhances its regionness and capacity 
to act.  WTO rules have an impact on international trade. Of particular significance in this chapter, 
Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS regulate regional trade agreements.570 Trade 
integration is an integral part of regional integration. Regional integration in the EAC is pursued 
not just in trade and trade facilitation and areas such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, 
technical standards, investment, competition, intellectually property rights for the expansion of 
economic growth but for the benefits of regional cooperation on other issues too, such as 
political stability and security, shared natural resources, infrastructure projects and border 
administration. Article 3 of the EAC Treaty provides the requirements for accession by a foreign 
country as member or associate to the Treaty. The requirements include amongst others 
adherence to the Community’s principles, market driven economy and geographical proximity 
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and interdependence with the Community. Admission is considered on the basis of the EAC 
Procedure for Admission and is exclusively a function of the EAC Summit of Heads of State.571 The 
widening of the new EAC has materialised through the accession of Burundi and Rwanda to the 
Treaty in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. As suggested in the theoretical framework, the EAC, as 
a region, can be viewed as a social construct and a politically contested space. It is expected to 
continue expanding further eastward and southward following the expression of interest by 
neighbouring countries and their membership applications. The Republic of Sudan formally 
applied to join the EAC in 2011, a few months ahead of the region’s most contiguous and now 
newest member, South Sudan.572 Somalia also formally applied to join the EAC in 2012.573 The 
DRC which shares borders with five of the six current Partner States of the EAC expressed 
interests to join Community too. 
The EAC Treaty defined a set of fundamental and operational principles that guide the 
achievement of its objectives. The principles determine the political, economic and social 
governance system of the Community. Articles 6 and 7 EAC Treaty reads “commitment to good 
governance, rule of law, human rights and a belief in people-centered and market-driven 
cooperation”. The creation of norms, values, moral ideas, or practices and procedures is 
characteristic of states grouped in regionalism. These principles help to shape common political 
ground in the process of economic, social and political integration of East African countries, which 
political organisation and governance are perceived as essentially ethnocratic, except for 
Tanzania, and militaristic, with a substantial militarisation of political space in Burundi, Rwanda 
and Uganda.574  
3.3.3. Organs of the EAC 
The organisational structure of the EAC is set out in Article 9 EAC Treaty. It includes the following 
organs: 
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3.3.3.1. The Summit  
The composition and role of the Summit are defined under Articles 10 and 12 EAC Treaty. The 
Summit comprises the heads of state or government of the Partner States. It is the EAC 
counterpart of the European Council which also consists of all the EU Heads of State or 
Government.  The Summit is responsible for the overall policy direction and functioning of the 
Community. Like the European Council,575 the Summit gives general directions and impetus to 
the development and achievement of the objectives of the Community. As such, it is the vision 
setting organ of the Community. It operates on a yearly rotating chairmanship and meets on a 
yearly basis minimum,576 while the European Council meets at least twice every six months or 
whenever necessary. Like the European Council which almost always decides by consensus, all 
decisions of the Summit are taken by consensus (Article 12(3) EAC Treaty). Therefore, the 
Community’s survival depends of the goodwill of the heads of states or perhaps the Partner 
States. The quest for different interests and the divergences in the economic levels and priorities 
of the members in a regional organisation often makes consensus difficult to reach. The EAC 
Treaty recognises the principle of variable geometry which allows progression in cooperation 
among groups within the Community for wider integration schemes in various fields and at 
different speeds.577 The variable geometry principle thus moderates the consensus decision 
taking that at time can hamper the integration progress. The decision by the heads of state of 
Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda to revamp the Northern Corridor against the will of Tanzania in 2013 
explains how coalitions of power are sometimes created in regional organisations and the 
relationship between weaker and stronger members. From the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism, the three heads of states can be seen in this case as rational actors pursuing 
their preferences in a logic of calculation. The fact that Tanzania, the second largest economy in 
the EAC, does not need trade corridors like smaller landlocked fellow Partner States Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi, explains its opposition.  
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3.3.3.2. The Council of ministers  
The Council of Ministers is the main policy organ of the Community (Article 14 EAC Treaty)  as far 
as implementation of the Treaty provisions and integration programmes are concerned. It can 
initiate and submit bills to the EALA for consideration and enactment into law. Although it can be 
considered as the counterpart of the Council of Ministers of the EU, it is fair to say that the latter 
enjoys greater powers and competences, its main functions being legislation, the budget, policy 
making, coordination of execution, and the foreign policy of the EU. Also, no legislation can be 
adopted without the Council of Ministers of the EU although in most cases the Council needs the 
European Parliament to pass a law.578 The Council of Ministers of the EAC is made up of ministers 
responsible for EAC affairs in the Partner States, such other ministers of the Partner States as 
each may determine, and the Attorney General of each Partner State. (Article 13 EAC Treaty). 
The Council of Ministers of the EU too is composed of ministers of the Member States,579 their 
attendance at the meeting of the Council depending on the topic of discussion. While the Council 
of Ministers of the EAC meets twice a year, the Council of Ministers of the EU meets in ten 
different configurations most which meet once or twice a month.580 Like the Summit, the 
Council’s decisions are taken by consensus too. The Council of Ministers of the EU uses a different 
decision-making mechanism that includes simple majority voting, qualified majority voting and 
unanimity. It has a six months rotating presidency.581   
3.3.3.3. The Coordination committee  
The Co-ordination Committee consists of Permanent Secretaries responsible for EAC affairs in 
each of the partner states and such other Permanent Secretaries of the Partner States as each 
may determine (Article 17 EAC Treaty). It is mainly in charge of implementing the decisions of the 
Council; it serves as a watchdog for the community, making and submitting recommendations on 
the implementation of the Treaty; it reports to the Council of Ministers (Article 18 EAC Treaty). It 
is responsible for regional cooperation and coordinates the activities of the Sectoral Committees. 
At this stage, the organizational structure of the EU is slightly different to that of the EAC but 
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equally integrates the national systems as opposed to a separate system. A body of permanent 
representative of the Member States (COREPER in French, Comité des Représentants 
Permanents) sits directly below the Council (Articles 16(7) TEU and 240(1) TFEU. It prepares all 
the meetings of the Council. In turn, the work of COREPER is prepared by over 250 different 
working groups where national experts meet for preparatory work.582 
3.3.3.4. Sectoral Committees  
Sectoral Committees are responsible for preparing detailed plans and setting out priorities for 
their respective sectors (Article 21 EAC Treaty). They basically conceptualize programs and 
monitor their implementation. They are established by the Council of Ministers on the basis of 
the recommendations of the Coordination Committee which spells out their composition and 
functions (Article 20 EAC Treaty). Sectoral Committees meet as often as necessary (Artic le 21 EAC 
Treaty). Relevant sectoral committees established include the Sectoral Committee on Co-
operation in Defence, as well as an Inter-State Security Committee. 
3.3.3.5. The Secretariat  
The Secretariat is the full-time executive organ of the Community (Article 66 of EAC Treaty). It is 
the counterpart of the EU Commission, although the latter is far more developed institution than 
the EAC Secretariat. The Secretariat is comprised of the offices of the Secretary General and 
Deputy Secretaries-General of the Community, the Counsel for the community and other officers. 
The Secretary General serves a fixed five-years term and is appointed by the Summit on a rotation 
basis (Article 67 EAC Treaty). In turn, the EU Commission is composed of the College of 
Commissioners which consists of one Commissioner per Member State. It has a president and a 
number of vice-presidents, one of which is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy.583 The EU Commission functions as a collegiate body and it serves a 
five-years term of office.   
The EAC Secretariat is in charge of the executive management of the community and ensures 
that decisions adopted by the Summit and the Council are properly implemented.584 It also 
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oversees the operations of the autonomous institutions of the EAC which include: Lake Victoria 
Basin Commission; Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency; Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation; Inter-University Council for East Africa; and the East African Development Bank.585 
The EU Commission has a larger mandate that includes administrative, legislative, quasi – judicial 
and enforcement powers. E.g. it has the exclusive right of legislative initiative in most areas 
except the Common Foreign and Security Policy.586 
3.3.3.6. The East African Court of Justice  
The EACJ is the judicial arm of the Community (Article 23 EAC Treaty).587 The Court became 
operational on 30th November 2001 and heard its first case in 2005.588 It is the counterpart of the 
ECJ, entitled the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ which is the judicial body of the EU. The 
ECJ has been part of the institutional set-up of the EU from the start.589 The EACJ consists of a 
First Instance Division and an Appellate Division while the ECJ consists of two courts, the higher 
court also called the ‘Court of Justice of the EU’ and the lower court previously entitled the ‘Court 
of First Instance’ and now called the ‘General Court’. Judges of the EACJ are appointed by the 
Summit among qualified sitting judges of national courts of adjudication or from recognised 
jurists, on recommendation of the Partner States on the basis of two judges for the First Division 
or one judge for the Appellate Division (Article 24(1) EAC Treaty). The ECJ higher court consists 
of one judge per Member State and eleven Advocates-General who provide legal opinions to 
assist the Court in its work.590 The General court too consisted of one judge per Member State 
but was enlarged, in 2016, to two judges per Member State.591 Judges and Advocates-General 
are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States, after each member 
State nominates its own candidate.592 
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The court’s basic role is to ensure adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of 
and compliance with the Treaty (Article 23 EAC Treaty). It has jurisdiction to hear and determine 
disputes between the Partner States on the interpretation and application of the Treaty and 
between the Community and its employees (Articles 27(1), 31 EAC Treaty). The power to refer a 
case for determination by the Court on the ground of violation of obligations under the Treaty or 
infringement of the provisions of the Treaty is concurrently vested in the Partner States, the 
Secretary General and any resident in a Partner State (Articles 28, 29, 30 EAC Treaty). The general 
function of the ECJ is to ensure that EU law is observed throughout the EU in the interpretation 
and application of the treaties. The ECJ higher court deals with cases between the institutions 
and cases between Member States, including infringements.593  It also deals with preliminary 
references from national courts.594 The General Court hears all actions by individuals and 
companies.595 The TEU allows for specialized courts to be set up, e.g. in the field of intellectual 
property.596 The EAC Treaty provides instead for a possible future extension of the Court’s 
jurisdiction with respect to original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdictions as the Council 
will determine and upon conclusion of a protocol to operationalise the new jurisdiction.597 In 
2015, the Court’s jurisdiction was extended to cover trade and commerc ial disputes and disputes 
arising out of implementation of the protocol on the Establishment of the EAMU.  
While the Court has not yet been conferred a human rights jurisdiction, it had been able to affirm 
its jurisdiction over matters of human rights as a fundamental principle of the Community. In 
James Katabazi v. Secretary General, the First Instance Division of the Court held that while it 
does not have jurisdiction over human rights violations per se, it may still consider cases with 
regard to interpretation of the Treaty, which includes ‘respect of the rule of law: “While the Court 
will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from 
exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27 (1) merely because the Reference 
includes allegation of human rights violation”.598  A parallel can be established here between the 
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Katabazi case and case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that was instrumental in the 
evolution of fundamental rights protection in the EU. In spite of lacking textual basis in the 
original treaties,599 the ECJ in this case declared the supremacy of Community law in relation to 
the member states’ constitutions and stated that ‘respect for fundamental rights forms an 
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice’.600 It further stated 
that ‘the protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community’.601 In Attorney General of Rwanda v. Plaxeda Rugumba, too, the Appeal Chamber 
held that although the EACJ does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning human 
rights per se, article 6(d) of the Treaty and Article 6 of the African Charter allow the Court to 
assert jurisdiction over the claim.602 Hence, East African legal and natural persons have been 
referring cases to the Court on the basis of violation of fundamental principles of the Community 
set out in Article 6 as good governance including democracy, rule of law, accountability, social 
justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as human and peoples’ rights. A protocol for 
the extension of its human rights and other jurisdictions is currently under consideration.603  
The EACJ does not require that applicants exhaust domestic remedies before applying to the 
Court.604 The Court primarily issues declarations as to whether particular act or legislation 
infringes rights or provisions of the Treaty.605 It occasionally also recommends specific 
amendments to legislation to bring it in conformity with the Treaty.606 In Burundian Journalists 
Union v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi , the Court ruled that a number of 
Burundi’s Press Law Nº.1/11 provisions were in violation of principles enshrined in Articles 6(d) 
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and 7(2) EAC Treaty; the Court urged Burundi to comply with the judgment.607  
EACJ’s judgments are binding. Article 38(3) EAC Treaty requires the Partner States to take 
immediately measures necessary to implement a judgment of the Court. However, the EACJ does 
not have judgment enforcement mechanisms of its own.608 It, thus, lacks legal rights to impose 
compliance with its judgments. In Burundian Journalists Union v. The Attorney General of 
Burundi, referred to above, the Court stated that it finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction to 
give any orders to a government.609 Implementation of the judgments of the Court depends on 
the political will of the Partner States. The Court’s legal system would, therefore, better be 
characterised as inter-governmental, not supranational as often referred to. On the other hand, 
the ECJ is a truly supranational body.610 While it has compulsory jurisdiction over all EU law, 
except  the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other smaller limitations, it has the final say 
on the interpretation and application of EU law and all national and EU bodies are bound by the 
interpretation.611   
3.3.3.7. The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA)  
The EALA is the legislative arm of the Community and is, as such, responsible for the legislative 
process. It is the counterpart of the European Parliament. The functions of the EALA are provided 
under Article 49 EAC Treaty and include legislative powers, investigative or supervisory, 
representation and budget oversight. Its main function is to legislate on aspects of East African 
cooperation. The EALA oversights all matters that fall within the Community's work and its 
functions include debating and approving the budget of the Community, making 
recommendations to the Council, and liaising with National Assemblies on matters pertaining to 
the Community. Of all African regional Parliaments and in the world more generally, the EALA is 
the only regional parliamentary body with the power to initiate legislation.612 Article 59(1) EAC 
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Treaty allows any member of the EALA to propose any motion or introduce any bill in the House. 
Rule 64 of the EALA Rules of Procedure of 2001 too provides that every committee of the House, 
within its area of competence, and every member of EALA has a right to move a private members’ 
bill. From its inauguration on 30 November 2001 to date, EALA has passed over 47 legislations, 
the majority of which originated from private members’ bills.613  
The power of the EALA to initiate legislation for the EAC is shared with the Council of Ministers 
whose decisions, regulations and directives made in pursuant of the provisions of the EAC Treaty 
are binding on the Partner States and on all organs and institutions of the Community except the 
Summit, the Court and the EALA within their jurisdictions. Additionally, the Council’s regulations, 
directives and decisions are equal to EALA laws. Kennedy Gastorn points out the tension existing 
in the shared law-making power between EALA as a legislative organ and the Council as a policy 
organ, which consequence is the passing of bills by EALA on matters under negotiation, opposed 
or agreed upon by the Council, hence reopening concluded negotiations as well as legislating on 
matters outside the scope of the Treaty.614 
Like the EALA, the European Parliament’s primary functions concern legislation, the budget, and 
political control.615 However, the European Parliament does not have the right of initiative 
although it can ask the Commission to submit a legislative proposal,616 in which case the 
Commission is obliged to act upon the request but this is not a formal right to initiate 
legislation.617 Only the European Commission, and in a few cases the Council, can initiate 
legislation.618 Consequently, the legislative power of the European Parliament consists in 
amending and adopting proposals.619 Depending on the legal basis underlying the proposed 
legislation, about three procedures apply to the legislative power of the European Parliament, 
namely the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (known before Lisbon as the ‘co-decision’ procedure), 
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the ‘consent procedure’, and the ‘consultation procedure’.620 The ordinary legislative procedure 
is the ‘normal’ or default mode to pass legislation. It is regulated by Article 294 TFEU. Under this 
procedure, the European Parliament is co-legislator, can veto legislation and propose 
amendments but the adoption of a legislative proposal must be approved by the Council of 
Ministers.621 Under the consent procedure, the Council formally adopts an act, but the European 
Parliament is requested to give its consent in certain legislative areas, as a special legislative 
procedure under Article 289(2) TFEU. The consultation procedure too is a special procedure 
under Article 289 TFEU and an exception to the ordinary legislative procedure. It requires the 
Council to consult the European Parliament.622 However, the Council is not actually bound by the 
Parliament’s opinion. This procedure is applicable in a limited number of policy areas.623 
Laws enacted by EALA are binding on the EAC Partner States and directly enforceable. They take 
precedence over all laws of the Partner States on similar matters pertaining to the 
implementation of the EAC Treaty, except national Constitutions.624 However, EALA’s power to 
make laws as a regional parliament is seriously constrained by two facts. On the one hand, it can 
only put forward and vote on motions and bills if they have no cost implications to any fund of 
the Community.625 Similarly, Article 59(1) EAC Treaty bars any motion that does not relate to the 
functions of the Community and any bill that does not relate to a matter to which acts of the 
Community may be enacted. On the other hand, the Heads of state of the Partner States must 
collectively assent to the motions and bills otherwise they lapse if a Head of State withholds 
assent.626 As a result, many private members’ bills passed by the EALA have not been operational 
for lack of assent by the Heads of state, including the EAC Human and Peoples Rights Bill passed 
on 25 April 2012, intending to establish an EAC human and peoples’ rights regime and give effect 
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to the provisions of the Treaty on matters of human and peoples’ rights.627 Like the EACJ, EALA is 
not a supranational institution and it lacks mechanisms to enforce its decisions, despite the 
power to make binding laws on all Partner States.  
Membership of the EALA consists of nine members per each Partner State. Their term of office is 
five years renewable once628, except ex-officio members who attend the Assembly by virtue of 
their official capacity and enjoy no security of tenure or term-limit. Ex-officio members of EALA 
do not participate fully in the legislative process as they have no voting right.629  They include the 
Minister responsible for EAC affairs in each Partner State, the Assistant Minister for EAC affairs 
(who attends the meetings of EALA in the absence of the substantive Minister), the Secretary 
General of the EAC and the Counsel to the Community.630  The term of office of Members of the 
European Parliament too is five years. Seats in the European Parliament are divided in accordance 
with the principle of degressive proportionality631 that attributes a minimum of six and a 
maximum of ninety-six seats to each Member State.632 Members of the European Parliament are 
elected by direct universal suffrage in national elections, unlike members of the EALA who are 
elected by their respective national parliaments.633 In practice, political parties represented in 
the national parliaments of the EAC Partner States nominate eligible members for the EALA. 
Ogbonnaya and Ogujiuba argue that the fact that members of EALA are not elected by direct 
universal suffrage undermines their legitimacy to make laws for the people of the region.634 They 
also observe that none of other regional parliaments in Africa has its members elected by popular 
vote or direct universal suffrage.635 While they acknowledge that the EALA is progressively 
evolving into a truly legislative organ of the EAC, in function and objective, compared to its 
counterparts in Africa with a more advisory power, they recommend an institutional and legal 
 
627 Gastorn, K. (2015). Op.Cit., p.39. 
628 Article 51(1) EAC Treaty. 
629 Article 58(2) EAC Treaty. 
630 Article 48(1) EAC Treaty. 
631 The principle means that smaller countries in the EU have fewer MEPs than bigger countries, but also that MEPs 
from larger countries represent more people than their counterparts from smaller countries. 
632 Article 14(2) TEU. 
633 Article 50(1) EAC Treaty. 
634 Ogbonnaya U.M. and K. Ogujiuba (2015). Op.Cit., pp.558 & 570. 
635 Ibid., p.565. 
119 
 
reform of membership of African regional parliaments towards a popular and direct universal 
election system, to enable the latter to contribute meaningfully to regional socio-economic and 
political integration.636 Indeed, EALA members need to be elected directly by the citizens of the 
Community if the principles enshrined in the EAC Treaty, such as good governance and people-
centered cooperation as well as the independence recognised to the Parliament should bear a 
real meaning.  
3.3.4. Pillars of the EAC 
The EAC adopted a linear integration process similar to that of the EU. It is an economic 
cooperation organisation that seeks to increase economic growth and sustainable development 
through trade and investment among the Partner States. The proposed sequence of the EAC 
integration includes a Customs Union as the entry point, a common market, a monetary union 
and ultimately a political federation.637 These four stages constitute the pillars of the 
Community’s integration strategy. 
3.3.4.1. The Customs Union 
Article 75 EAC Treaty provides for the conclusion of the protocol on the establishment of the 
Customs Union. The Protocol establishing the EAC Customs Union was adopted on 2nd March 
2004. It aims at liberalising trade among the Partner States and establishing free trade within the 
Community, with regard to goods originating from the Partner States. Accordingly, the Customs 
Union requires the Partner States to remove all tariff barriers to trade among them, including all 
duties, as well as non-tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions and prohibitions on trade in 
goods, except as provided for by the Protocol.638  
In addition to liberalisation of trade among the Partner States and consecutive removal of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers, the Customs Union Protocol establishes a CET for all goods imported in 
the Community, therefore establishing a single customs territory. The adopted CET provides a 
three band tariff as follows: 0% for meritorious, raw materials and capital goods; 10% for 
intermediate goods; and 25% for consumer or finished goods.639 The application of a CET 
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constitutes an exception to the GATT’s generalised Most Favoured Nations clause, an ancient 
technique that requires parties to a trade agreement to extend ipso facto to all the initial parties, 
without there being any negotiations, any additional advantage from any new agreement they 
may contract with a third party.640 The CET implies that the Partner States are expected to levy 
the same tariff rates for imports from non-member states and the same preferential tariff rates 
on imports from non-member states  with which they have a special trade agreement.641 In 
practice, however, it is not possible for states to belong to two different customs unions applying 
different CETs without what a joint report of the World Bank and the EAC calls a perforation of 
the CET.642 The EAC, like other African RECs, is characterised by a multi-membership of the 
constituent states. This is to say that members belong to more than one REC. In the EAC, Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda are also members of the COMESA. Tanzania is a member of the SADC. 
Burundi and Rwanda also belong to the ECCAS. A perforation of the CET affects the free 
movement of goods in a customs union as goods imported under a different CET may not be 
allowed to freely circulate across the borders of the members, unless the CETs are similar. In 
order to remedy to this conflicting situation, the Customs Union Protocol and other related 
regulations allow EAC Partner States to uphold tariff preferences granted to third countries as a 
temporary exception of the CET, provided such preferences had been agreed upon before the 
ratification of the EAC Customs Union Protocol.643  
The EAC Customs Union has still not been fully operational. In addition to persisting NTBs, it has 
been reported that the Partner States have in some cases introduced new explicitly protectionist 
NTBs, though the majority of them meet an agreed regulatory objective, such as food and 
product safety.644  
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Another challenge that slows down the EAC Customs Union is the fact that a revenue sharing 
mechanism has not yet been agreed by the Partner States.645 The formation of a customs union 
requires members to agree on modalities for sharing tariff revenue. The EAC Treaty itself affirms 
that the benefits of the integration shall be equitably shared.646 Matambalya advances that there 
should be mechanisms to ensure equitable sharing of the costs of integration among members 
of a customs union and that in the absence of such mechanisms the same countries which reap 
the highest benefits of integration will also bear the smallest burden.647 One of the reasons for 
the collapse of earlier integration efforts, indeed of the EAC in 1977, was the perception of a 
disproportionate sharing of economic benefits accruing from the regional market and a lack of a 
formula to deal with the problem.648 The current EAC, therefore, needs to address problems 
arising from the implementation of the Treaty, including the Customs Union (and the Common 
Market). 
 The establishment of the customs union in 2005 was intended to progress over a period of five 
years, with a fully-fledged customs union in place in 2010. The goal has not been fully achieved 
as the EAC Customs Union has not been complete. Holmes and Rollo cautiously argue that the 
EAC is not yet a Customs Union in anything but name, reckoning that it took the EU 35 years to 
remove internal customs barriers.649 The next phase in the EAC economic integration as defined 
by the EAC Treaty is a common market. 
3.3.4.2. The EAC Common Market. 
The establishment of the Common Market among the EAC Partner States is provided for by 
Article 76 of the EAC Treaty and defined in the Common Market Protocol signed on 30 November 
1999 and entered into force in 2010. The Common Market Protocol (as well as the Treaty) 
introduced four freedoms as follows: the free movement of goods, of capital, of services, of 
persons and labour, the latter coupled with the right of establishment and residence.  
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 The free movement of persons who are citizens of the Partner States is provided for under Article 
7 of the Common Market Protocol. It includes the freedom to move within, stay in and exit the 
territory of the Partner States without any restrictions. Under the Common Market Protocol, East 
African citizens are eligible to enter the territories of the Partner States without a visa, subject to 
the use of a valid common standard travel document. In order to ease the movement of citizens 
across the borders, the EAC launched a biometric passport at the 17th Ordinary Summit of the 
Heads of state on 2nd March 2016.650 The 35th meeting of EAC Council of Ministers of 30th March-
4th April 2017 directed the Partner States to start issuing the new EAC passport by 31st December 
2018.651  
 3.3.4.3. The East African Community Monetary Union  
The EAMU was established on 30th November 2013 and is currently being implemented. It aims 
at promoting and maintaining monetary and financial stability.652 The EAMU Protocol envisages 
the adoption of a single currency and thus the constitution of a single currency area.653 The 
Protocol subjects the adoption of the single currency by at least three Partner States that fulfil, 
amongst other requirements, full implementation of the customs union and common market, 
and the attainment and maintenance of macroeconomic convergence.654 The adoption of a single 
currency will realistically take a long time due to the unfinished implementation of the customs 
union and common market.  
3.3.4.5. Political federation 
Political federation constitutes the last stage in the integration plan of the EAC and is defined as 
the ultimate objective of the Community. It is a political system in which two or more states come 
together to form a super-state under a single political authority. The EAC Treaty does not assert 
the establishment of a political federation with the same vigour as for the preceding three 
economic pillars. Article 123 EAC Treaty refers to ‘the eventual establishment of a Political 
Federation of the Partner States’. While this may be interpreted as reducing or affecting the 
 
650 Joint Communiqué of the 17th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of state, item 17. 
651 http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20170407/eac-start-issuing-ea-e-passport-january-2018, 
consulted on 4th July 2017. 
652 Article 3 EAC Monetary Union Protocol. 
653 Article 18 EAC Monetary Union Protocol. 
654 Ibid. 
123 
 
political will necessary to the attainment of political federation, it may also be understood as 
reinforcing the Treaty’s preservation of national sovereignty of the Partner States observed 
through, for instance, the lack of enforcement mechanisms for the decisions made by the 
institutions of the Community. Moreover, the Treaty is not specific about the type or model of 
political federation envisaged by the EAC. A model, Structure and Action Plan for the East African 
political Federation, as well as a Constitution, are currently under discussion by the Summit of 
the Heads of States.655 
The envisaged political federation in the EAC is built on three main foundations and the 
commitment of the Partner States to establish specific frameworks for cooperation in those 
spheres. Firstly, the Partner States commit to adopt common foreign and security policies (Article 
123 EAC Treaty). Secondly, they agree to adopt common mechanisms in matters relating to peace 
and security, specifically disaster and refugees’ management, cross-border crimes, drug 
trafficking and terrorism (Article 124 EAC Treaty). Lastly, the Partner States commit to cooperate 
and establish a framework in defence affairs (Article 125 EAC Treaty). So far, the EAC Partner 
States have adopted a number of protocols under the scope of political federation, including the 
Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination, the Protocol on Peace and Security, the Protocol on 
Defence, and the Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East African Region. However, 
the EAC is confronting to a challenge with ratification of some of these instruments. The EAC 
Partner States are largely dualist systems regarding the relationship between their national laws 
and international law including regional laws.656 According to article 151(4) EAC Treaty, Protocols 
are integral parts of the Treaty. Article 8(2) EAC Treaty provides for domestication of the Treaty, 
thus implicitly extending the same requirement to protocols. The domestication process has 
been halting the full implementation of the protocols. For instance, the Protocol on Peace and 
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Security, signed in 2013 after more than four years of negotiations, has still not been ratified by 
all Partner States. As of April 2017, it was reported that only Rwanda and Uganda have ratified it 
and that at least two Partner States have not yet done so, South Sudan being presumably one of 
them.657 The lack of collective ratification slows down the entry into force and the full 
implementation of the Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination too, since its conclusion in 
2010.658 While the Partner States negotiate instruments and reach an agreement on regulatory 
frameworks often after difficult and lengthy negotiation processes, it seems absurd that they do 
not ratify them on time. This has raised a concern and a lot of criticisms about the Partner States’ 
political will and commitment towards the whole process of integration in the EAC. Their lack of 
political will is often explained by the fear by political leaders of a loss of national sovereignty and 
a concern that the Partner States would basically be relegated to powerless subjects of the 
Community.659  In this regard, Ruhangisa Eudes advances the view that the Partner States 
maintain a considerable degree of sovereignty, despite the expression of their desire for ceding 
some of their sovereignty to a supranational EAC.660 He further argues that the Partner States are 
not wholly ready to cede a substantive part of their sovereignty.661 Nevertheless, the Partner 
States have relinquished some, though not significant, sovereignty to the EAC, at least in the 
identified areas of cooperation. The signing of protocols in the framework of political federation, 
the removal of barriers to trade and the establishment of a CET in the Customs union, the 
provision of freedom of movement of people, goods and factors of production in the Common 
Market, and harmonization of laws and convergence of policies are all the expression of the 
multilevel process of regionalization that fills the EAC with institutional and political ties, political 
trust, interdependence, and increased homogeneity.  
The Treaty places people at the centre of integration effort in the EAC. The fir st operational 
principle of the Community as outlined in Article 7 EAC Treaty reads ‘people-centered and 
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market-driven cooperation’. As argued in the theoretical chapter, a successful regional project 
presupposes linkages between states and non-state actors. Contrary to the defunct EAC and 
other older regional schemes in Africa that stressed formal structures and inter-governmental 
actions to the exclusion of non-state actors and informal linkages and processes of interaction, 
the current EAC is typically an expression of the new regionalism that  came up as a response to 
globalisation, especially the challenges posed by transnational actors and challenges to the 
nation state, such as financial crises, migration, environmental degradation, transnational crime, 
etc.662 Morten Bøâs acknowledges the recognition by the current EAC of the grass-root people, 
wananchi, small-scale traders, people on the ground who use informal routes and networks for 
their goods and services across the borders and who actually stand to benefit most from the 
opening of borders663. Koroma et al. argue that a discussion of regional integration and trade in 
Africa will be incomplete without examining the relevance of informal or sometimes also referred 
to as illegal cross-border trade.664 In Eat Africa, it accounts for over fifty percent of intra-regional 
trade, particularly agricultural products.665 Informal cross-border trade constitutes what is 
sometimes called shadow regionalism or informal regionalism in Africa, as opposed to state-
directed market driven regionalism. It consists of informal networks often involved in illegal 
transactions across borders, including organised crime, drug dealers, terrorism groups, clan 
leaders and warlords.666 Accordingly, Bøâs calls for the need to grasp the dynamics of informal 
regionalism, firstly by adopting a dynamic understanding of  the region as a social construct and 
not just a geographical understanding of the region or formal political and economic cooperation; 
secondly, by studying informal regionalism from below and accounting for the networks involved, 
including smuggling and crime.667  
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Conclusion 
The EAC has been criticised for being overambitious and for speeding up the integration process 
before progressively completing each of the stages of integration, the last, political integration, 
having been a subject of a fast-tracking mechanism initiated by the Summit of the Heads of State 
since 2004. Whereas fast-tracking political integration is commendable from the point of view of 
the academic debate, it has been argued that political integration should come first or drive 
economic integration, or at least both pursued at same time. Also, the EAC multi -pronged 
approach to integration, though appreciated, is often said to be rigid and to lack sufficient space 
for careful sequencing that a regional integration scheme needs to maximise the benefits.  
As a multidimensional regional cooperation institution that goes beyond trade to include social, 
cultural and political integration, the study of the EAC must take into consideration bottom-up 
and informal processes that engage in illegal transactions across the borders. Particularly, the 
debate over the merits and demerits of regional integration refers to the possibility of increased 
transnational organised crime as a direct consequence of the removal of borders and free 
movement of people inherent to regional integration schemes. It is precisely the nature and 
magnitude of organised crime in the EAC that the next chapter addresses. 
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4. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN EAST AFRICA 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the status of transnational crime in East Africa. It argues that transnational 
crime phenomenon in East Africa is on the rise. The crimes considered in the chapter are not 
exhaustive but constitute, arguably, a representative sample of transnational criminal activity in 
the East African region.  
The main research that informs the chapter consists of the EAC commissioned “Study to assess 
transnational organised crime and terror ism in the EAC region” (2015) and three reports 
published by the UNODC in 2009, 2011 and 2013. Reports made by The Sentry (2015, 2016, 2017) 
too contributed significantly in the chapter but in relation to money laundering only. This thesis 
could not collect data on transnational crimes directly from the Partner States for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was costly and not practical to travel to all the EAC Partner States for collecting the data. 
Secondly, accessing countries data on transnational organised crimes is generally considered 
difficult because sometimes they are treated as confidential and they are often scattered. The 
viable option for the thesis was relying on reports made by credible international organisations 
and specialized agencies like the UNODC. The reliability of the data collected by the organisations 
is arguable. Nevertheless, the thesis gives credit to the data based on the methods used in their 
collection. The “Study to assess transnational organised crime and terrorism in the EAC region” 
(2015), e.g., analysed national crime reports (on registered cases and court cases) and statistics 
from the police and relevant government departments in some Partner States.668 It also analysed 
written briefs, existing documents and media reports.669 It conducted interviews too with key 
stake holders at national police, Interpol national and regional bureaus, prosecution and 
government departments.670 The UNODC study on “Organised Crime and trafficking in Eastern 
Africa” (2009) is based on UNDOC data, secondary information, interviews with representatives 
of government institutions, international organisations and NGOs.671 The two other UNODC 
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studies provide no more information than data and information were reported by governments 
to UNODC and other international organisations. The Sentry report “War Crime Shouldn’t Pay” 
(2016) states it conducted interviews with experts and eyewitnesses and reviewed corporate 
findings, legal records, financial data and correspondence, and analysed UN and other official 
documents, and international and local news accounts.672 With such limited and fragmented 
quantitative data, the chapter’s aim is not to provide a full account of transnational organised 
crimes in the EAC, rather to establish their existence and magnitude. 
The first section of the chapter lays down the context of the emergence of transnational crime 
globally. The second section defines transnational crime and presents its characteristics and 
distinctiveness from other crimes. The third section discusses the particular context of East Africa 
as a growing illicit market and the reasons for such situation. The fourth section discusses the 
operational modes of the criminal networks involved in transnational crime in East Africa. The 
last section presents the extent of selected transnational crimes in East Africa.  
4.1. A historical account 
The study of transnational crime as such is relatively recent. The term is considered to have 
entered the vocabulary of criminology after the introduction of the concept of transnational 
actors by International Relations in the 1970s.673 The concept of transnational crime is considered 
to have been coined at the 5th UN Congress on crime prevention in 1975.674 However, early 
manifestations of transnational crime are referred to with regard to deliberate illegal trade 
between Britain and Spain’s colonies in South America, in the first half of the 18th century, as 
well as the introduction, by Britain, of an opium market in China by the 19th century, despite the 
restrictions of opium in Britain itself.675 
Serious concerns over transnational crime arose in the 1980s.676 Transnational crime was then 
expanding to broader criminal activities. This expansion of transnational crime is explained by a 
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series of transformations that the world order was undergoing, precisely technology advances in 
transport and communication, and globalisation.677 
Technological advances have increased the mobility of people and goods across the borders of 
countries and facilitated communication among people across the planet as well as transactions 
and the transfer of funds. The development of transport has reduced the cost of travel and has 
resulted in a greater mobility of people, including criminals. As a result, illicit market has 
expanded and illegal trade and illicit trafficking in prohibited goods have flourished. The 
reduction of costs of transportation and communication has brought interdependence, 
interconnection and a closer integration of countries which, in essence, is what globalisation 
means, a borderless world where flows of ideas, people, transactions, cultures, values, norms 
and crimes increasingly move across the borders with less restrictions.678  
If globalisation is generally perceived as positive for fostering human rights especially those of 
women and children, and bringing a greater awareness of global challenges such as environment 
protection, global warming, infectious diseases including HIV, Ebola, it is also said to produce 
negative consequences, of which the growth and expansion of transnational crime such as 
terrorism, trafficking in people and drugs, migrant smuggling, money laundering, and 
corruption.679 In this era of increased globalisation in which the world is often described as a 
global village, states have become less powerful while transnational actors have greatly emerged 
and established themselves as key subjects of the international system. This process is facilitated 
by regionalism, an intermediate step to globalisation, and associated liberalisation of the market, 
the establishment of common markets, of freedom of movement of goods, people and capital, 
and the removal of borders between countries. Criminal gangs take advantage of fast 
transactions and transfer of fund eased by new technology, the ease of transport and movement, 
as well as the weakening and failure of states, and loopholes in national legal systems, to 
establish illegal business or, sometimes, front legal business alongside illegal activities.680  
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The late 1980s witnessed major events that were of critical importance for the development of 
transnational crimes. First, was the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union which opened Eastern Europe to the West and prompted the 
creation of many new states.681 This new development signalled the apparent triumph of 
democracy over totalitarianism and was hailed as the victory of capitalism over socialism. It was 
highly significant in global politics and restructured the international system, putting an end to 
the traditional divide between the East and the West. However, the newly created states were 
often weak and unstable.682 Their subsequent collapse and the outbreak of the Balkan war at the 
beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century prompted illegal migration of East 
Europeans to West and Central Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that 
thousands of skilled workers left unemployed constituted a resource for organised crime 
including surveillance, forging documents, smuggling, banking and financial crime, and violence, 
giving criminal gangs profitable criminal activities such as trafficking women for the sex trade, 
smuggling cigarettes and other goods, and trafficking drugs.683   
4.2. Understanding transnational crime: Definition 
There is no exact and agreed upon definition of ‘transnational crime’.684 The term ‘transnational 
crime’, as such, is not a legal concept but a framework under which a series of offences is 
analysed. In accordance with the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, 
transnational crime is a form of organized crime although the latter does not exist as an ideal 
type but rather as a degree of criminal activity.685 The Convention itself does not provide a 
definition of organized crime. Instead, organized crime is understood as a ‘serious crime’ 
committed by an ‘organised criminal group’.686 According to Article 2 of the Convention, 
‘organised criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of two or more people committing 
serious crimes for profit or material benefit. The EU Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA 
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on the fight against organised crime also contains similar wording defining ‘criminal organization’ 
as a structured association of more than two persons committing, for profit or material benefit, 
offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty.687 Article 2 of the UN Convention referred to above defines a 
‘serious crime’ as a ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of 
liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty. While there is similarity between the two 
instruments in terms of the meaning of ‘organised criminal group’ or ‘criminal organization’, the 
UN Convention remains the most important and legally binding instrument on transnational 
organised crime that states in all parts of the world can ratify. 
Organised crime groups are characterized by the presence of individuals at the local, national, 
regional or transnational levels.688 They are often dynamic networks with loose structures and 
international connections.689 While there is consensus that organised crime tends to be restricted 
to illegal goods and services, it is also noted that organised criminal groups simultaneously 
engage in legal activities for three major purposes: concealing their illegal activities, washing the 
dirty money from crime, and using the laundering of profit from organised crime to gain 
respectability in society.690 
Most doctrinal definitions of organized crime emphasize  its primary aim as profit making, the 
focus of its activities on outlawed goods and services, the significance of violence and corruption 
in its maintenance, and its hierarchical structure and relative organizational permanency.691 The 
consensus academic definition of organized crime reads as follows: Organised crime is a 
continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often 
in great pubic demand.692 Organised crimes that are perpetrated across national borders are 
referred to as transnational organized crimes.693 The concepts of transnational crime, organized 
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crime and transnational organized crime are often unconsciously used synonymously but, in 
reality, they are distinct although interwoven phenomena. Hence, it is important to clarify this 
chapter’ s analytical concept, transnational crime.  
Although transnational crime is a form of organised crime, it is not necessarily organised or 
perpetrated by organisations, particularly in the context of states where borders are fluid and 
goods distribution and supply networks are substantially controlled by informal sector.694 
Therefore, transnational crimes may be understood as criminal activities by an individual, 
individuals or even regimes, across two or more countries.695 The distinctiveness of transnational 
crime is the breach of territorial sovereignty, involving crimes across and beyond borders.  By its 
nature, it connects source, transit, and destination countries.696  
Scholars advance different definitions of ‘transnational crime’. Vincenzo Ruggiero put forward 
the standard definition of transnational crime as offences whose inception, prevention, and 
direct effects involve more than one country.697 Pankratz and Hanns apply a constructivist 
approach to transnational crime and consider the phenomenon as a social construction.698 Jay 
Albanese views transnational crime as a law violation that involve more than one country in its 
planning, execution, or impact.699Transnational crime can be defined simply as crimes that cross 
borders or acts that violate the laws of more than one country. The term ‘cross-border crimes’ is 
sometimes used as an equivalent to that of transnational crimes.700 Article 3 (2) UN Convention 
on Transnational Organised Crime provides that an offence is transnational in nature if it is 
committed in one state but is planned or controlled in another ( (a), (b) ), if it is committed in one 
state by groups that operate in more than one states ( (c) ), or if it is committed in one state and 
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impacts on other states  ((d) ). Subparagraph (c) expands the notion of ‘transnational’ to not only 
criminal activities but to actors too.   
Transnational crimes are different from domestic crimes. They require two or more people to 
carry out criminal offenses which cannot simply be undertaken by offenders without contacts in 
other countries.701  It  might make sense to treat as domestic crimes those committed by local 
groups or gangs which do not operate beyond national borders, no matter how serious the crimes 
are in a given state or the gangs fit the definition of an organised criminal group under the UN 
Convention on Transnational Organised Crime. The level of required organisation in a 
transnational crime is arguable and may depend on the complexity of the networks involved.702  
There are more nuances that could be made to clarify the distinctiveness of transnational crimes 
from international crimes too. The difference between the two types of crimes is particularly 
blurred.703 International crimes are crimes prohibited by international laws, norms, treaties and 
customs, whereas transnational crimes are specifically concerned with acts criminalised by the 
laws of more than one country.704 Transnational crimes affect the interests of more than one 
country and not necessarily the world whereas the effect of international crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, is global. That is not to deny the widely held opinion 
that transnational crimes constitute a global threat and challenge.  
Different typologies of transnational criminal networks have been theorised by scholars. They 
include highly complex and hierarchical networks to less structured gangs and even loose 
individuals whose role may not involve huge operations.705 The typologies advance social, 
cultural, political and economic explanations of transnational crime phenomenon and the 
operational structure of organised crime networks worldwide. Social explanations, for instance, 
put forward ethnical aspects to understand crime syndicates in Northern America or mafia 
network in Italy such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, or even the Japanese Yakuza.706 Cultural 
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explanations examine the involvement of family members in specific forms of organised crimes 
of which their relatives are victims. They have been used to understand organised crime at 
different levels in certain jurisdictions including Asia and Africa. For example, the belief in the 
aphrodisiac power of rhino horns in Chinese traditional medicine and in tiger penises in Korea, 
Vietnam and Indonesia, the use of shark fins for gourmet soup in China, is put forward to explain 
the thriving of poaching of endangered species.707 Political explanations, by contrast, focus on 
the state apparatus and link organised crime to state failure, authoritarianism and weak rule of 
law.708 It is often advanced that states’ economic policies and prohibitions of illicit activities 
actually create opportunities for organised crimes such as medical drugs counterfeit, smuggling 
of cigarettes protected species, and prohibited substances, etc.709 Some states’ policies  
facilitating female labour export for overseas employment and promoting tourism as a foreign 
exchange earner allude to a certain theory of state’s ‘conspiracy’ in transnational crime.710 
Similarly, a report on state-sponsored smuggling indicates an ironic situation where states enact 
laws and ratify international conventions prohibiting all sorts of illegal activities, on the one hand, 
and engage in same activities of which they financially benefit, for example sales in weapons, on 
the other hand.711  
Economic explanations suggest that organised crime is a criminal enterprise aimed always at 
making profit and personal gain.712 The profit motive distinguishes organised crime from 
international crimes whose aims could be political or religious hatred.713  Economic approaches 
to organised crime analyse the criminal market from a supply-demand perspective, and makes a 
correlation between organised crime and the growth in demand for illegal criminal services.714 
Economic explanations view organised crime as a product of market forces and capable to 
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respond to new demand and to strategically divert its illegal background by using legal business. 
Albanese and Pankratz and Hanns emphasise the importance of focusing on analysing the 
criminal market rather than the actors and networks, in order to understand the reasons 
organised crime flourishes.715 Pankratz and Hanns too point out the need to include a 
’marketplace approach’ in addition to the organisational/network - focused perspective to 
transnational crime.716 
As a form of organised crime, transnational crime is not just motivated by profit and personal 
gain from illicit activities but its existence is also sustained by the use of force, threats, monopoly 
control and corruption.717 Organised criminals often use violence to maintain their control over 
victims, in cases of human trafficking and migrant smuggling,718 for example, but also to impose 
their criminal activities on the populations and ascertain their power, in the case of warlords. 
They use violence not only to obtain and defend their control and possession of commodities but 
also for their own protection as well as that of their assets, and their illicit networks and 
businesses. Specifically, violence occurs in human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms sales, piracy, 
trafficking of minerals, warlordism, etc. It takes the form of murder, serious physical and 
psychological harm, damages to the environment and to animals including poaching of protected 
species.  
If violence is the most visible modus operandi of organised crime, corruption plays a crucial role 
in its planning, execution and sustainment. Organised crime groups resort to corruption in order 
to obtain the goods, to avail them and to protect their members from prosecution. It seeks to 
infiltrate the state’s system in order to secure the support it needs to prosper but also to establish 
a parallel system of power and control, undermining the state’s capacity and accountability.  
Despite the lack of consensus about the definition of transnational crime, there seems to be an 
agreement that it encompasses a wide array of criminal activities. This is reflected by various 
attempts at categorising transnational crime proposed by scholars and by the United Nations too. 
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The categorisation proposed by Jay Albanese,719 for example, is particularly striking for its 
consideration of three broad objectives of transnational crimes as follows: 
- Provision of illicit goods: Drug trafficking, stolen property and counterfeiting. 
- Provision of illicit services: Human trafficking, cybercrime and fraud, commercial vices 
(Example, illegal sex and gambling). 
- Infiltration of business or government: Extortion and racketeering, money laundering, 
and corruption. 
There are unlimited criminal activities that could constitute transnational crimes. The progress in 
new technologies creates new forms of crimes or at least changes the way the crimes are 
committed. A transnational crime, whether classic types such as drug and human trafficking, or 
more modern and computer aided forms of hacking or identity theft, will necessarily fit any of 
the categories above. Computer-aided crimes are not often new crimes but rather modern forms 
of existing crimes that are made possible by the use of sophisticated technology.720 
4.3. The particular context of East Africa  
It is crucial to understand the reason East Africa is particularly prone to transnational crime. The 
end of the Cold War spurred a series of political and economic reforms that prompted African 
states to abandon authoritarian regime types in favour of more democratic and pluralist 
governance systems.721 Many African states, including East Africans, started to liberalise their 
economies and to privatise the public service in an attempt to achieve increased efficiency and 
productivity.722 At the same time, the wave of the new regionalism revived many regional 
organisations that had previously collapsed, such as the EAC, and inspired the creation of new 
ones. The spirit of the new regionalism is open market, the recognition of bottom-up processes 
and the participation of ordinary people in the conduct of regional projects723. This market driven 
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regional cooperation meant the elimination of barriers to trade, the opening of borders to allow 
unrestricted movement of people, goods and services, and the economic integration of the 
countries.724 This situation raises concerns in the context of East Africa, and the whole Africa 
indeed, where the boundaries between formal and informal economies are blurred.725 The 
prominence of the informal economy in many parts of Africa, including East Africa, is emphasised 
in many studies and is often associated with what has come to be termed ‘shadow regionalism’, 
which is a complex mode of regionalism supported by regime actors for their self-financial 
interests, and involving small-scale traders and vendors of all types of goods (fruits, staple 
products, clothes, small appliances, etc.).726 Söderbaum argues that shadow regionalism in Africa 
takes advantage of large border disparities and it has, hence, expanded to more criminal activities 
such as illicit trade in drugs such as heroin, cocaine, mandrax, and light weapons, etc.727 In 
addition to the threat posed by the informal economy in East Africa, poverty, social inequality, 
economic crisis are all factors that explain the reason informal workers, petty traders, street 
vendors, self-employed agents, families engage in illicit and criminal market.728 
Other contextual factors that explain organised crime in East Africa include lack of or low public 
awareness of organised crime as well as poor knowledge and the limited capacity of law 
enforcement agencies to deal with the phenomenon.729 The forces in the EAC Partner States have 
different levels of training and appreciation on how to deal with organised crimes.730 The lack of 
knowledge affects case management and the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute 
transnational organised crime which, in turn, has an effect on conviction rate.731 East Africa, like 
most of the continent, is not exempted from this challenge. 
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Above all, corruption is perhaps the most important factor that enables and encourages criminal 
organisations to operate their illegal businesses without any fear of arrest and prosecution. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, corruption in East Africa is endemic. Except Rwanda which has 
been ranked 50 in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 and third to Botswana and Mauritius 
in Africa, all other East African countries are placed among the most corrupt amongst 176 
surveyed countries. South-Sudan is listed as  second to the last, whereas Somalia, one of the 
countries in the broader Eastern Africa region is last.732 Of significance for this research, the police 
and the judiciary are cited as the most corrupt institutions in East Africa.733 The respondents to 
the interviews for this thesis too recognized corruption is rampant in the EAC and they made a 
correlation between high levels of corruption in national criminal justice agencies and the 
occurrence of crimes.734 Corruption is not just a means for criminal organisations to facilitate 
their activities but it is also, as such, an organised crime. As a means, it is used by criminal 
organisations to seek for protection from powerful elites and to guarantee themselves against 
prosecution, indictment, sentencing and imprisonment. Criminal organisations strive to infiltrate 
the state apparatus at all levels. Therefore, corruption represents a threat in terms of 
transnational crime in East Africa, but an examination of this particular aspect is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The growth of transnational crime in East Africa is also explained by the weakening or the 
implosion of the state’s authority in neighbouring countries such as the DRC and Somalia and the 
onset of a series of brutal wars since the early 1990s in Rwanda and the DRC.735 Ongoing political 
instability in countries surrounding the EAC (the DRC, Somalia, Central  African Republic) and 
within the Community itself (Burundi) has unleashed wave of violence and spread small arms, 
light weapons and other munitions amongst civilians and non-state armed groups, so called 
negative forces, such as the Ugandan LRA, the Kenyan Mungiki, the Rwandan FDLR, and the 
Somali Al Shabaab. These non-state armed groups operate across the borders of East African 
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countries. The LRA, for example, although eradicated in Northern Uganda where it originated, is 
currently believed to have established itself across the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan. Similarly, 
the Rwandan FRDL operate in DRC while Somali Al Shabaab’s repeated attacks in Kenya and 
Uganda has raised considerable concern about terrorism in the region. The involvement of non-
state armed groups in organised crime and illicit trafficking in East Africa has been documented 
by various reports. The smuggling of minerals and timber from Eastern DRC, for example, has 
been attributed to the LRA and the FDLR.736 Also, piracy on the Indian Ocean has been linked to 
Al Shabaab militias. The presence of non-state armed groups in the EAC and its surrounding 
neighbourhood, their involvement in organised crime and the amount of violence they cause to 
the populations contribute to making the region more vulnerable to organised crime and provoke 
illegal immigration of East Africans, exposing women and children in particular to sexual 
exploitation and forced labour. 
The most significant contextual explanation of organised crime in East Africa relates to its 
strategic location off the shores of the Indian Ocean with major ports in Kenya (Mombasa) and 
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Lindi and Tanga) and its long history of trade with Arab traders. East 
Africa makes an enormous contribution to global trade since over ninety percent of such trade is 
conducted by sea. The region has been identified as a hub for transnational crime and illicit 
trafficking since it is located in the middle of the trade route between Asia and Europe.737 East 
Africa is said to increasingly playing middleman role for illicit trade.738  
A criminal hub is, at least in relation to the EU, as quoted by Pankratz and Hanns, a conceptual 
entity generated by a combination of factors, such as proximity to major target ma rkets, 
geographic location, infrastructure, types of organised crime groups and migration processes 
involving key criminals or organised crime groups in general.739 East Africa presents all the above 
characteristics. It is a transit zone for illicit trade and a source as well as a destination for illicit 
and criminal goods. The UNODC transnational organised crime threat assessment report on 
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Eastern Africa indicates that the cost of trafficking seems not to discourage organised crime 
networks whose objective is to find areas where their business and networks would circumvent 
any interference, arrest or prosecution.740 Among the factors that motivate criminal 
organisations to identify safer routes is weak criminal justice systems and legal loopholes or 
simply lack of appropriate legislation to curb organised crime. Accordingly, transnational crime is 
seen as a major threat to the rule of law, if the rule of law was to be defined as the just 
administration of predictable social rules (order) and their compliance with international 
standards (human rights).741 
4.4. Transnational networks in East Africa 
Understanding how transnational criminal networks operate in East Africa is vital both for 
preventive measures and for policymaking in general. A distinction needs to be made between 
the criminal networks, on the one hand, and the routes and the means they use, on the other 
hand. Criminal network refers to organised crime group as defined in Article 2(a) of the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime: a structured group of three or more persons 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefits”. 
Transnational crime in East Africa is conducted by powerful criminal networks that involve Asian 
and European groups, regional groups as well as local gangs. These criminal networks are 
involved in the procurement, processing and transport of illicit goods across the borders. Various 
nationals have been mentioned in the Asian networks which involve Chinese, Iranians, Pakistani, 
Indians and Malaysians. Regional gangs comprise mainly Nigerians based in East Africa, some 
holding allegedly dubious South African passports obtained through corruption, fraud, or 
marriage.742 East African criminal networks are said to be fluid and flexible.743 They comprise 
national criminal syndicates, family networks with extended family across country borders, 
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independent businesses and small scale loose organisations.744  These local gangs are organised 
into middlemen who run façade businesses, and buyers. The collaboration and interaction among 
local and foreign criminal groups enable a transfer of skills, enhance the capabilities and 
organisational infrastructure of the groups, and facilitate access to resources.745 At the local level, 
influential people, political figures and people in high positions within the judiciary, law 
enforcement, the military, abusing their positions play a vital role in facilitating the crimes in East 
African countries.746 Reports allege that business people and non-state armed groups engage in 
arms trade across the borders and barter weapons for timber, minerals, coffee and commodities 
such as motorcycles. 
The modus operandi of transnational criminal networks in East Africa includes the use of transit 
by sea, air and land. In drug trafficking, for example, various reports have established that heroin 
is transported from Southwest Asia across the sea to the shores of East Africa. It is suggested that 
Afghan opium is moved by land across the Makran region to Pakistan.747 The drug is then shipped 
to the ports of East Africa. It is suggested that the seizure of drugs in East Africa during the 
monsoon suggests that the drugs are carried by dhows used by Arab traders for centuries, to 
carry merchandise on the Indian Ocean for trade along the coasts of East Africa.748 It is further 
argued that maritime containers are also used for the transport of drugs outside the monsoon 
season. Containers serve also for moving drugs inland from East African seaports. Main East 
African Sea ports in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam are targeted though traffickers move further 
down to southern Tanzania port of Lindi, for example, to avoid any interception.  
East Africa is particularly attracted as a transit zone because of its seaports. For transnational 
criminal networks, the coasts of East Africa represent a remote area and a safer itinerary for 
trafficking their illicit goods. East Africa plays the role of transit zone for drugs destined for 
European and West African markets. A possible explanation for this diverted route is tight control 
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in the Balkan route that connects Southwest Asia to South-Eastern Europe via Turkey.749 There 
are concerns that East Africa might become the new Balkan route for global drug trafficking.750 
In addition to the maritime routes, transnational criminal networks also operate by air. 
Specifically, illicit trafficking is conducted through airfreight and air courier. Air transport is used 
not only for illicit goods in transit but also for those destined to East Africa as well as for those 
originating from the region. Major airports, particularly Entebbe, in Uganda, and Jomo Kenyatta, 
in Kenya, are mentioned as growing targets for traffickers. Possible reasons advanced include 
weak law enforcement capability and corruption. With an expanding air traffic and connections 
to major cities such as Dubai in the UAE and Doha in Qatar, East Africa is increasingly being seen 
as a hub for transnational crime.  
The third method used by transnational criminal networks in East Africa is land transit. Traffickers 
take advantage of porous borders to move illicit goods between East African countries. Lengthy 
borders, informal border crossing points, inadequate human and communication resources in 
some border posts, especially in remote, rural and coastal regions, shortage and lack of electricity 
are all make East African national frontiers porous.751 Reports point out that land is used by 
criminals to smuggle timber, wildlife and minerals across Eastern DRC to East Africa, for shipment 
to Europe.752 Land is also the main transportation way for intra-regional transnational crime 
across the borders of East African countries as well as for illicit drugs destined to South Africa and 
Mauritius.753  
East Africa is not just a transit. It is also a destination and a source or origin for illicit goods such 
as drugs, for trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, as well as illicit trafficking of 
ivory. The trafficking involves expatriate communities in East Africa, notably Chinese for illicit 
trade of ivory. A link has not yet been established between Iranian Balochs traffickers arrested in 
East Africa in connection with the trafficking of drugs and Baloch communities established in the 
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region.754 Reports, however, indicate, in cases of human trafficking, that the presence of an 
established diaspora often contributes to the facilitation of trafficking.755  
Whether seaports, airports or land, traffickers are attracted by the low likelihood of detection 
and interception, and the prospect of corrupting or bribing the security and control professionals 
at border posts. 
4.5. Specific transnational crimes in East Africa 
4.5.1. Trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants 
Human trafficking and migrants smuggling constitute two overlapping forms of the same criminal 
activity, irregular migration, an area that has become profitable for organised criminal who 
provide their services to people from less-developed regions of the world to reach richer 
countries.756 The distinction between the two phenomena was never formally formally 
established in law until the adoption of two protocols supplementing the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime adopted in 2000, also referred to as the Palermo Convention. The 
first, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and 
children, which entered into force on 25 December 2003, defines trafficking in persons as the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.757 The second, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
entered into force on 28 January 2004, defines the smuggling of migrants as the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of 
a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.758  
 
754 Ibid, p.24. 
755 UNODC (2009). Op.Cit., p.18. 
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757 Article 3 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children , 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. 
758 Article 3 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime. 
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Further distinction between human trafficking and migrant smuggling is elaborated in the two 
protocols and concerns the means by which the two acts are committed and the relevance of the 
consent of the victims. Accordingly, the purpose of human trafficking is exploitation for 
prostitution, forced labour, slavery, servitude or the removal of organs and it is characterised by 
the coercion or the deception of victims whose consent is de facto nullified. Migrant smuggling, 
however, is characterised by a profit motive deriving from a contractual relationship between 
the would-be migrant and the smuggler759, which often terminates upon the arrival in the 
destination country. Hence, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants does not make any 
reference to migrants as victims and it does not state any provision regarding their consent, 
presumably because they are considered to have voluntarily used smugglers.760 
Human trafficking as well as migrant smuggling in East Africa are both motivated by economic 
and political reasons such as poor and conflict torn states, unemployment, income levels, the 
deaths of parents, education and the prospect of better conditions and increased opportunities 
in other states.761 Most victims are lured by the promise of a good job, a higher salary, improved 
education opportunities and other favourable prospects.762 No extended research has specifically 
addressed the issue of migrant smuggling in the EAC. Rather, most reports have examined 
migrant smuggling in the wider Eastern Africa region and the flow of illegal migrants from the 
horn of Africa through the Mediterranean to Europe and through the Gulf of Aden to the Middle 
East and South East Asia through Yemen. However, Kenya in the EAC is regarded as a destination 
country for illegal migrants. 
Human trafficking in East Africa occurs at the domestic, intra-regional, and international levels. 
At the domestic level, child trafficking constitutes the largest human trafficking problem, 
particularly the exploitation of girls in domestic servitude as well as sexual exploitation of girls in 
tourist area and urban centres.763 It is estimated that about 50 girls, mainly from Somalia, are 
 
759 Di Nicola, A. (2005). “Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of migrants” In:  Reichel, P. (Ed) (2005) 
Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. Sage Publications. London, p.183-184. 
760 Ibid, p.184. 
761 UNODC (2009). Op.Cit., p.16 and 18. 
762 Ibid., p.18. 
763 East African Community (2015). Op.Cit. p.5 
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trafficked every week from north-eastern Kenya to Nairobi.764 Boys too are trafficked for sexual 
exploitation and for forced labour as farm labourers and cattle herders in pastoral communities, 
and in mines, in factories, in hunting, in fishing boats on the high sea and lakes and in criminal 
and violent gangs such as rebel groups and armed forces.765  Other exploitative activities of 
human trafficking include, human sacrifice and child marriage.766 The trafficking is often 
facilitated by the victims’ family members, friends, or intermediaries.767 Human trafficking in East 
Africa involves a great amount of violence by armed forces such as the Ugandan LRA and ADF, 
Rwandan FDLR and Somali Al Shabaab who forcefully enrol children and adults into their 
insurgency movements, often as soldiers, sex slaves and ammunition porters, spies and 
messengers, in addition to drug abuse. The abduction of children and adults by the Ugandan LRA 
has, particularly, attracted a good deal of attention as many of the victims in Uganda, DRC, South 
Sudan and Central African Republic remain unaccounted for. The UNODC 2009 report advances 
the view that there are indicators that the trafficking of children in conflict zones is becoming a 
growing trend linked to sophisticated transnational criminal networks.768 
At the intra-regional level, large scale transnational human trafficking occurs between the 
countries in the region. Rather worryingly, child and women trafficking and smuggling is said to 
be conducted in refugee camps, notably in Rwanda and Kenya, to countries in the region, to 
South Africa, Northern America and Europe.769 Child sex trafficking too, along the borders of the 
EAC PS is said to have become extensive.770 Also, child and women trafficking in the region is 
boosted by the growing tourism and sex industry.771 
At the international level, large scale trafficking of children, women and to some extent men 
involve bigger organised networks of African citizens or international syndicates.772 For example, 
in December 2010 the police in Rwanda discovered a group of 54 Bangladeshi men illegally 
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766 East African Community. (2015), Op.Cit., p.7. 
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brought into the country, who were being trafficked by a fellow Bangladeshi to Mozambique as 
part of trafficking ring.773 The victims were aged between 19 and 49; their passports were found 
in the hands of the trafficker at arrest.774 Confinement and confiscation of passports, as well 
threats demanding the refund of expenses incurred on air tickets and processing residence, in 
case a victim attempts to terminate a job contract or demand to be let free from forced 
prostitution, are the common control mechanisms of traffickers.775 It is reported that child 
trafficking in Uganda has become a booming business with an average of 60 children per day 
leaving the country.776  
The main destination of international human trafficking in East Africa is the Middle East, 
especially the Gulf countries. East Africans are trafficked to Yemen, Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria.777 Other destinations include South Africa, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Thailand, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, India, Czech Republic, Italy, 
France, the UK, Germany and the US.778 Although East African countries are primarily seen as an 
origin and source for human trafficking, they are also, to a much lesser extent, destination and 
transit countries for victims trafficked from South India, other African countries and Madagascar.  
4.5.2. Drug trafficking 
Drug trafficking is the illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of 
substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws.779 Drug trafficking in East Africa seems to 
be a recent phenomenon. Until early 2000s, drug trafficking in the region was not big enough to 
attract the attention of the international community. Since then, this trafficking has considerably 
increased in proportions and varieties of drugs. East Africa has now been identified as a major 
transit and a destination for hard drugs from South Asia and Latin America. Powerful drug cartels 
have been identified in the region, especially a Kenyan cartel comprising current and former 
parliamentarians, activists linked to politicians, a prominent businesswoman and customs 
 
773 https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/27188, accessed on 19th September 2017. 
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147 
 
personnel working with a networks of Chinese, Somali and Pakistani to smuggle drugs.780 Also, 
reports by law enforcement experts in Iran and Pakistan have identified the increasing activities 
of Eastern African drug cartels in their countries.781 The types of drugs trafficked in the region 
include cannabis, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, mandrax and drug precursors such as 
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and anthranilic acid. 
Cannabis is by far the most widely consumed and trafficked drug in East Africa. It is extensively 
produced in Tanzania and Uganda. A review of reports conducted by the UNODC and the EAC 
reveals that East Africa is beset by the trafficking of hard drugs, especially heroin and cocaine. As 
indicated above, the flow of hard drugs in East Africa has not been alarming until the first seizures 
of large amounts, especially for heroin, pointing to the increase of drug trafficking in the region. 
Kenya remains the most affected country in the region, followed by Tanzania. Their coastal 
borders along the Indian Ocean and ports constitute a favourable entry point for large maritime 
shipments of heroin from South Asia and cocaine from South America. Elsewhere in Uganda and 
Rwanda, for example, there has been evidence of air traffic for heroin and cocaine and an 
increase use of postal and courier services, especially for heroin, and cocaine to a lesser extent. 
As alleged in a UNODC report, any seizure of 50Kg of heroin is considered large, particularly when 
encountered far from the major sources.782 The enormous amounts of heroin intercepted in 
Kenya, particularly, suggest that East Africa is the locaton of significant levels of drug trafficking. 
Two consignments of 787Kg of heroin worth US$278M were intercepted off the coasts of Kenya 
by the Australian Navy in April and November 2014.783 Also, the Kenyan police detected 342Kg 
of heroin in the tank of a ship docked at the Port of Mombasa.784 More than a tonne of heroin 
worth US$ 268M was seized by the Australian navy in a dhow in Kenyan waters, in April  2014.785 
At least three more large seizures involving hundreds kilogrammes of heroin each, off the coast 
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of Tanzania, are reported to have been conducted by the multinational Combined Maritime 
Forces.786 
If heroin is clearly the most problematic illicit drug in East Africa, large proportions of cocaine 
have also been detected in the EAC countries. Cases include the seizure, in 2004, of 701Kg and 
253Kg of cocaine respectively concealed in two containers in an outbound cargo vessel off the 
coast of Malindi and in a refrigerated container in a warehouse in Nairobi.787 In Kenya, a major 
seizure of 1.2 tons of cocaine was carried out in the Port of Mombasa in 2006.788 Other seizures 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 4 March 2011 involved 81Kg of cocaine and 30Kg of cocaine 
alongside 67Kg of heroin on 7 September 2011.789  
In Rwanda, 7.3Kg of cocaine were intercepted at Kigali International Airport in November 2014, 
and 2.5Kg in January 2015.790 In both cases, the drugs originated from Brazil and were concealed 
in women’s handbags. Another seizure involved 13.5Kg of cocaine intercepted at Kigali 
International Airport in February 2015 and involved three suspects of whom two Rwandan 
women holding Belgian passports.791 It is clear that drug traffickers have organised themselves 
in criminal groups and they have established extensive international links globally. The existence 
of at least ten major international drug trafficking networks, headed by West Africans but also 
involving Kenyans have been identified in Kenya.792 The majority of traffickers in Uganda, 
allegedly, are Nigerians although Ugandans too have recently been recruited into the trade.793 
More interceptions of cocaine are mentioned in Uganda, with 32Kg of cocaine seized by Police 
anti-narcotic squad at Entebbe International Airport, on 12 July 2014, and the destruction of 
159.68Kg of assorted drugs including 91Kg of cocaine, 9Kg of heroin, 41Kg of methamphetamine 
and 16Kg of ephedrine.794 Minor detections of methamphetamine in transit to South Africa have 
 
786 UNODC (2013). Op.Cit., p.21. 
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been reported in the region.795 The diversion or attempted diversion of (essential chemical) 
precursors in East Africa has also been reported, with alarming quantities; as much as two and 
half tonnes of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine stolen in Kenya and Tanzania in about 20 
incidents between 2009 and 2011.796 The interception in 2007 by the Indian authorities, of 5 tons 
of anthranilic destined for Kenya is seen as an evidence of the emergence of mandrax in the 
region, anthranillic acid being a substance used in the production of mandrax.797 
4.5.3. Money laundering 
Money laundering is the process of concealing illicit gains that were generated from criminal 
activity. As such, it was first defined in Article 3(1) of the UN Convention against illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotic substances of 1988, the Vienna Convention, basically as the process 
of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of proceeds (money or property) of crimes related to 
drugs.798 The definition of money laundering has been expanded to include other serious 
offences, given that considerable profits are generated by other criminal activities and organised 
crime too. Accordingly, the UN Convention against transnational organised crime of 2000 
adopted the same definition of money laundering as the Vienna Convention and requested states 
to apply the definition to “the widest range of predicate offences”. The FATF too, an inter -
governmental body that sets and monitors international standards for anti -money laundering 
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796 UNODC (2013). Op.Cit., p.20. 
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798 Article 3(1)(b): 
i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of 
participation in such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin 
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regulations, urges states to “apply money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to 
including the widest range of predicate offences.”799 
Money laundering facilitates a wide range of criminal activities such as tax crimes, frauds, 
computer crime, trafficking in drugs and humans, prostitution rings, illegal sales of weapon, 
embezzlement and corruption.800 More specifically, corruption and money laundering are 
intrinsically linked as is money laundering closely connected to the financing of terr orism. As 
such, money laundering poses a threat to the security of the global financial system.801 Predicate 
offences can generate huge amounts of proceeds and substantial profits for the individuals or 
groups involved in the criminal acts. The objective of launderers is to disguise the illegal origin of 
criminal proceeds in order to legitimise the ill-gotten gains of the crimes, by washing “dirty 
money” to be used later without raising suspicion.802 It is globally accepted that money 
laundering involves three stages: Placement (the goal in this stage is to deposit criminal proceeds, 
generally cash, into a bank account at home or abroad); layering (the goal in this stage is the 
concealment of the criminal origin of the proceeds); and integration (the goal in this final stage 
is to use criminal proceeds for personal benefit. The integration phase may be further divided 
into two sub-phases: justification and investment).803  
Money laundering in East Africa is said to be on the rise.804 The region is also described as 
vulnerable to money laundering for several reasons. Firstly, informal and cash-based economy is 
prominent in most EAC countries as is the case in Africa in general.805 Secondly, porous borders 
and the influx of refugees, coupled with weak customs and tax collection capacity create 
vulnerabilities.806 Thirdly, an increasing level of technology penetration and the transformation 
of the banking and financial sectors, specifically mobile money and onl ine banking, facilitate the 
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www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/supplemental/, accessed on 29 September 2017. 
151 
 
transfer of considerable amounts of money across borders and  make illicit financial flow 
relatively easy.807 Fourthly, black market for smuggled goods and grey market goods is thriving, 
especially in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.808 It is reported that, in Kenya, goods marked for 
transit to the northern corridor countries of which Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan 
are part, are exempted from Kenyan customs duties and are often sold through.809 The fifth 
vulnerability is, the prevalence of alternate, cash-based, unregulated and unlicensed informal 
remittance systems, known as Hawala, in Kenya, Tanzania (especially Zanzibar) and Uganda, that 
facilitate cash-based unreported transfers both within the countries and across the borders.810 
Informal remittance systems are used by nationals, by specific ethnic groups such as Pakistani, 
Indians and Somalis, as well as foreign refugee populations. Sixth, poor financial regulatory 
mechanisms alongside weak legislative framework to combat money laundering, coupled with 
limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to respond to money laundering, make East Africa 
vulnerable and attractive to money laundering.811 Last, there is large scale corruption involving 
officials and their associates,812 also known as grand corruption, which the Conference of States 
Parties to the UN Convention against Corruption (2015) defines as an expression used to describe 
corruption that pervades the highest levels of government, engendering major abuses of 
power.813 .  
Money laundering in East Africa derives largely from embezzlement, corruption, 
misappropriation of public funds and foreign aid, abuse of public procurement, frauds, illicit 
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trades, trafficking in drugs, counterfeit, tax evasion, smuggling of minerals, trade in illegal timber, 
wildlife trafficking, arms trade, stolen motor vehicles and Internet crime. Trade based money 
laundering or the use of cash-based business remains the main method used to launder the 
proceeds of crime in East Africa, particularly real estate, trade in securities, tax evasion, and cash 
and bogus sales transactions.814 Laundered money in East Africa has both domestic and 
transnational dimensions.815 The domestic dimension encompasses criminal activities that 
produce and invest proceeds locally.816 In the transnational dimension, the criminal activities 
either involve transnational groups or generate proceeds that are invested locally or moved 
across the borders.817 A concern is raised about the lack of prudence in the investment of public 
fund, particularly foreign investment originating from illegal sources that take advantage of East 
African countries’ favourable investment policies, to launder money.818  
Kenya is ranked number one in money laundering in East Africa, followed by Uganda, Tanzania 
and Rwanda.819 Being the financial hub of East Africa, its financial and banking sectors are the 
most sophisticated, with its banks expanding branches throughout East Africa. The United States 
Department of State’s report indicates that Kenyan financial institutions engage in currency 
transactions related to international narcotics.820 Kenyan companies, specifically a commercial 
bank (the Kenya Commercial Bank) and a petroleum and fuel multinational corporation (Dalbit), 
have also been recently linked to money laundering in South Sudan.821 At least five major 
corruption cases in Kenya have come to light, in the last twelve years, involving abuse of public 
procurement, misappropriation of public funds, embezzlement and fraud of millions of dollars 
each.822  
 
814 UNODC (2009). Op.Cit., p.39. 
815 Mniwasa, E.E. (2004). Op.Cit., p.51. 
816 Ibid. 
817 Ibid. 
818 UNODC.(2009) Op.Cit., p.39. 
819 Masinde J. “US State Dept thinks Africa’s leading mobile money platform is vulnerable to money laundering”. 
Quartz Africa. 6 March 2017, at www.qz.com/924977/us-state-dept-thinks-africas-leading-mobile-money-
platform-is-vulnerable-to-money-laundering/, accessed on 15 September 2017. 
820 United States Department of State. Money laundering and Financial Crimes. INCSR II (2017), p.116. 
821 The Sentry. (2016). Op.Cit., p.41 and 43. 
822 Nyakachunga, V. “Top 5 Corruption Cases that Remain Unsolved in Kenya”. Kenyans.CO.KE. 1st March 2016, at 
www.kenyans.co.ke/news/top-5-corruption-cases-remain-unresolved-kenya, accessed on 1st October 2017. 
153 
 
Tanzania is not an important regional financial centre but recent cases include the removal from 
office of several senior officials at the Tanzania Revenue Authority, including the Commissioner 
General, and the Director General of Tanzania Ports Authority, in November and December 2015 
respectively, over allegations of corruption and tax evasion involving millions of dollars.823 Other 
recent cases indicate a multimillion dollar corruption scandal in the energy sector involving a 
government minister and resulting in her removal from office in December 2014, thirteen 
accounts of money laundering against an advocate in August 2011, and US government’s 
accusations of large scale money laundering against a Tanzanian bank, in July 2014.824  
Uganda is not a financial regional centre but there is a belief that money laundering is widespread 
in the country. It is reported that British authorities identified several people possessing fake 
diplomatic passports from the Ugandan Department of Finance and laundering money in the 
UK.825 
Rwanda too is not a major financial centre. An IMF assessment report indicates that there is no 
evidence that money laundering is a significant problem in Rwanda and points out a non-
negligible risk of criminal proceeds generated both in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries 
being laundered in Rwanda.826 Money laundering in Rwanda is essentially domestic in nature. It 
involves predicate offences such as embezzlement, illicit trafficking and corruption. What 
remains uninvestigated is the proceeds resulting from criminal actions.827 There has not been any 
conviction for money laundering in Rwanda so far. Elsewhere in East Africa, the number of 
convictions is non-existent or low.828 
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There have been reports of money laundering in South Sudan involving political and military 
elites. Money laundering in South Sudan derives from systemic large-scale looting of the state 
coffers, trade in weapons, corruption, rent seeking, and abuse of position in connection with 
business activities in the oil and gas, mining, and financial sectors. Corruption is widespread in 
the oil rich world’s newest state. The illicit proceeds are invested inside the country, for funding 
armed patronage networks, or offshore in neighbouring countries, especially Uganda, Kenya and 
Ethiopia829, or in distant countries such as Australia, often as real estate investments. The case of 
six individuals sanctioned by the UN and the United States for taking a role in the conflict in South 
Sudan has been documented by The Sentry.830 The case of a particular Lieutenant General cited 
in the Sentry’s reports, for example, indicates his direct involvement in the procurement of 
weapons, a wide range of commercial ventures, and numerous companies incorporated in South 
Sudan, including engineering and energy companies.831 The General is also alleged to have 
received substantial payments form numerous multinational firms from at least three countries 
that operate in South Sudan, including Kenya, and millions of dollars through his personal bank 
account, including cash deposits and large payments from several international companies 
operating in SS, backed by Chinese, Lebanese and Turkish investors.832 It is also reported, though 
not confirmed, that Somali nationals are involved in money laundering through foreign exchange 
bureaus in South Sudan. 833 Overall, South Sudan’s economic and financial system is characterised 
by corruption and the flow of illicit funds, offshoring of assets by elites, large-scale abuse and 
mismanagement of the extractive industry, particularly oil; financial and trade-based fraud, the 
convergence of licit and illicit systems, disguised beneficial ownership, and regulatory evasion.834  
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834  KnowYOurCountry. South Sudan, at  www.knowyourcountry.com/southsudan1111, Consulted on 3rd October 
2017. 
155 
 
The issue of dirty money earned through criminal activities also facilitates the financing of 
terrorism. 
4.5.4. Terrorism 
Terrorism is a contested concept for which there is no universally accepted definition. Attempts 
at defining terrorism have produced many understandings of terrorism by scholars as well as 
national and regional policymakers. The academic literature often mentions a certain ‘academic 
consensus definition of terrorism’ proposed by Alex Schmid in 1988 and which he revisited later 
on. According to his “revised academic consensus definition of terrorism”, terrorism refers, on 
the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear -
generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of 
calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting 
mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects 
on various audiences and conflict parties.835 There is a general consensus, in the academic 
literature, that terrorism entails the intent to generate a wider psychological impact beyond the 
immediate victims. The psychological intent and the political motive are key to defining 
terrorism. These two elements are well captured in the following proposed simple definition: 
Terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating 
a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive.836  
In Africa, the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, the Algiers Convention, adopted by the Organisation of African Union in July 1999, 
serves as the blueprint for domestic anti-terrorism laws on the continent.837 The EAC Protocol on 
Peace and Security adopted the same definition as in the Algiers Convention. Article 1 of the 
Protocol reads as follows: 
terrorism’’ means: 
 
835 Schmid, A. P. (2012). “The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism”. Perspectives on Terrorism 6(2), 
p.158. 
836 Richards, A. (2014). “Conceptualising Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 37, p.213. 
837 Hübschle, A. (2011). From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organised Crime -Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Perspectives on Terrorism 5(3-4), p.82. 
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(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a Partner State and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, 
any person, any member or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public 
or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is 
calculated or intended to: 
(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, 
the general public or any segment of any of these, to do or abstain from doing any 
act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain 
principles; or 
(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to 
create a public emergency or create general insurrection in a Partner State; 
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, 
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any 
person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a)(i) and (ii); 
The rise of transnational organised crime and the changing nature of terrorism have caused 
scholars to suggest a convergence between the two phenomena.838 They are distinct despite 
their overlaps and similarities.839 It is established that not only transnational organised crimes 
substantially contribute to terrorism financing, terrorism too has increasingly become 
transnational. The emergence of transnational terrorism is associated with Al-Qaeda terrorism 
style.840 The Sunni Islamist multi-national organisation was responsible of the twin bomb attacks 
on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7th August 1998, killing 213 
and 11 people respectively. Bombers of an Al Qaeda East Africa cell were helped by members of 
 
838 Hübschle, A. (2011). Op.Cit., p.81. 
839 Bobic, M. (2014). “Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: Nexus needing a human security framework”. 
Global crime 15(3-4), p.247. 
840 Schneider F and R. Caruso (2011). “The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Transnational Crime 
Organisations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results.” Economics Security Working Paper 52, 
p.2. 
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Al Shabaab, the Somali dominated Islamist group who has been responsible for many terrorism 
attacks in East Africa. 
Al Shabaab, “the Youth” in Arabic, was established in approximately 2004, as a radical wing of 
Somali’s now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts.841 Its existence became public in 2006 when the 
Union of Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab swore bayat, a loyalty oath, to Al 
Qaeda in 2012.842 It has recruited significant numbers of foreign combatants in Kenya, Tanzania 
and other east African countries.843 It has now emerged as a transnational terrorist group which 
operations expands beyond Somalia where it seeks to impose Sharia law. Al Shabaab is now 
becoming a more mobile, networked regional presence, whose growing reach along the African 
coast is providing valuable new sources of funding and recruits.844 If most of its operations 
outside Somalia focused on Kenya for a while, it has also carried limited attacks in Tanzania and 
Uganda. Al Shabaab threatens to attack Kenya, Uganda and Burundi for their participation in the 
AMISOM. The suicide bomber attack that killed 76 people in Uganda, in July 2010, represents the 
first of a series of Al Shabaab serious incidents in the region. Other major attacks include the 
siege of the wealthy Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, in September 2013, where Al Shabaab 
operatives killed 68 people and wounded 175 more;, and the attack on Garissa University, in April 
2015, the worst single terrorist in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, 
with 147 victims mostly student. The coastal and northern Kenyan counties near the border with 
Somalia, especially Mandera, Garissa and Lamu, have recently particularly suffered attacks. 45 
incidents reportedly left 70 people dead and 79 injured, in 2014.845 14 people were killed in 
 
841 Haenlein, C. “How severe is the terror or threat in East Africa?” BBC Africa. 20 July 2015, at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa, accessed on 4 October 2017. 
842 LeSage, A. (2014). “The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy and Regional Threats. 
Strategic Forum 288, p.10. 
Dearden, L. “Isis: New terrorist group Jahba East Africa pledges allegiance to ‘Islamic State’ in Somalia” 
Independent. 8 April 2016, at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-new-terrorist-group-jahba-east-
africa-pledges-allegiance-to-islamic-state-in-somalia, accessed on 4 October 2017. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Haenlein, C. “How severe is the terror or threat in East Africa?”. Op.Cit. 
845 East Africa: Kenya Sees Progress in Counter-Terrorism Amid Reduced Attacks. All Africa. 18 January 2017, at 
www.allafrica.com/stories, accessed on 4 Oct 2017. 
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presumed Al Shabaab attacks in July 2015, and 5 people in a firebomb attack on a vehicle, in 
Mandera and Lamu counties respectively.846 
Whilst the main terrorism threat in East Africa has been Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliated 
organisation, a new jihadist group called Jahba East Africa announced its formation and its 
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, in April 2016.847 The group is officially 
comprised of militants fighting in Somalia, including Kenyans, Tanzanians and Ugandans.848 
Reports indicate tensions within Al Shabaab, opposing traditionalists who favour a focus on 
Somalia, and internationalists who see the group as a transnational jihadist organisation.849 The 
creation of Jahba East Africa, a pro ISIS faction, is seen as a resulting from the internal disputes 
between supporters of ISIS and Al Qaeda within Al Shabaab.850 There are have been reports of 
many more Al Shabaab affiliated islamist groups, including Al Hijra in Kenya, Ansar Muslim Centre 
in Tanzania (Tanga), and Uamsho in Zanzibar. Al Hijra has been blamed for a long series of small-
scale attacks since 2011 in Kenya’s main cities of Nairobi and Mombasa, including grenade 
attacks, rudimentary improvised explosive device attacks, targeted killings of moderate 
preachers and security personnel, and attacks on churches and sporting events.851  
The US Department of State affirms that terrorism is a growing concern in Tanzania.852 In 
particular, the rise of violent islamist attacks targeting local Christian leaders, churches, bars and 
restaurants have tarnished the country’s reputation for peace and stability. LeSage lists at least 
18 islamist attacks throughout Tanzania between October 2012 and July 2014, including acid 
attacks, explosives, hand grenade and homemade petrol bomb attacks, beheading and burning 
against catholic priests, churches, local residents, the police and moderate muslim clerics.853 
 
846 US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, p.30. 
847 DeFreese, M. “New Fronts Emerge in Africa’s “Arc of Terrorism”. Huffpost. 5th August 2016, at 
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Independent. 8 April 2016, at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-new-terrorist-group-jahba-east-
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Despite an increased frequency of Al Qaeda offshoot’s terrorism incidents in various parts of 
Tanzania, they have largely been unreported in international media854, except the first acid attack 
against foreign tourists, namely two young British women, in 2012 in Stone Town, Zanzibar.855  
In Uganda, two insurgent groups, the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces 
are said to have crossed the line into terrorism. The LRA, founded in 1987, has notoriously carried 
out attacks against civilians through massacres, abductions, mutilations, sexual enslavement, 
brutal indoctrination including forcing recruits, mainly women and children, to burn homes, kill, 
loot and rape.856 The LRA was listed as a terrorist group by the US in 2001, though it has since 
been removed from the list of designated terrorist groups. The African Union declared the LRA a 
terrorist organisation.857 The group is now spread across the DRC, Central African Republic and 
South Sudan. The ADF operates from Eastern DRC, committing atrocities against the people of 
western Uganda and eastern DRC—raiding and burning down schools and villages, and killing 
innocent people indiscriminately, clandestinely planting improvised explosive devices in 
commuter taxis, buses, bars, and busy streets, and abducting and ruthlessly killing civilians who 
refused to cooperate with them.858  
4.5.5. Environmental crimes  
Environmental crimes in East Africa take the form of wildlife poaching –the killing of wildlife in 
contravention of national and international law- and the smuggling and illegal trade in 
biodiversity products, especially elephant’s ivory and rhino’s horns. Other animals such as lions, 
buffalos and leopards are targeted too.859 Although the fauna, specifically wild animals, is most 
affected, natural resources illegally taken from East Africa include flora and timber too.860 
Environmental crimes are dealt with in reference to the following international instruments 
whose primary purpose is the protection of the environment: the 1973 CITES, the 1987 Montreal 
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the 1989 Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary movements of hazardous Waste and their Disposal. 
Poaching is said to be on the rise in East Africa.861 Various reports indicate an escalation of wildlife 
poaching and trafficking in the region in the last two decades, after a relative increase in the 
elephants populations that resulted from the ban on international trade in ivory imposed by the 
CITES in 1989. The resurgence of poaching in East Africa is attributed to the rising demand and 
price for wildlife, especially elephant’s ivory and rhino’s horn in the Asian market and China in 
particular, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, porous borders, weak governance 
and corruption, poor management of natural resources, low income, widespread poverty and 
endemic resource-based conflicts among communities, flaws in the criminal justice systems and 
weak environmental legislations.862 Environmental crime has a profound effect on the East 
African region. It poses a security threat in the region and disrupts societies. It devastates the 
ecosystems too and threatens the extinction of endangered species. Wildlife crime hinders 
sustainable development and impacts on tourism trade which represents a key part of many 
national economies. The Serengeti National Park in Tanzania and its ecosystem extending to 
Maasai-Mara in Kenya is said to be the most affected area in East Africa.863 
Environmental crime in East Africa is becoming increasingly organised and transnational and one 
of the most significant areas of trans-border criminality.864 Transnational environmental crime 
has been recognised as the fastest growing area of organised crime globally,865 specifically, the 
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transnational criminality involving large-scale exploitation and the theft of natural resources or 
transnational illegal wildlife trade.866 Transnational environmental crime in East Africa involves 
increasingly sophisticated networks linked to organised crime.867 Local poachers in pastoral areas 
including protected and unprotected areas work in tandem with well-connected and organised 
gangs and transnational criminal networks operating in multiple countries, to move the wildlife 
trophies in the illicit markets overseas.868 This is corroborated by large-scale seizures, in Asian 
countries, of illegal wildlife products originating from East Africa. Examples include the seizure in 
Thailand, in July 2012, of nearly half a tonne of ivory worth more than $700,000 and 3 tonnes of 
Kenyan ivory in April 2015, and the confiscation in May 2015, by Singaporean customs, of 3.7 
tonnes of Kenyan illegal ivory worth $60 million.869 The greater role of transnational criminal 
syndicates in the ivory trade is associated with the increase of foreign nationals from end-user 
markets in Africa, and in East Africa indeed, specifically Asian nationals and Chinese in 
particular.870 Chinese nationals and increasingly East African nationals are playing a crucial role 
in the ivory supply chain.871 Three Chinese citizens were arrested at Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport in Nairobi, on 3rd April 2016, with worked ivory bangles, lion teeth and pieces of ivory, 
the latter concealed in cooking foil and a condom.872 A Vietnamese national too, was arrested at 
Jomo Kenyatta Airport on 15 May 2015, in transit from Maputo (Mozambique) to Hanoi, with 
seven rhino horns, rhino tails and 1,2kg of lion teeth and claws.873 In Tanzania, four Chinese 
nationals whose passports showed that they had travelled frequently to Mozambique and 
Malawi were arrested in Mbeya, on 5 November 2-15, with 11 rhino horns.874 
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Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya contribute over three-quarters of East Africa’s transactions of large 
raw ivory.875 A report of the Secretariat of the CITES indicate that the three countries accounted 
for eighty per cent (80%) of large seizures of ivory shipments in Africa, in 2013.876 The report also 
points out that large-scale seizures, defined as 500Kg or more of raw or worked ivory seized at a 
single time, are indicative of the presence of organised crime in the illicit ivory trade.877  
Tanzania and Kenya constitute key exit points for ivory leaving Africa while Uganda is a regional 
entrepôt for ivory originating in Central Africa.878 Kenya has been identified as a source for wildlife 
commodities and a transit and exit point for illegally traded wildlife products from other countries 
including Mozambique, Uganda, the DRC, and Zambia and South Sudan.879 As a major hub in East 
Africa for the smuggling of products by sea, the port of Mombasa represents a major transit route 
for elephant’s tusks from Africa, counting for over 10 tonnes of illegal ivory intercepted between 
January and October 2013.880 In Uganda, an audit by the wildlife authority in 2014 revealed the 
disappearance of about 1,300 Kg of ivory worth $1.1 million.881 Tonnes of illegal wildlife worth 
millions dollars, including ivory, rhino’s horns and pangolin skins have been intercepted at 
Entebbe international airport too, between 2013 and 2015.882 An incidence worth mentioning is 
a high court judge’s order, in Uganda, to release a cargo of 2.9 tonnes of ivory that entered the 
country fraudulently declared as coffee for export, a ruling that was described as seriously 
undermining the ability of Uganda’s legal system to impose law and order and deter criminals.883 
About 4 tonnes of illicit ivory were confiscated by Ugandan authorities between 2014 and 
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2015.884 A haul of more than a tonne of ivory suspected to originate from the DRC or Tanzania 
(chopped into small pieces and treated to prevent it being detected) was seized in Kampala in 
February 2017, leading to the arrest of a Liberian and two Guinea Bissau nationals.885  
The Ivory trade is said to be on rise in Rwanda.886 Ten suspects including six Rwandan nationals 
and four foreign nationals from Guinea Conakry were arrested in Kigali, on transit to Asia, with 
80Kg of partially processed ivory.887 In March of the same year, three Guineans and a Rwandan 
were sentenced to six years imprisonment after they pleaded guilty to trafficking about 88Kg of 
ivory.888 
Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on transnational crimes, meaning crimes that transcend the borders of the 
EAC. The reports that inform the chapter reveal other organised crimes such as racketeering, 
motorcycle theft, and cattle rustling, which, in my opinion, are largely not transnational, rather 
domestic crimes over which states have exclusive jurisdiction and do not require international 
cooperation. Hence, they were not considered in this chapter, as were other transnational crimes 
too, such as piracy, computer crime, trade and smuggling of small arms and light weapons and 
illicit trade in counterfeits and other illegal commodity, not considered for the sake of limiting 
the scope of this chapter and the thesis.  
The commissioning by the EAC of a report, in 2015, to find out the extent and nature of 
transnational crimes in the region, arguably, suggests a serious security concern over the crimes. 
Despite the dearth of reliable data, in particular on South Sudan, the youngest world country and 
the newest member of the EAC, data reported on the rest of the Community are sufficient to 
establish that the threat of transnational crime in the EAC is considerable and needs to be 
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addressed systematically, if the new EAC survives and if regionalism is taken seriously, not just 
trade but crime too, for peace and security. Cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC is 
therefore required. To what extent can the EAC cooperate in criminal matters and how can the 
Community effectively handle transnational crime is discussed in the next chapter. 
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5. A COOPERATION MODEL FOR THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the reasons transnational crime has not yet translated into a meaningful 
action in the EAC despite growing concerns at both national and regional levels. It attributes the 
lack of concrete response to transnational crime in the EAC to the Partner States’ tendency to 
view transnational crime through national lenses and their failure to understand that effective 
fight against transnational crime requires joint efforts. The chapter advances that the EAC Partner 
States must view transnational crime as a regional problem that calls for regional solutions. It 
claims that the EAC’ policies, particularly the relaxation of borders, facilitate transnational crime 
and, as such, engage the Community’s duty to protect. The chapter argues that bilateralism is 
irrelevant for fighting transnational crime in the EAC. It proposes multilateralism as a more 
suitable approach. 
The chapter discusses two cooperation systems as applied in the EU, the MLA and the MR, and it 
assesses their strengths and weaknesses. It argues that MLA in the EU, which is essentially based 
on intergovernmentalism, proved inefficient, too bureaucratic, slow and cumbersome, therefore 
unsuitable in the context of regional integration. Further, the chapter argues that MLA had in 
mind domestic crimes, not transnational crimes. The chapter views MR as convenient for 
streamlining cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. It argues that MR will judicialize 
cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC and enable direct contacts between competent 
authorities, unlike MLA politically handled and diplomatically channeled cooperation. The 
chapter considers MR as a modern cooperation system capable to adapt to technological 
pressures in view of the increased mobility of transnational criminal networks and the need to 
secure quick assistance in the arrest and extradition of suspects and accused for trial, or the 
provision of evidence or measures such as the confiscation of proceeds of crimes. 
The chapter proposes the adoption, in the EAC, of an arrest warrant and an evidence warrant 
similar to the EAW and the EIO created in the EU and based on MR. It examines the tension 
between MR and human rights, in light of the abolition, in the EU’ s mechanisms above, of 
principles such as dual criminality, political offence and nationality exception traditionally viewed 
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as the expression of states’ protection of their citizens against foreign powers. Building on 
criticisms against the two mechanisms for failing to provide adequate protection of human rights, 
the chapter argues that care should be given to specific rights that are at risk in the mechanisms, 
should the EAC adopt them. The chapter advances that the scope of the two mechanisms should 
be limited to a set of defined transnational crimes, not other minor offences, to avoid their 
misuse in the national legal systems. It also advances that the jurisdiction ratione personae for 
the two mechanisms should be restricted to judicial authorities, to guarantee the protection of 
the rights of those affected. 
The chapter traces the institutional development of cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, to 
understand the impact both MLA and MR have had on it. It argues that the shift towards MR in 
the EU lead to the creation of institutions with more supranational character as 
intergovernmentalism in cooperation in criminal matters became untenable. The chapter 
recommends the creation of a regional police and an agency for criminal justice in the EAC, 
inspired respectively by Europol and Eurojust in the EU. It argues that the traditional state 
embedded policing is inappropriate for fighting transnational crime effectively. It views 
transnational policing as a logical response to the transnationalisation of crime in the EAC. The 
chapter also argues that the agency for criminal justice will ensure the coordination and 
implementation of the proposed mechanisms above, facilitate direct contacts between relevant 
authorities in the national criminal justices and preserve cooperation in criminal matters from 
political interference. Moreover, the chapter argues that the agency for criminal justice will be 
cost effective as a superstructure for all criminal justice actors and will prevent unnecessary 
multiplication of institutions. 
The chapter considers the establishment of a transnational criminal justice in the EAC as an 
inevitable consequence of a certain transnationalisation of law, particularly criminal law, and the 
expansion of transnational crime. It examines the implications of transnational criminal justice as 
a burgeoning system with no agreed principles. It argues that in the absence of a unified body of 
transnational criminal law, harmonization of procedural and substantive laws will help achieve a 
convergence of national criminal justices and a more effective justice in the EAC as has been the 
case in the EU. The chapter discusses potential side effects of transnational criminal justice in 
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light of the protection against double jeopardy, ne bis in idem, as an essential principle in criminal 
law. It argues that the lack of a common standard for ne bis in idem as a principle originally 
developed to apply nationally puts individuals at risks of double jeopardy and may hinder the 
right to free movement in the EAC. It recommends the establishment of ne bis in idem as a 
constitutional legal principle and fundamental right in the EAC. 
The chapter examines human rights issues in light of the contrast between transnational criminal 
justice as a system which enforcement is entirely domestic and its supranationalisation with 
mechanisms and institutions above the national level. It argues that the traditional human rights 
system cannot provide sufficient protection at the transnational level for the simple reason that 
it was not made to cope with the transnational aspects of crime. Further, it argues that 
transnational criminal justice in the EAC requires rethinking human rights anew and adopting a 
human rights statement that protects rights both at national and transnational level. The chapter 
argues that effective protection of rights in the EAC is a prerequisite for establishing cooperation 
in criminal matters. 
5.1. Rationale for cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC 
The previous chapter 4 established, from various reports including a report commissioned by the 
EAC in 2015, that transnational crimes have considerably expanded in the EAC and in the wider 
Eastern Africa region and constitute a threat in the region. The mere fact that the EAC 
commissioned the report is arguably the evidence that the Community is concerned with the 
phenomenon. However, how far is the community concerned by the threat of transnational 
crimes is questionable not least because states often examine transnational crimes through 
national lenses, losing sight of the transnational dimensions of these crimes.889 This is mainly the 
result of the national character long associated to criminal law as the exclusive competence of 
sovereign states. Understandably, cooperation in legal and judicial matters so far lags behind all 
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other fields of interests defined in the EAC Treaty, and criminal matters perhaps totally ignored 
at the regional level, although the EAC is said to be very concerned by transnational crime.890  
At present, the EAC’s response to transnational crime consists of loose policy frameworks that 
essentially encourage inter-states cooperation, as opposed to a common approach through 
regional cooperation. For example, the EAC 2006 Strategy on Regional Peace and security calls 
the Partner States to adopt the UN Model Law on Mutual Assistance; the EAC 2013 Protocol on 
Peace and Security calls the Partner States to enact laws on MLA (Article 12(2)(f)); and the 2001 
Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking calls the Partner States to cooperate with each 
other to afford MLA (Article 5).891 Whereas inter-states cooperation offers a solution at national 
level, the regional level is deprived of any solid mechanisms to fight transnational crimes yet the 
pervasive effects of transnational crimes are such as they transcend national borders and affect 
the whole region. The Partner States’ affiliation to the EAC means that bilateral cooperation is 
irrelevant for an issue that affects the region, its interests and stability including peace and 
security.  To quote the words of a respondent to the interviews for this research, ‘bilateral 
arrangements are a vote of no confidence to the regional spirit’.892  Although bilateral 
arrangements are regarded as practical as well as imposing robust enforcement obligations, they 
are often designed to suit the needs of the law enforcements on the basis of reciprocity.893  
Multilateralism must be the defining approach to cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC, for 
its emphasis on international law and its capacity to create norms and values.894  
Cooperation in criminal matters cannot be left to the Partner States. The nature of transnational 
crimes and the existence of the EAC as a supranational entity require dealing with the crimes at 
the regional level rather than in terms of parochial bilateral arrangements which are limited to 
 
890 Interview with respondent 6. 
891 The EAC wider policy framework on law and crime inc lude the EAC Treaty, the Protocol in Defence Affairs, the 
Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination, the Protocol on Good Governance, the Protocol on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism, the EAC Early Warning 
mechanism, the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the EAC Early Warning Mechanism and the EAC Peace 
Facility. 
892 Interview with Respondent 5. 
893 Harfield, C. (2003). “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance: Political Perspectives on 
International Law Enforcement Cooperation Treaties”. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal 
Justice. 27(2), pp.229. 
894 Ibid., p.229-230. 
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the parties. Imagine a criminal network comprised of EAC nationals and other African and Asian 
nationals residing in different EAC states who are involved in the shipment of significant amounts 
of drugs in Kenya; the police in the EAC states recover substantive amounts of drugs from 
suspects associated with the network; search and seizure operations reveal the suspects have 
bank accounts scattered in the EAC Partner States; the police believe the money is the proceeds 
of the crimes. Although such a case sounds relatively uncomplicated, it involves complex issues 
that will require cooperation among the states to conduct investigations across the borders of 
the Partner States to secure evidences legally and to arrest and extradite suspects to stand trial 
in the Partner States. Furthermore, the case involves important questions, such as to determine 
which court has jurisdiction over the matter, since conflicts of jurisdiction will arise among the 
states. Bilateral arrangements will not totally solve the issues above. In addition, serious 
complications may occur where there is no bilateral treaty for the provision of assistance 
between the Partner States. Such case may result in a limbo. 
Effective fight against transnational crimes requires the joint effort of states, a collective action 
rather than isolated efforts.895  No state acting alone can effectively tackle transnational 
crimes.896 In addition, the national law enforcements may not have sufficient skills and capacity 
to respond to the crimes. In some instances, transnational criminal networks may have access to 
more means than individual states. Technological advances in transport and communication 
means that criminal networks move rapidly across the borders and operate financial transactions 
faster and remotely, often with the ability to move and disguise their proceeds of crimes safely. 
The borders in the EAC are porous, giving the chance to criminals to roam around without the 
fear of any obstacles, to expand their criminal activities in the region, and to evade justice. 
Moreover, transnational criminal networks take advantage of the differences in the national legal 
systems to frustrate justice. It can be argued that the relaxation of borders in the EAC, specifically 
the freedom of movement in the Common Market, has encouraged the expansion of 
transnational crimes in the region. The establishment of the Common Market opens up a single 
 
895 Coffey, G. (2013). Op.Cit., p.61. 
896 See Parcalabu, D.D., Modiga, G. and G. Gurita (2011). “Importance and necessity of International Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. European Integration Realities and Perspectives. Legal Sciences, p.172. 
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East African territory and a space in which various processes interact including crimes. Therefore, 
the EAC has the duty to protect its citizens against the abuse, by criminals, of the freedom of 
movement provided in the Common Market.  
The expansion of transnational crimes in the EAC897 and their potential pernicious effects on the 
integration efforts and on the security and welfare of the citizens require extending cooperation 
to criminal matters.898 Crime is very key issue especially as the EAC moves towards political 
federation.899 Specifically, transnational crime is causing a lot of damage in the Partner States.900 
There is correlation between levels of crime, security and development.901 The EAC Common 
Market identifies crime as one of the bottlenecks for its implementation.902 Cooperation in 
criminal matters is as much important as other areas903 and it needs to be considered as 
priority,904 especially in view of the EAC’s ultimate goal for a federated region with a unitary 
government and a unitary political system.905 The EAC needs to move from inward nationalistic 
approach to criminal matters, to an outward approach for the common good of the region.906 It 
must thus extend cooperation to criminal matters as part and parcel of its portfolio, what has 
been referred to us as an ‘integrated cooperation in all aspects’.907   
A common policy in crime matters in the EAC needs due consideration and is critical for reducing 
undesired effects of transnational crimes in the region and consequent destabilization and 
damages to the economies.908 This requires a change in the EAC’s approach to crime matters and 
a move from inter-state bilateral arrangements to a multilateral regional response as did the EU, 
the OAS, the ECOWAS or the ASEAN.    
 
897 See, EAC (2015). Study to assess transnational organised crime and terrorism in the EAC region, p.5  
898 On similar concern in the EU, see Ventrella, M. (2013). European integration or democracy disintegration in 
measures concerning police and judicial cooperation. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4(3), p.292. 
899 Interview with Respondent 1 
900 Interview with Respondent 2 
901 Interview with Respondent 1 
902 Interview with Respondent 3. 
903 Interview with Respondent 6 
904 Interview with Respondent 1 
905 Interview with Respondent 5. 
906 Interview with Respondent 1. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Interview with Respondent 2 and 4. 
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5.2. Existing models of cooperation: A quest for the EAC 
International cooperation in criminal matters encompasses all measures taken in support of 
foreign criminal proceedings, by extending assistance to ensure the arrest and extradition of 
fugitive suspects or accused and the procurement and transmission of evidence between 
states.909 While the international legal framework on cooperation in criminal matters910 calls 
upon states to provide each other with assistance in the subject matters of the various global 
instruments, there has been a parallel development of regional initiatives to facilitate mutual 
assistance between states, in Europe, America, Southeast Asia and Africa. This section examines 
two different models of cooperation in criminal matters. The first model, MLA, emerged from the 
Council of Europe pioneering and innovative system that governed extradition and mutual 
assistance in criminal matters in the EU prior to the introduction of its own system. The second 
model, MR, was established by the EU later on. 
5.2.1. Mutual legal assistance 
The MLA model came about with the creation of the European Communities in 1957 and 
consequent need for joint efforts to combat crimes as a spillover effect of economic integration 
of the European States. The model aimed at facilitating cooperation while protecting states’ 
sovereignty and the rights of individuals.911 Two instruments adopted by the Council of Europe, 
the firsts of their kind, constitute this model. The European Convention on Extradition of 13 
December 1957, entered into force on 18 April 1960 and the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in criminal matters of 20 April 1959, entered into force on 12 June 1962.912  
The MLA model has great regard to states’ sovereignty.913 It is based on the principles of comity 
and reciprocity.914  It involves a requesting state that sends a request to the requested state. 
 
909 Meyer, F. (2008, 2010). Cooperation in Criminal Matters, p.1 
910 For example, the universal conventions against terrorism, the UN Conventions against Transnational Organised 
Crime and against Corruption. 
911 Mackarel, M. (2006). “‘Surrendering the Fugitive- The European Arrest Warrant and the United Kingdom’”. The 
Journal of criminal Law 71, p.365. 
912 Both conventions have been supplemented by additional protocols: Four additional protocols to the Convention 
on extradition (1975, 1978, 2010 and 2012) and two additional protocols to the Convention on Mutual Legal 
Assistance (1978 and 2001). 
913 Ruggeri, S. (2014). “Transnational Investigations and Prosecution of cross-Border Cases in Europe: Guidelines for 
a Model of Fair Multicultural Criminal Justice”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural 
Inquiries in Europe. Springer. London, p.196, 201. 
914 Harfield, C. (2003). Op.Cit., p.222 and 230. 
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Under this system, states are free to cooperate, and the requested state is generally not obliged 
to respond to the request made by the requesting state.915 Article 2 of the Convention on Mutual 
Assistance provides that the requested state may refuse a request if it considers that execution 
of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security or ordre public or other essentials 
interests. The states are free to define their essential interests and their decisions on requests 
are free of legal considerations; they are made on purely domestic policy. Also, if ordre public 
refers to most fundamental legal principles, its composition may differ from state to state.916 In 
that respect, the MLA model is unpredictable.  
One main characteristic of the MLA model is the role played by political authorities and the 
involvement of the executive power in the process. Requests for assistance and requests for 
extradition are sent through diplomatic channels. While the judicial authority examines the 
request, checks the requirements and confirms admissibility and legality917, the final decision 
whether or not to grant extradition is approved by the Executive authority.918 The decision-
making process is twofold with a government prong completing the judicial prong.919 When asked 
what about the thesis’ suggestion that the EAC becomes a legal area where cooperation is moved 
from national foreign affairs to the judiciary, a respondent said what matters is smooth 
cooperation and whether the change would expedite cooperation, add value and make a 
difference, before adding: “the problem is what challenges have we experienced by going to the 
ministry of foreign affairs…?”.920 The response can be found in the criticism made against the 
MLA model for being cumbersome, bureaucratic, inefficient and slow, with requests taking too 
long to be granted.921 A similar opinion was put forward by a respondent to the interviews for 
 
915 Schünemann, B. (2014). “Solution Models and Principles Governing the Transnational Evidence Gathering in the 
EU”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. Springer. London, p.166. 
916 Meyer, F. (2008-2010). Op.Cit., p.8. 
917 Bertrán de Felipe, M. and A. Nieto Martín (2012). “Post 9/11 Trends in International Judicial Cooperation”. 
Journal of International Criminal justice 10, p.587. 
918 The role of the political authorities is less in assistance requests for evidence than in extradition. Usually, the 
competent authority approves the requests.  
919 Meyer, F. (2008-2010). Op.Cit., p.8. 
920 Interview with Respondent 6. 
921 Vandebroek, E and F Verbruggen (2013). “The EU and the death penalty abolition: The limited prospects of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters as an external policy tool”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4(4), 
p.488. Also, Meyer, F. (2008-2010). Op.Cit., p.10. 
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this thesis, who described cooperation through diplomatic channels as too long, loose and lacking 
proper reprimand mechanism.922 The MLA model does not establish time limits or strict deadlines 
for granting a request. Moreover, it does not establish any standard form in which the request 
shall be made. This lack of specific form in the MLA model causes a great challenge considering 
the complications of international cooperation in criminal matters, including foreign language 
difficulties and the differences in the legal systems. Furthermore, the MLA model gives the states 
the possibility to make declarations and reservations.923 It provides for broad grounds for refusal, 
making the system uncertain.924 For example, dual criminality, the requirement that an offence 
for which a request for assistance or for extradition is made must constitute an offense under 
the law of the requested state too, is a key feature of the MLA model. In extradition matters, the 
system imposes bars to requests, such as the political offence exception (the principle that a 
request shall not be granted if the crime is political by nature) and the nationality exception (or 
non-extradition of nationals).925 Another exception in the MLA model is the specialty rule or the 
bar on further evidence transmission or extradition for offences committed prior to the 
request.926 While these exceptions and bars are often seen as protecting the rights of individuals, 
they are also arguably symptomatic of the protection of states’ sovereignty in the MLA model 
and a certain lack of flexibility and trust in foreign legal systems. The reason might be the post-
war context of the emergence of the MLA model despite the adoption of the ECHR in 1953.  
Traditionally, the principle in the MLA model has been that the applicable law is the law of the 
requested state, or locus actum regit (also lex loci actus).927 The EU 2000 MLA Convention 
changed this fundamental rule and required the requested state to comply with the procedure 
and formalities indicated by the requesting state, unless compliance would be contrary to the 
 
922 Interview with Respondent 5. 
923 Ibid., p.482. 
924 Meyer, F. (2008,2010). Op.Cit. p.10. 
925 Mann, G.J. (2007). “The European Arrest Warrant: A Short-Lived Mechanism for Extradition”. Syracuse Journal 
of International Law and Commerce 34, p.718. 
926 Rackow, P. and C. Birr (2010). “Recent developments in legal assistance in criminal matters”. Goettingen Journal 
of International Law 2(3), p.1091. 
927 Vermeulen, G. (2006). “A. EU conventions enhancing and updating traditional mechanisms for judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters”. ERES Revue Internationale de droit penal 1(77), p.82. 
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fundamental principles of the requested state.928 Nevertheless, the locus actum regit principle is 
another illustration that protection of sovereignty is fundamental in the MLA model. To the 
question “which law should apply in a request for assistance, whether the law of the requested 
state or that of the requesting state”, most of the respondents to the interviews for this thesis 
expressed a preference for locus actum regit. However, one respondent’s response suggested a 
preference for locus fori or the application of the law of the requesting state, in the following 
terms: “…say country A is pursuing a fugitive who is in country B. … country B who the fugitive is 
living in should allow the legal regime of country A to pursue this fugitive, pick him and let him 
be tried in country A where the fugitive has committed offence. … country B should be given 
liberty to exercise its legal jurisdiction”.929 While the locus actum regit principle is 
understandable, it constitutes a serious obstacle to the admissibility of evidence obtained 
abroad, particularly where there are differences in the legal systems between the states involved. 
Arguably, the MLA model was made for legal systems that are similar. The respondents to the 
interviews for this thesis identified the divergences in national legal systems in the EAC as a 
challenge to cooperation in criminal matters in as far as they cause variations in how the Partner 
States handle their issues, specifically criminal matters, and a lack of trust between relevant 
national agencies.930 
The MLA model was improved over the years to provide fast and more efficient assistance in the 
EU and to adapt to new investigation techniques. The 1990 CISA, incorporated in the legal 
framework of the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 (entered into force on 1st May 1999), 
reduced the grounds for refusal of a request for assistance.931 It maintained the requirement for 
dual criminality for search and seizure orders932 and removed it for all less invasive investigation 
measures. Also, the EU adopted the Convention on Simplified Procedures in Extradition in 1995 
 
928 Article 4 (1) EU 2000 MLA Convention. 
929 Interview with Respondent 5. 
930 Interview with Respondent 1, 2 and 7. 
931 Rackow, P. and C. Birr (2010). Op.Cit., p.1097. 
932 Article 51 EU 2000 MLA Convention 
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and the Convention on Extradition in 1996, both which unfortunately never entered into force 
for poor ratification.933 
The MLA model is at best inappropriate for handling transnational crimes in the EAC. The system 
was conceived for national procedures with a transnational aspect in broad sense, such as 
national investigations requiring the collection of evidence abroad.934  To use the words of Clive 
Harfield, transnational organised crimes as the phenomenon is understood today had yet to 
trouble policymakers.935  As will be argued in further sections, transnational crimes need to be 
understood as distinct and different from national and international crimes. Even with some 
improvements as did the EU 2000 MLA Convention, to adapt to new investigation techniques, 
the MLA model failed to provide the efficiency required for granting assistance in investigation. 
The reason for the ineffectiveness of the MLA model is to be found in its philosophical principles, 
in particular the strong emphasis on sovereignty and consequent broad grounds for refusal. The 
move towards a regional supranational governance system in the EAC and its implications for 
ceding part of national sovereignty to the Community requires reconsidering criminal law not as 
exclusively a states’ sovereign prerogative over their citizens but as a shared competence. In that 
respect, the MLA model appears outdated for enabling the provision of assistance with less 
possible formalities. Furthermore, the EAC’s aspiration to political federation means the 
convergence of the governance systems of the Partner States towards a super-structure in which 
the differences will be kept to the minimum. The respondents to the interviews for this thesis 
emphasised the political federation aspiration of the EAC as a key factor for the determination of 
a suitable cooperation model, which, in the view of one respondent, would require “moving from 
nationalistic approach of view which is inward looking to outward looking where we see 
ourselves as one political federation”.936  Another respondent made a similar opinion: “One clear 
fact is that EAC’s ultimate goal is to form a federated region with a unitary government and a 
unitary political system. … I prefer a situation where the sovereign States can share their 
 
933 Mackarel, M. (2006). Op.Cit., p.364. Also, Mathisen, G. (2010). Op.Cit., p.4. 
934 See Ruggeri, S. (2014), Op.Cit., p.194. 
935 Harfield, C. (2003). Op.Cit., p.222. 
936 Interview with Respondent 1. 
176 
 
sovereignty and come up with a unitary system that allows for all those that I’ve mentioned”.937 
In the legal field and in criminal law in particular, the quest for a model of cooperation in the EAC 
needs to ensure a swift and frictionless arrest and handing of suspects, accused or convicted of 
transnational crimes between the Partner States and the collection, transmission and 
admissibility of evidence across the borders in the same conditions. Ensuring the admissibility of 
evidence gathered in a foreign State is the biggest challenge in international cooperation in 
criminal matters. This concern was expressed by a respondent to the interviews for this thesis in 
the following terms: “…say for example I think, I’m not wrong, Uganda which passed a bill which 
allows evidence taped message on the phone which can be used as evidence in court; in other 
countries it would be against their own laws, so how do you deal with this question…”.938 The 
admissibility of evidence gathered in a foreign State would need to be taken into account in the 
EAC as it progresses towards political federation and a unitary system where the legal systems of 
the Partner States will cease to be seen as foreign and will rather be part of an integrated 
governance. 
The ever-closer cooperation and integration between the EU Member States after the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty on the EU and the unprecedented technological advances in transport and 
communication compounded with the expansion of transnational crimes in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century spurred the need for a more efficient, flexible and fast cooperation system. 
Furthermore, the MLA model proved unable to overcome the differences in the legal systems 
and traditions of the Member States.939 This situation resulted in a gradual shift from the MLA 
model to a system that removes unnecessary barriers to cooperation in criminal matters. 
5.2.2. Mutual recognition 
The MR principle in the EU was elaborated in criminal matters in June 1998 with the European 
Council of Cardiff and was further developed in 1999 at the Tampere European Council which 
qualified MR as the cornerstone of cooperation in both  civil and criminal matters within the 
 
937 Interview with Respondent 5. 
938 Interview with Respondent 7. 
939 See, Raffaelli, R. (2017). Judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Fact sheets on the European Union, p.2. 
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EU.940 The principle originated from the internal market where it means that goods lawfully 
produced in a Member State should be allowed to move freely in other Member States without 
any barriers.941 The Tampere Council of 1999 (in its conclusion 36) stated the importance of the 
MR principle in criminal matters as a way of transcending the limits of traditional judicial 
cooperation to facilitate the prosecution of crimes and to prevent impunity arising from some 
forms of criminality in a context of free movement of people and goods.942  
The basic premise of MR is that decisions made by judicial authorities in a Member State take 
effect in the legal system of another Member State.943 In the view of the Tampere Council, the 
MR principle was to apply to courts judgments and other decisions, especially those securing 
evidence as well as freezing orders.944 The concept of MR is closely connected to the EU’ s 
objective to create ‘an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’945 in accordance with Article 67(1) 
TFEU. The idea behind the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice is that the territory of the 
Member States should constitute one single judicial space which legal pluralism is maintained 
and respected946, as further stated in Article 67(1) TFEU which stresses the ‘respect for … 
different legal systems and traditions of the Member States’. 
MR is explicitly recognized by Article 82 TFEU which provides that ‘judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83’.  The principle is applied to both 
judgments and decisions taken in the pre-trial phase.947 MR is not contingent upon harmonization 
 
940 Alegre, S. and M. Leaf (2004). “Mutual Recognition in the European Judicial cooperation: A Step Too Far Too 
Soon? Case Study- the European Arrest Warrant”. European Law Journal 10(2), p.200-1. 
941 Mancano, L. (2016). “The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters”. 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 18, p.217. 
942 Roma Valdés, A. (2015). “The mutual recognition principle in criminal matters: a review”. ERA Forum 16, p.292. 
943 Obokata, T. (2011). “Key EU principles to combat transnational organised crime”. Common Market Law Review 
48, p.809. 
944 Bonasera, J. (2017). “Brexit and the European Arrest Warrant: The United Kingdom’s Chance to Curtail abuse of 
the Surrender System”. Arizone Journal of International and Comparative Law 34(3), p.643 
945 Satzger, H. (2019). “Is mutual recognition a viable general path for cooperation?”. New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 10(1), p.45. 
946 Ibid. 
947 Roma Valdés, A. (2015). Op.Cit., p,292. 
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of national criminal laws and procedures.948 Nothing in Title IV of the TEU makes the application 
of MR conditional upon harmonization of criminal laws of the Member States.949 The aim of 
harmonisation is to eliminate differences while the differences are recognized under the MR 
principle.950 MR operates despite the differences in national criminal laws and procedures.951  
The conceptual centerpiece of the MR principle in criminal matters is mutual trust, the 
assumption that the legal systems of all Member States offer equivalent protection of individual 
rights and equal procedural guarantees.952 MR implies that a judicial decision taken by a 
competent judicial authority of a Member State has to be executed in another Member State 
without any need for prior recognition, presuming that judgments to be recognized and enforced 
always comply with the principles of legality subsidiarity, and proportionality.953 Therefore, a 
judgment made in the United Kingdom, e.g., should be recognized with less formalities possible 
in France or in another jurisdiction. However, critics described mutual trust as ‘a fiction’.954 The 
assumption that Member States’ adherence to the ECHR made their legal systems equivalent in 
terms of fundamental rights protection attracted fierce criticisms based on the numerous 
judgements of the ECtHR on Member States’ violations of fundamental rights of individuals, 
especially the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, and fair trial 
guaranteed in Articles 3 and 6 ECHR, respectively.955  
Unlike the EU, the EAC is deprived of any enforcement mechanism in human rights matters. While 
the EAC Treaty  refers to the ACHPR as the benchmark or the bedrock in terms of human rights 
standard, as some respondents to the interviews for the thesis recalled,956  none of the six EAC 
Partner States recognizes the competence of the ACtHPR to receive cases from individuals and 
 
948 Obokata, T. (2017). “The Value of International Law in Combating Transnational Organised Crime in the Asia-
Pacific”. Asian Journal of International Law 7, p.47. 
949 Obokata, T. (2011). Op.Cit., p.810. 
950 Ibid. 
951 Obokata, T. (2017). Op.Cit., p.47. 
952 Mancano, L. (2016). “The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters”. 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal studies 18, p.215.  
953 Roma Valdés, A. (2015). Op.Cit., p,292. 
954 Ibid. Also, Bonasera, J. (2017). Op.Cit., p.656. 
955 Heard, C. and D. Mansell (2011). “The European Arrest Warrant: The Role of Judges When Human Rights are at 
Risk”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 2(2), p.135. 
956 Interviews with Respondents 2 and 6. 
179 
 
NGOs (See section 5.4.3.). Furthermore, the EACJ too lacks an enforcement mechanism and it 
cannot impose compliance with its judgments (See section 3.3.3.6.). When asked whether there 
should be a test of compliance with human rights in cooperation in criminal matters or whether 
the EAC should just adopt the MR principle like did the EU, the respondents to the interviews for 
this thesis expressed a support for MR overall and emphasized compliance with human rights 
standards too, as the following quote reads: “Much of course you may want to come up with the 
issue of mutual recognition …, human rights must measure international standards”.957  Another 
respondent added: “… a mutual recognition of decisions would be the best way to do … and this 
idea of mutual respect would actually deal with the issue of the fear for losing your sovereignty 
because what you are telling each other is that you’ll be relying to respect each and everyone’s 
decision…”.958  To a further question on the extent to which it would be worth setting a human 
rights standard applicable in cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC, all respondents 
converged on the importance of the issue, recalling that human rights constitute a fundamental 
principle of the Community and a requirement for adherence to the EAC Treaty.959  They 
expressed concerns about possible variations in national principles and standards and risks for 
abuse and injustice to citizens.960  They also emphasised the need for the EAC to come up with 
internationally recognized human rights standards at the regional level.961  Moreover, the 
respondents recognized the difficulty of the Partner States to agree on human rights standards 
for the EAC, which a respondent attributed to the delicate nature of the issue, and which the 
same respondent further said explains why the EACJ’s jurisdiction has not been extended to 
human rights yet.962  Arguably, the same reason explains the persistent reluctance of the EAC to 
adopt its own human rights instrument (See section 5.4.3.). 
 
957 Interview with Respondent 1. 
958 Interview with Respondent 7. 
959 Interviews with Respondents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
960 Interviews with Respondents 1 and 5 
961 Interviews with Respondents 1, 3, 5 and 6. 
962 Interview with Respondent 3 
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The MR principle is not absolute or automatic.963 It does not imply a strict, complete and blind 
positive acceptance of different national standards.964 However, it introduced a high level of 
automaticity in cooperation in criminal matters in the EU.965 Member States are to a great extent 
required to provide assistance, save where grounds for refusal apply. On the question whether a 
request for assistance should entail an obligation to the requested state or whether should the 
latter have a margin of appreciation to grant the request or not, there was a divided opinion 
among the respondents to the interviews for this thesis, with a clear majority in favour of an 
obligation to cooperate. Those in favour of an obligation to cooperate considered that the 
freedom of movement in the EAC commands establishing such an obligation to avoid the 
Community becoming a hub for fugitives.966  A respondent added, in addition, that the defining 
criteria should be the magnitude of the crimes.967  This particular aspect comes up in the next 
two sections on the application of MR to extradition and assistance in evidence. The respondents 
in favour of a certain margin of appreciation instead justified their view on the basis of protection 
of human rights. They expressed concerns about politically motivated prosecutions. E.g., a 
respondent said: “It might be that someone is pursued for political reasons in the disguise of a 
criminal offence, … you should have a margin of appreciation to look at whether the request is 
obviously reasonable, appropriate… .”968  Another said: “The issue about appreciation will always 
be there. … we should be cautious that we don’t end up violating human rights.”969  However, 
one of those in favour of a margin of appreciation added that, in the spirit of cooperation, the 
requested state should explain the reason it does not grant a request and not simply put aside a 
request.970 
 
963 See more, Suominen, A. (2014). "Limits of Mutual Recognition in Cooperation in Criminal Matters within the EU 
- Especially in Light of Recent Judgments of Both European Courts." European Criminal Law Review 4(3), p.215. 
964 Satzger, H. (2019). Op.Cit., p.54. 
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967 Interview with Respondent 1. 
968 Interview with Respondent 7. 
969 Interview with Respondent 6. 
970 Interview with Respondent 7. 
181 
 
The application of MR in criminal matters has been contested and praised in various studies. 
Opponents to the extension of MR to criminal matters argue that it produces a reverse effect 
than in the internal market where its use in decisions enabling business, trade and movement 
constrains the power of government agencies and conversely empowers the private sector; MR 
in cooperation in criminal matters allegedly benefits the law enforcement to the detriment of 
suspects and defendants.971 On this issue, a respondent to the interviews for this thesis recalled 
the principle that the EAC is a people centred and private sector driven cooperation, as enshrined 
in Article 6 EAC Treaty, before adding: “this cooperation should not be seen from the political, 
the bureaucratic sense of it only… …it’s a cooperation for East Africans, not East African 
governments”.972 For proponents of MR, the principle grants extraterritorial effects to foreign 
legal decisions, transposing some degree of foreign legal elements into the domestic criminal 
justice973 and facilitating integration in criminal matters.974  
The MR is a very flexible concept and, under certain circumstances and conditions, a viable path 
for cooperation outside the EU too.975 Given the differences in the legal traditions in the EAC, the 
principle may need additional complementary factors, e.g., the respect of a common set of 
fundamental rights in criminal procedures, to create an objective basis for mutual trust among 
the Partner States. While the adoption of MR and the extent of its application is a political 
decision, the principle resonates well with the EAC’ s ultimate objective for establishing a political 
federation. If adopted in the EAC, MR will streamline the provision of assistance in criminal 
proceedings in the Community.  
Like the MLA model, MR has been applied to extradition and assistance in evidence and 
introduced specific instruments that are adaptable to the EAC.  
 
971 Marin, L. (2014). “Effective and Legitimate- Learning from the Lessons of 10 Years of Practice with the European 
Arrest Warrant”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 5(3), p.331. 
972 Interview with Respondent 6. 
973 Bonasera, J. (2017). Op.Cit., p.644. 
974 Allegrezze, S. (2014). “Collecting Criminal Evidence Across the European Union: The European Investigation 
order Between Flexibility and Proportionality". In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural 
Inquiries in Europe. Springer. London, p.55. 
975 Satzger, H. (2019). Op.Cit., p.55. 
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5.2.2.1. Mutual recognition and extradition 
The first concrete application of the principle of MR in criminal matters concerned the field of 
extradition though, strictly speaking, its first application was Article 54 CISA which the ECJ, in the 
combined case Gözütok and Brügge, conceived of as imposing mutual recognition of final 
decisions in criminal matters.976  
EU Member States sought to replace the old extradition system by a mechanism that will ensure 
fewer or no grounds for refusal are required to mutually handing crime suspects and accused 
who might be staying in their respective territories. Consequently, on 13 June 2004, the Council  
of Ministers adopted the FD 2002/584/JHA on the EAW and the surrender procedures between 
the Member States. As Article 1(1) FD 2002/584/JHA indicates, the EAW was set up for 
‘conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order ’. It is a 
transnational legal instrument and law enforcement mechanism.977 The EAW was introduced to 
tackle serious cross-border crimes such as terrorism and trafficking in human beings.978 It was 
adopted against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, of 11 
September 2001, which intensified European cooperation against transnational crime.979 The aim 
of its adoption was to remedy the negative consequences of free movement of persons, 
combined with open borders, which entailed a real risk of unfettered actions of criminals.980 
The stated purpose of the EAW is to simplify and expedite the extradition procedures between 
Member States of the EU.981 The FD EAW applies several methods to achieve this end. Firstly, it 
replaces all previous extradition agreements between the Member States by a uniform surrender 
procedure982 in which the same warrant is used for arresting the persons wanted for prosecution 
 
976 Fletcher, M., Lööf, R. and B. Gilmore (2008). EU Criminal Law and Justice. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
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978 Heard, C. and D. Mansell (2011). Op.Cit., p.134. 
979 Bonasera, J. Op. Cit., p.644. 
980 Ostropolski, T. (2014). “The principle of proportionality under the European Arrest Warrant- With an excursus 
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or for enforcement of custodial sentences, and for their transfer to the requesting state. The FD 
EAW replaces the diplomatic and political phase in the conventional extradition by a system 
totally controlled by the judiciary within an integrated transnational justice system.983 The EAW 
issued by relevant ‘judicial authorities’ must be recognized as valid and enforced by the courts of 
other Member States. As a result, the FD EAW changes the terminology from ‘requesting and 
requested states’ in the old extradition system to ‘issuing  and executing states’.984 Furthermore, 
the FD EAW establishes a general rule that the EAW must be treated as a matter of urgency.985 It 
provides strict time limits to execute a warrant. A final decision on the execution of the EAW 
must be taken within 60 days, with a possible extension for 30 days; where a person consents to 
the surrender, the decision shall be taken within 10 days after the consent has been given (Article 
17 FD EAW). Whether or not the person agrees to the surrender, he or she shall be surrendered 
no later than 10 days after the final decision to execute the EAW has been formally issued, unless 
serious humanitarian reasons apply. (Article 23 FD EAW). 
Secondly, the FD EAW introduces significant changes in the extradition system. It reduces the 
grounds for refusal to extradite a person to a minimum core. The execution of the EAW shall be 
refused in case the offence for which it has been issued is covered by amnesty, or when a person 
has already been judged in respect of the same offence (ne bis in idem), or, lastly, where criminal 
liability age limits applies under the law of the executing state. (Article 3 FD EAW). The FD EAW 
excludes the nationality exception from the grounds for refusal. Member States cannot refuse to 
extradite their own nationals accused or suspected for committing a serious crime in another 
Member State. However, the FD EAW gives the option to Member States to request guarantee 
that, upon conviction, the individual is returned to serve the sentence to their home state. 
(Article 5(3) FD EAW). Member States do still have the power to avoid their nationals having to 
serve custodial sentence or detention in other Member States, if they undertake to execute the 
sentence or detention order imposed in the issuing State (Article 4(6) FD EAW).  
 
983 Bonasera, J. (2017). Op.Cit., p.644-645. 
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The FD EAW removes the dual criminality exception for 32 generic types of offences986 where 
they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for 
a maximum period of at least three years.  For all other offences, the executing state may refuse 
surrender on the ground of absence of dual criminality. (Article 2(4) FD EAW). Ordinarily, the 
EAW may be issued for offences punishable under the law of the issuing Member State by a 
custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least twelve months or, 
where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for at least four months. 
(Article 2(1) FD EAW). The FD EAW provides for the possibility for waiving the principle of 
specialty too, to enable the prosecution or detention of a person concerned by the EAW, for an 
offence committed prior to the surrender. This deviation from the rule of specialty operates on 
condition that a Member States notifies its reciprocal consent to the General Secretariat of the 
Council. (Article 27(1) FD EAW).  
The removal of dual criminality raised concerns in respect of the principles of legality and 
equality. It was challenged in Advocaten de Wereld for infringing legality, equality and non-
discrimination.987 In particular, the list of 32 types of offences was claimed to be superfluous, 
vague, lacking a definition of the offences, and therefore violating the principle of clarity.988 It 
was alleged that the abolition of dual criminality for 32 types of offences potentially caused 
discrimination and unequal treatment of individuals wanted under the same warrant.989 In the 
EAC, this issue would need to be addressed if the Community adopts a common arrest warrant. 
Considering the experiences of the EAW and the criticisms it attracted, such a common arrest 
warrant should be limited to serious offences and not to all offences. A common arrest warrant 
needs to be put into the context of a transnational criminal justice and be limited to serious 
 
986 The offences include terrorism, trafficking in human beings, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, laundering of the proceeds of crime, environmental crime, corruption, fraud including that affecting 
the financial interests of the European Communities, computer related crime, sexual ex ploitation of children and 
child pornography, trafficking in stolen vehicles, illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives, 
participation in a criminal organisation, etc. 
987 Geyer, F. (2008). “European Arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European Communities. Judgment of 3 May 
2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad”. European Constitutional Law 
Review 4, p.152 and 155, 
988 Ibid. 
989 Ibid 
185 
 
offences and those with a transnational dimension and which proceedings are transnational too. 
It is important to bear in mind that the aim of such a common arrest warrant should be to ensure 
the most serious criminals, and not ordinary criminals, are arrested and brought to justice. The 
idea of categorizing the most serious offences was put forward by a respondent to the interviews 
for this thesis too, though in a more general context of transnational criminal justice and not in 
relation to a common arrest warrant specifically.990  Nevertheless, it is indicative of the need to 
avoid misuse of transnational criminal justice instruments, like an arrest warrant. The 
determination of the types of offences to which a common arrest warrant in the EAC would apply 
could be done by way of listing types of offences or identifying circumstances that attract 
extradition. Alternatively, a mixed method where a list of facts that fall under extradition and 
conditions for a minimum degree of criminal sanction would ensure a common standard is 
established throughout the EAC. Establishing a set of conducts coupled with the determination 
of minimum sentences for the conducts would prevent the inappropriate use of such a restrictive 
instrument with the negative consequences it entails for the individual.  
The broad jurisdiction ratione materiae of the EAW lead to its excessive disproportionate use for 
minor offences such as thefts of 0,45 g of cannabis, 2 tyres, a piglet, a dessert from a restaurant,a 
chicken, bicycles,  a bottle of beer, or detention of 3 ecstasy pills.991 Fingers were pointed at 
Poland particularly, Czech Republic and Lithuania too, for issuing the EAW for trivial, ‘bagatelle’ 
offences.992 It has been suggested that the disproportionate use of the EAW is intrinsically linked 
to East European countries’ civil law prosecution system typically based on legality, which does 
not allow the prosecution a margin of appreciation before prosecuting an offence, as opposed to 
common law opportunity system where the prosecution balances the severity of the offences 
with the interest to prosecute.993 The reason of the misuse of the EAW is its notorious lack of a 
proportionality test. This strain in the EAW was remedied by the EU Commission after it 
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recognized the ‘systematic issue of the EAW’ as a problem of concern.994 Unfortunately, the 
proportionality test inserted in the revised handbook on how to use the EAW is not binding. The 
EAW still lacks a mechanism to insulate it from a disproportionate use.995 
In the EAC too, the differences in the national legal systems can undermine the appropriate use 
of common instruments for cooperation in criminal matters, such as warrants. In addition, the 
consequences for the inappropriate use of a common arrest warrant can be devastating for the 
individuals whose rights are affected. Therefore, it will be necessary to attach a proportionality 
test to a common arrest warrant to ensure it is used as an ultima ratio measure, especially in the 
context of MR and the obligation it imposes to execute courts’ judgments, decisions and orders 
including warrants. A normative basis for the proportionality principle will need to be established, 
to ensure fair issue of warrants by competent authorities. 
The failure of the FD EAW to define the competent ‘judicial authorities’ for issuing the EAW 
caused divergent practices as a result of the differences in the legal systems of the EU Member 
States. This question was referred to the ECJ by the Amsterdam District Court in Poltorak, 
Kovalkovas and Özçelik, asking for legal clarification of the meaning of ‘ judicial authorities’ and 
whether it was obliged to execute EAWs issued by the Swedish police, the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Justice and a Hungarian prosecution respectively.996 The case shows how the differences in the 
legal systems can cause a challenge for the legality of mechanisms of cooperation in criminal 
matters and for the protection of the rights of individuals. The court based its interpretation on 
the theory of separation of power, emphasizing authorities involved in the administration of 
justice, namely judges and prosecutors, to the exclusion of the police which is essentially a branch 
of the executive.997 The rights of individuals in the EAC would benefit a great protection if the 
issue of an East African arrest warrant was strictly limited to competent national authorities 
involved in the administration of justice. 
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An arrest warrant affects fundamental rights such as the right to liberty and habeas corpus, the 
right to private life but also the prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment 
guaranteed under international instruments.998 The interference is even greater in the context 
of cooperation given the individual is confronted to unfamiliar legal systems, let alone difficulties 
in communicating in foreign languages. In view of the multiplicity and divergences of procedural 
laws and the risk of infringement for the persons affected, a common arrest warrant must 
guarantee sufficient protection of procedural rights as well as the integrity and dignity of 
individuals against outrageous detention conditions and atrocious sentences such as death 
penalty which is still applicable in in the EAC, in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. 
The main provision on rights protection in the FD EAW, Article 1(3), provides that the FD shall not 
have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal 
principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU. Further reference to individual rights is made in the 
preamble, particularly recitals 10, 12 and 13. Although the FD EAW’s aim is to replace 
conventional extradition with a surrender system based on MR between Member States, it has 
been plagued by tensions between the application of MR to extradition procedures and the 
protection of individual rights ever since its inception.999  In Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 
PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the ECJ attempted to reconcile the need to uphold the integrity of 
the EAW system with the protection of the fundamental rights of the requested person.1000  It 
ruled that the execution of an EAW must be postponed if and for so long as there is a real risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment arising from detention conditions in the issuing Member 
State.1001  With this ruling, the ECJ did not introduce a new ground of refusal; it opted instead for 
a ground of mandatory postponing of the execution of an EAW, which is not provided for 
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expressly in the EAW.1002 While the ruling did not detail whether it covered also other 
fundamental rights, it is argued that, in the interest of protecting fundamental rights of the 
requested person, national courts should be able to postpone the execution of an EAW if a ‘real 
risk’ exists that other fundamental rights of the requested person, such as the right to effective 
judicial remedies, would be breached in the Member State.1003  In a recent decision (Case C-
216/18 PPU LM, EU:C:2018:586), the ECJ extended the Aranyosi and Căldăraru ruling to cover 
the real risk of a breach of the fundamental right of a fair trial as per Article 47(2) CFREU.1004  
In view of the differences in the procedural laws of the EU Member States and their unequal 
protection of rights, the mere reference to national legal systems for the enforcement of rights 
protection is inadequate as is the reference to human rights in the preamble of the FD EAW 
insufficient. It could be argued that the risks for infringements of individual rights, particularly 
the abolition of dual criminality and the political offence and nationality exceptions traditionally 
considered as the expression of the protection states owe to their citizens notwithstanding the 
distrust in foreign legal systems,1005 requires a more explicit protection of rights in an instrument 
such as the EAW. The respondents to the interviews for this thesis were slightly divided on the 
question whether an EAC instrument on mutual assistance in criminal matters should provide an 
explicit ground for refusal to cooperate in case a request violates human rights. Most of them 
opposed the idea on the ground that it creates a certain contradiction and a practical 
enforcement problem.1006   The respondent in favour of the idea expressed concerns about death 
penalty in extradition and argued that it is standard practice to put exceptions in international 
instruments, making a direct reference to the security and public health exceptions to the 
freedom of movement principle under the EAC Common Market Protocol.1007 The EAW has been 
praised overall, despite the challenges to its legality and constitutionality in a few States. It was 
acclaimed for being a more efficient instrument than the traditional extradition.1008 Statistical 
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data for the decade after the adoption of the EAW suggest that it expedited the extradition 
process and increased the average time for extraditing a person from 9-12 months to 45-48 days, 
and to 15-17 days where the person consents to surrender.1009  
5.2.2.2. Mutual recognition and assistance in evidence  
Assistance in evidence is perhaps the most valuable form of cooperation in criminal matters, 
given the importance of evidence in the determination of criminal liability. While obtaining some 
types of evidence in an ordinary case can be fairly difficult, the process becomes even harder 
where the authorities of a state need to access evidence that is lying in another state. Also, the 
field of evidence has been affected by technological advances, just as crime has become more 
digital, changing face and increasingly affecting more states at once and faster. 
Member States of the EU sought to device a mechanism that expedites and simplifies the 
procurement and transmission of evidence among them. Attempts at creating a mechanism for 
assistance in evidence resulted in two different instruments in the MR model. At first, the Council 
of Ministers adopted the FD 2008/978/JHA on the EEW for the purpose of obtaining objects, 
documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters. The EEW was modelled on the 
EAW and shared many of its characteristics, such as the restriction of grounds for refusal, the 
obligation imposed on the executing State to grant the assistance sought, the establishment of 
strict time-limits for executing the warrant, the judicialization of the process and the 
establishment of a standard form in replacement of the letter rogatory. It replicated the same 
list of 32 offences for which verification of dual criminality is not allowed unless a search or 
seizure is requested (Article 14(2) FD EEW). The EEW was meant to be issued for obtaining 
evidence that is already in possession of the executing authority prior to the issuing of the 
warrant (Article 4(4) FD EEW). The evidence could include objects, documents or data from the 
search of the suspect’s premises, historical data from witnesses, or records resulting from special 
investigative techniques. The EEW excluded the taking of evidence from interviews, statements 
or hearings, the taking of evidence from a person’s body including DNA and fingerprints, real-
time evidence such as interceptions of communications or the monitoring of bank accounts, 
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evidence requiring analysis of existing objects, documents or data, and evidence related to 
electronic communication data retained by service or network providers (Article 4(2) FD EEW). 
These and all other evidences falling outside the ambit of the EEW had to be obtained by using 
the MLA instruments. In practice, the EEW existed in tandem with the MLA model (Recital 18(a) 
FD EEW). It was implemented only in a dozen of Member States. Hence, it has never had any 
measurable impact.1010 The coexistence of the two models in evidentiary matters rendered 
assistance very complex and fragmented.1011 Paradoxically, the fragmentation constituted a 
counter-effect to the very objective of the MR model to simplify and expedite cooperation in 
criminal matters. Consequently, the search for a more comprehensive system applicable to all 
types of evidence, to replace all existing instruments for assistance in evidence, resulted in the 
adoption by the European Parliament and the Council, on 3rd April 2014, of Directive 2014/41/EU 
on the EIO in criminal matters.  
The EIO is defined as a judicial decision issued and validated by a judicial authority of a Member 
State, to carry out investigation to obtain evidence in another Member State or to request the 
transmission of evidence already in the possession of the executing State (Article 1). As the name 
suggests, the EIO is an order; it is an obligation to the authority in the executing State to provide 
the authority in the issuing State with the assistance sought, save where conditions for non-
execution apply.  
The Directive establishes a procedure for the issue, recognition and execution of the EIO. The EIO 
can be issued in respect of existing or prospective criminal proceedings under the law of the 
issuing State, as well as administrative proceedings that may give rise to criminal proceedings 
(Article 4). Such extension of the EIO to administrative proceedings extends its ambit to cases 
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where criminal proceedings may never take place.1012 The EIO should have been limited to 
criminal proceedings, strictly speaking. 
The scope of application of the EIO is deliberately wide to take into account the differing roles of 
the police and prosecutors in the Member States.1013 Ratione materiae, it applies to any type of 
evidence, with the exception of the JITs and the gathering of evidence by such teams, and to any 
criminal proceedings with no limit to specific offences (Article 3).  Unlike the EEW, the EIO allows 
to request evidence that does not yet exist. It makes possible to request to interview suspects or 
witnesses, or to obtain real-time information by intercepting and monitoring telephones or email 
communications or bank and financial accounts and systems.1014 It also makes possible to obtain 
DNA samples or fingerprints and to send the information to the issuing State.1015 The Directive 
makes provisions for specific measures such as the transfer of persons held in custody for the 
purpose of carrying out an investigative measure, the hearing by videoconference and 
teleconference, covert investigations, and controlled deliveries. Ratione personae, it can be 
issued by various authorities, including judges and prosecutors and other authorities as 
determined by the issuing State (Article 2). This raises concern for legality and proportionality, 
especially for invasive measures.1016 
Unlike the EAW, the EIO establishes a proportionality safeguard for the measures sought. It 
requires the issuing authority to assess and ensure the measures requested are necessary and 
proportionate to the rights of the suspects or accused (Article 6). The imposition of this duty on 
the issuing State rather than the executing State reflects the very nature of MR. An assessment 
of the necessity and proportionality of an EIO by the executing State would create an unintended 
ground for refusal. Nevertheless, the EIO indirectly gives the possibility to the executing State to 
weigh the proportionality of the requested measure. It allows the executing State to have 
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recourse to an investigative measure other than that indicated in the EIO, if the same result 
would be achieved by less intrusive means (Article 10(3)). 
The EIO lays downs the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution. These include where 
immunity or privilege apply under the law of the executing State; where the execution of the EIO 
would harm essential national interests or jeopardize the source of information or involve the 
use of classified intelligence; where the investigative measure would not be authorized in a 
similar domestic case in the executing State; ne bis in idem; where execution of the investigative 
measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the executing state’s obligation under 
Article 6 TEU and the CFREU (Article 11). Three more grounds for refusal take the form of a 
territorial clause1017: where the EIO relates to a criminal offence alleged to have been committed 
outside the territory of the issuing State and wholly or partly on the territory of the executing 
State, and the conduct for which the EIO is issued is not an offence in the executing State; where 
the conduct for which the EIO has been issued does not constitute an offence under the law of 
the executing State, unless it concerns an offence listed within the 32 categories of offences that 
correspond to the same categories listed in the EAW; and where the executing State restricts the 
use of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO to offences punishable by a certain 
threshold that excludes the offence concerned by the EIO..  
The Directive allows the executing State to postpone the recognition or execution of the EIO until 
such time as necessary, where execution might prejudice an on-going investigation or 
prosecution or where the evidence concerned is already being used in other criminal proceedings 
(Article 15). It applies strict time-limits for the execution of the EIO and sets as principle that 
recognition or execution of the EIO must be carried out with the same celerity and priority as in 
a similar domestic case. A decision to recognize or execute the EIO must be taken within 30 days. 
The investigative measure must be carried out within 90 days extendable to 30 more days (Article 
12). Surprisingly, the directive does not set any time-limit for the transfer of evidence, except the 
duty imposed on the executing State to transfer, without undue delay, the evidence obtained or 
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already in its possession (Article 13). The transfer of the evidence may be suspended pending the 
determination of a legal remedy. 
The Directive empowers the issuing State to request the executing State to observe the 
formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing State, unless they are contrary to 
its fundamental principles of law (Article 9(2)). This provision reflects Article 4(1) EU 2000 MLA 
Convention; it combines the application of the lex loci (typical of the MLA model) and the lex fori 
(typical of the MR model). Considering the differences in the evidence rules of the Member 
States, the provision indirectly addresses the difficult issue of the admissibility of evidence in the 
issuing State.1018 Furthermore, the Directive imposes a duty on the executing authority to consult 
and inform the issuing authority, for example, before deciding not to recognize or to execute the 
EIO, before substituting the requested measure (Article 10(4)), when it cannot meet the time-
limits for recognizing or executing the EIO (Article 12(5-6)), etc. Perhaps the most innovative 
method in the Directive is the possibility given to the issuing authority to request that one or 
more of its authorities assist in the execution of the EIO1019 to the extent that they would be able 
to do so in a similar domestic case (Article 9(4)), although such participation does not imply law 
enforcement (Article 9(5)). The provision potentially facilitates the admissibility of evidence in 
the issuing State. It adds an extra-territorial function to the power of the issuing State who is able 
to choose the measure to be executed, for example, oral evidence and the examination of 
witnesses.1020 
The directive raises major concerns for human rights implications and fair trial, of the way 
evidence is gathered and shared across borders. Although it provides for the possibility for the 
suspect or accused too, or their lawyer, to request an EIO (Article 1(2)), it is flawed by the absence 
of the defence in the execution of the EIO in many ways.1021 For example, it does not require the 
presence of the defence at the hearing by videoconference or teleconference. Considering 
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evidence is the outcome of specific rules in every country, which strict compliance determines its 
genuineness, the EIO poses the risk of admitting evidence that was gathered inappropriately and 
thus violating the right to fair trial. A classic example is admitting as evidence the written 
declaration of a witness that was not obtained under cross-examination, or the statement of a 
suspect questioned by the police in the absence of a lawyer. While presumably the issuing 
authority may request the participation of the defence under the ‘formalities and procedures’ in 
the execution of the EIO, this makes the participation of the defence entirely dependent on the 
issuing State.1022 Given the differences in the rules of evidence, the failure to require the 
participation of the defence in the execution of the EIO puts individuals at risk of unfairness and 
inequality. Further unfairness concerns the provisions on legal remedies which l imit the power 
to challenge the substantive reasons for issuing the EIO only in an action brought before a court 
of the issuing State. (Article 14(2)) Consequently, this ‘distribution of competence typical of the 
MR model’1023 is unfair to the defence whose ability is already limited by geographical distance, 
language challenges and the ignorance of the legal system, laws and procedures of the issuing 
State.  
The EIO endangers the right to privacy too. The possibility for real-time evidence gathering, such 
as interception of telecommunications and obtaining information on bank accounts interferes 
with individuals’ rights to private life and correspondence, both protected by Article 8 ECHR and 
Articles 7 and 8 CFREU. The Directive does not explicitly provide minimum guarantee, such as 
those provided in the FD 2008/977/JHA (on the protection of personal data processed in the 
framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), for the protection of 
individuals who are subject of the measures. This is a matter of concern considering the 
differences in the national laws regulating intercepts, the crimes for which they may be used, 
who may authorize them, and specific obligations such as the disclosure of certain materials to 
the defendant.1024 The respondents to the interviews for this thesis too expressed concerns 
about possible violations of the right to privacy in transnational enquiries.1025  They 
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recommended putting in place safeguards and limitations to protect individuals’ rights and 
suggested the involvement of courts, specifically, when rights are at risk.1026  While they 
recognized that it is difficult to foresee how the safeguards and limitations would operate, they 
recommended that the safeguards and limitations operate prior to the execution of a request for 
assistance.1027  A respondent wished the safeguards and limitations are undertaken by the court 
in the issuing State, to ensure the evidence is admissible.1028 Further risks for infringements of 
the right to private life by the EIO concern the taking of evidence from the body of a person such 
as DNA samples and fingerprints. The Directive allows the executing State to indicate whether 
the evidence must be returned to it once no longer required in the issuing State. (Article 13(3)). 
However, it does not mention whether the issuing State is entitled to make copies of the 
evidence.1029 The situation raises concern in respect of data protection, storage and retention. 
Due regard must be given to the context in which private data are recorded, retained and used. 
The insufficiency in human rights protection in the EIO overall stems from the lack of explicit 
proclamation of the rights of the defence. The mere refence to compliance with the ECHR and 
the CFREU in its preamble has attracted strong criticisms for being inadequate for the protection 
of human rights.1030 The insufficient protection of rights in the EIO reflects the tension between 
MR and human rights, in particular the extension of MR, a principle initially conceived for trade 
and goods, to evidence has been found problematic, especially in view of the variances in the 
national evidence rules.1031 The lack of common rules in evidence, data protection and criminal 
procedure has prompted questions on the suitability of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
transnational investigations and evidence gathering,1032 or at least the need for a mechanism 
such as the EIO which proposal was viewed by some Member States, such as the United Kingdom 
and Germany, as premature.1033 The same concerns are applicable to the EAC. However, this 
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research conceives the establishment of an instrument for gathering and sharing evidence in the 
EAC as a ‘work in progress’ which will be achieved gradually. The research also considers that the 
choice of the appropriate term for an instrument for assistance in evidence in the EAC is not so 
much relevant. What matters is the scope of such instrument. It should be broad enough to cover 
the collection and transfer of all types of evidence. This research recommends the use of the 
term ‘’evidence warrant’’, for uniformity with ‘arrest warrant’. Efforts should be directed towards 
ensuring the instrument enables the national competent authorities to communicate with one 
another to solve potential hindrances in the execution of requests for assistance. When asked 
how could the EAC address issues of legality and admissibility of evidence in transnational 
proceedings, considering the differences in the national rules of evidence ,a respondent to the 
interviews for this thesis expressed the same idea, in the following terms:” I think the only way it 
can remotely be addressed is that you send the information to the relevant agencies, the 
prosecution departments and then they look at the procedures that they have in their country to 
see whether this particular kind of evidence at hand is helpful to them or is even admissible in 
the court …”.1034  Such communication between national authorities will necessitate institutional 
mechanisms. 
5.3. Institutional means 
The complexity of transnational crime as criminal actions committed in the territories of several 
countries by several accomplices often with different citizenships or residing in different 
countries1035 requires the coordination of cooperation efforts at the regional level. This has been 
acknowledged, in the EU, through the establishment of various institutions aimed at facilitating 
cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States. The institutions were 
developed at different periods of the integration process of the EU. Their nature was directly 
influenced by the overall institutional arrangement of the EU. This section discusses the 
institutions that were designed to create general networks between law enforcement and 
judicial authorities as most important, specifically liaison magistrates, EJN, EUROPOL and 
EUROJUST. It does not examine additional institutional mechanisms or operational networks for 
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the facilitation of the joint policing or prosecution of serious crimes in the EU, such as JITs, PCTF, 
CEPOL, the Prüm decisions and ECRIS. 
5.3.1. Types of institutions  
The development of institutions in the cooperation system of the EU shows two opposed trends. 
The MLA model was predominantly marked by the establishment of institutions that operated 
horizontally. The reason of this trend is to be found in the institutional framework of the EU as 
established by the TEU signed in Maastricht in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. The treaty 
created the third pillar JHA, the former framework for cooperation in justice, under Title VI, with 
its own intergovernmental method in contrast to the supranational character of the first pillar, 
the European Community.1036 Consequently, the institutions created to facilitate cooperation in 
criminal matters, in the third pillar JHA, bore an intergovernmental character.1037 First among 
them was the liaison magistrate, a concept promoted by the EU and borrowed from the French 
law1038 and which has become a common occurrence in international cooperation.1039 On 22 April 
1996, the Council of Ministers adopted Joint Action 96/277/JHA on a framework for the exchange 
of liaison magistrates to improve judicial cooperation between the Member States of the EU. 
Furthermore, the post-Amsterdam TEU (Article 30(2)(c)) called on the Council to ‘promote liaison 
arrangements between prosecuting /investigating officials specializing in the fight against 
organized crime…”. The liaison magistrate is an official with special expertise in cooperation, 
posted in another state on the basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements, to expedite and 
ensure effectiveness of cooperation as well as facilitate mutual understanding between the 
national legal systems concerned.1040  Liaison magistrates are sent to countries where differences 
in legal systems have caused delays.1041 They do not have extraterritorial power.1042 The 
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advantages of liaison magistrates include overcoming language problems, discussing requests for 
cooperation to identify and avert possible issues, and promoting mutual trust in the legal 
systems.1043 
The second mechanism with an intergovernmental character, the EJN, was set up on the basis of 
Joint Action 98/428 JHA of 29th of June 1998, to promote direct contacts between prosecutors 
and judges, linking up the central authorities for international cooperation in criminal matters 
and other authorities with specific responsibilities within the context of international 
cooperation.1044 It focuses on promoting effective cooperation in respect of serious crime such 
as organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism, by providing legal and practical 
information to competent local authorities, providing support with request for cooperation, 
creating a EU judicial culture, and cooperation with other judicial networks and partners including 
third countries.1045 The network is composed of national contact points, designated by each 
Member State, who are judges, prosecutors and representatives of the Ministries of Justice.1046  
The EJN does not have legal personality.1047 
The third mechanism in the series is the European Police Office, the establishment of which was 
agreed in the TEU.  Article K.1 provided that Member States would consider as a matter of 
common interest “police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, 
unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of crime, including if necessary certain aspects 
of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for 
exchanging information within a European Police Office”. Subsequently, Europol was created as 
an intergovernmental body, outside the Community legal framework and with its own 
Convention signed on 26 July 1995 and entered into force on 1 July 1999.1048 Europol works 
through a network of Europol Liaison Officers seconded by the Europol National Units created 
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and located in each Member State.1049 The Europol National Units provide a link between Europol 
and national police authorities. Europol is conceived as an executive police force without 
autonomous investigative powers.1050  Europol officers cannot carry guns, conduct home 
searches or tap wires, nor can they question, arrest or detain suspects.1051 
The creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 3 
TEU), -to ensure the free movement of persons and to offer a high level of protection to European 
citizens, and which covers, amongst other policy areas, cooperation in criminal matters (Articles 
67-89 TFEU)- , coupled with the move towards the MR model of cooperation in criminal matters 
exceeded the scope of the intergovernmental structure of the JHA and prompted the search for 
more supranational institutions. Existing institutions were reformed, particularly Europol. The 
Europol Convention was amended with three protocols1052 before it was replaced by the Council 
Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office, which entered 
into effect on 1st January 2010. The Council Decision transformed Europol from an 
intergovernmental organization into an agency of the EU.1053 Consequently, Europol lost its own 
legal status as an international organization established by international law; its legal personality 
is now derived from the EU.1054 
Amid the institutional reforms of the former JHA, a new institution, Eurojust, was created by 
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime. Eurojust was established as a permanent body with legal personality and entitled 
to negotiate cooperation agreements with third states.1055 It was built on an integrated approach 
between the police, the prosecution and the judiciary, with a purely supportive role in 
cooperation in criminal matters including facilitating direct contacts between national authoriti es 
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and a better use of existing measures of cooperation.1056 Eurojust has no binding power. It is a 
mediator, a facilitator without any decision-making power vis-à-vis national authorities.1057  It has 
no investigative powers, having been configured as an intergovernmental body in the perspective 
of the former JHA third pillar of the EU.1058 Eurojust is tasked with facilitating the execution of 
MLA and the implementation of extradition requests (Article 3(1)(b)) and advising in case two or 
more Member States have issued an EAW for the same person (Article 16 (2) FD EAW). It is 
entrusted with the power to monitor breaches of time-limits regarding the execution of EAWs 
which, according to Article 17(7) of the 2002 FD EAW, Member States have to report to Eurojust 
with giving reasons for the delay. The monitoring power of Eurojust has been reinforced by the 
Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and 
amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, which requires  Member States to inform their 
national member of the setting-up of any JIT and the results of its work (Article 13(5) and of any 
request or decision on judicial cooperation transmitted to at least two Member States and 
involving specific serious crimes, cases involving criminal organisations, or those with a serious 
cross-border dimension (Article 13(6)). The agency has clearly a number of supranational 
features.1059 Its most active function is the potential to trigger prosecutions in national level.1060 
While member states are given the possibility of not complying with a request by Eurojust, they 
are obliged to justify their non-compliance (Article 8). Article 85(1)(a) TFEU opens new prospects 
in terms of initiation of criminal investigations, which is entirely up to national authorities so far. 
It provides for the possibility of a direct initiation of criminal investigations by Eurojust. 
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Nevertheless, Eurojust cannot carry out formal procedural acts. Formal judicial procedural acts 
are carried out by the competent national officials (Article 85 (2)). This last provision strengthens 
the power of Eurojust. It is argued that despite the omission of the word ‘investigations’ unlike 
in Article 85(1), the express reference to ‘prosecutions’ in Article 85(2)1061 includes both 
investigations and prosecutions by competent national officials, including any members of 
Eurojust who would be expressly recognized as having such powers.  
Eurojust fulfills its tasks through national members seconded by each Member State in 
accordance with its legal system.1062 The national member must be a prosecutor, judge or police 
officer with equivalent competences.1063 They handle individual cases and all information 
exchanged between Eurojust and a member state is directed through them.1064 They have access 
to their national criminal records and are empowered to exchange information with other 
national members.1065 While they remain part of their national jurisdictions, they work at 
Eurojust’s premises.1066  
There have been arguments in Europe in favour of moving towards a more supranational 
approach to prosecution in cooperation, instead of mere ‘coordination’ and ‘strengthening’ role 
conferred to Eurojust. First ideas for supranational prosecution in Europe date way back before 
the establishment of Eurojust.1067 They were brought about by concerns over offences against 
the budget of the EU. The concerns have led to the establishment of the EPPO, for the protection 
of the financial interests of the EU.1068 Article 86 TFEU is the basis for founding an EPPO as a 
supranational body. This research will not discuss the latter institution for two reasons. Firstly, 
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the aim of the EPPO contrasts with cooperation as investigated here. Secondly, it has not been 
operational yet, hence it cannot be assessed.  
5.3.2. The relevance of the institutions for the EAC 
The evaluation, in this research, of the relevance for the EAC of the institutions developed for 
cooperation in criminal matters in the EU is guided by two assumptions. Firstly, tackling 
transnational crime at the regional level needs a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, not only 
responses to transnational crime must cover all the stages of the criminal process1069 but also 
address the root causes of the crimes. Secondly, transnational crime poses a challenge from its 
extension across multiple jurisdictions and so requires well-coordinated criminal justice 
responses amongst the countries in the region. Therefore, an integrated approach to a regional 
response to transnational crime is important for efficiency but also for promoting the spirit of 
cooperation among the key actors of the criminal justice systems. In accordance with the criteria 
above, this research considers necessary the establishment of a regional police and an agency for 
criminal justice in the EAC, similar to Europol and Eurojust.  
5.3.2.1. An East African Police 
The idea of creating a regional police is based on the assumption that the traditional state-
embedded policing model and authority is inappropriate for curbing transnational crime i n the 
EAC in view of the expansion of criminal networks across borders by communication technology, 
banking, shipping and transportation systems that facilitate their operations.1070 The view 
corresponds with the academic criminologist discourse as well as a certain popular language that 
associate the expansion of transnational crime with globalization and argue that there is an 
established need to develop transnational policing.1071  
A claim advances that the policing field has been a fragmented terrain since the end of the Cold 
War and the rise to prominence of neoliberalism.1072 It also argues that policing has become 
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transnational and is no longer embedded in the sovereign nation state.1073 This transformation 
of policing is described as symptomatic of the postmodern and the shift in contemporary society 
towards transnational practices.1074 A more pessimistic account advances that the fragmentation 
of the policing machine has given way to a chaotic policing system in postmodern institutions.1075 
The assumption that the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force in the 
maintenance of social order on its own territory does no longer hold true.1076 A host of other 
actors, transnational corporations, private interests, the media and the civil society compete to 
influence the social order by using the means at their hands.1077 
The necessity of establishing a transnational policing system in the EAC would quite legitimately 
be questionable in view of the existence of Interpol, probably because it is the oldest framework 
for police cooperation and the best-known global policing institution. However, Interpol was 
designed to be a global framework. Its primary purpose is to promote mutual assistance between 
police organisations in separate countries.1078 Its global focus does not make it the perfect 
mechanism for cooperation in a transnational setting.1079 Furthermore, Interpol was not 
constituted through a treaty, convention or any similar instrument. It was founded upon a 
constitution drafted by a random group of police officers without the involvement of their 
respective governments.1080 Thus this research recommends the establishment of a transnational 
policing mechanism in the EAC, on the basis of cooperation. 
Critics rightly point out that transnational policing is invariably presented in terms of liberal 
values.1081 While this holds true, this research would fall short if it ignored the governance 
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problems of transnational policing. The coercive power of the police in the maintenance of order, 
the search, arrest and detention of suspects, and intrusive methods of investigation raise major 
concerns in relation to the rights of citizens and to accountability.1082 For example, the sharing of 
false information between the police across two states may lead to responsibility especially when 
such information sharing results in a refusal to entry a country or even a detention at the 
borders.1083 Police actions require legal tools, or they would constitute criminal offences. Detail 
arrangements for securing adequate data protection safeguards must be put in place to regulate 
the sharing of information on suspects across national police agencies. Hence, this research views 
liberal values as essentially universal rather than strictly western values. The legitimacy of a 
transnational policing system in the EAC will depend on its accountability towards the 
Community. An accountability framework for policing in the EAC must be established, to allow 
different segments of the society to exercise control over the governance of the regional policing.  
An accountability framework for policing in the EAC must ensure policing practices are 
democratically accountable and transparent. Such framework should essentially consist of 
legislation, policies, procedures and initiatives that ensure the regional police is not insulated 
from public, parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, in addition to internal accountability 
mechanisms. Firstly, public control can be exercised through citizen review, to make policing 
accountable to the civil society.1084 The control may also take the form of public information and 
include access to documents or the publication of annual reports and press releases on the 
website of the policing institution.1085 Secondly, parliamentary control can be achieved by 
ensuring parliaments’ oversight on the regional police. Thirdly, judicial control can be guaranteed 
by giving courts the mandate to review the decisions of the regional police. The parliamentary 
and judicial controls might be split between relevant national and regional institutions. It has 
been noted, in the case of Europol, that the level of accountability gradually decreases as the 
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level of regionalisation increases.1086 The supranationalisation of Europol, particularly the change 
of its status to an agency of the EU, reduced the power of national parliaments to control 
Europol.1087  
The mandate of the regional police will have to include, specifically, the prevention and 
investigation of transnational crimes. The failure to think about crime prevention and reduction 
in the discourse about transnational crime and policing has had as effect a reinforced 
militarization of policing.1088 While the mandate could be wider and include serious organized 
crimes and international crimes, the establishment of such agency must be understood primarily 
within the context of policing transnational crimes as a result of joint policies of the Partner States 
under the governance of the EAC as a supranational entity.  
The lack of a provision for the creation of a common police in the Treaty establishing the EAC, 
unlike in the EU, suggests that the EAC was probably not fully aware of the extent of the security 
implications of its common market’s policies, particularly the relaxation of borders. The omission 
can also be seen as a persisting assumption of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of 
coercive force in the maintenance of social order within its own territory, an understanding that 
has changed since the end of the Cold War.1089 Not surprisingly, EU Member States too were not 
ready, by the signing of the Europol Convention in 1995, to transfer authority to a supranational 
entity.1090 The status of Europol has meanwhile been upgraded from an intergovernmental 
organization to an agency of the EU, with the power to request national police forces to conduct 
investigations, the so-called ‘right of initiative,1091 albeit without any real operational power. A 
regional law enforcement agency for the EAC too should be invested with some forms of 
supranational powers. Intergovernmentalism and its inherent limited power would significantly 
prevent such body from achieving considerable results.  
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Mostly, regional police would provide support in coordinating operations such as controlled 
deliveries, cross-border surveillances or covert operations much required in complex 
transnational investigations because of the inherent difficulties and dangers in collecting 
information and intelligence on the operations of organized criminal groups.1092 The 
establishment of such formal institution will ensure the legality of these operations often 
conducted without the knowledge of the persons concerned. As is argued by Marc Alain, official 
cooperation agreements formalize practices and information exchange and attempt at diverting 
horizontal and informal procedure to a controlled formal vertical structure.1093  
A regional law enforcement organization will be useful for developing effective systems of 
information sharing on the profile, motives and modus operandi of the offenders, the scope and 
trends in transnational crime, its impact and the effectiveness of the response to it. In view of 
the importance of information sharing for the identification of offenders and for the issui ng of 
appropriate sentences, an East African Police would also maintain a computer regional system of 
databases on criminal records and information systems on persons wanted for arrest or 
extradition, witnesses, persons put under surveillance, etc. Information exchange and processing 
naturally involves data protection and implicitly raises human rights concerns that will have to 
be addressed properly. 
In accordance with the EU’s experience, this research advances that the establishment of a 
regional police will prompt the need to create a comparable institution, in the law enforcement, 
to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of transnational crimes. 
5.3.2.2. An East African agency for criminal justice 
There was a feeling, in the EU, that a corresponding unit to Europol was lacking at the prosecution 
level.1094 However, the nature of the transnational criminal justice, especially the fact that all 
procedural acts are carried domestically in the Member States meant that the unit would not be 
 
1092 Dandurand, Y. Colombo, G. and N. Passas (2007). “Measures and mechanisms to strengthen international 
cooperation among prosecution services”. Crime Law and Social Change 47, p. 279. 
1093 Alain M. (2001). “Transnational police cooperation in Europe and in North America: Revisiting the Traditional 
Border Between Internal and external Security Matters, or How Policing is being Globalized”. European Journal of 
crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 9(2), p.126. 
1094 Souminen, A. (2008). “The Past, Present and the Future of Eurojust”. Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 15(2), p.220. 
207 
 
invested with real prosecutorial powers. Instead the envisaged unit mingled the prosecution, the 
police and the judiciary in a single institution acting as a coordinator and an intermediary 
between the Member States.1095 While this approach is questionable, it may be justified by the 
responsibility incumbent to the three professions in the issue and the execution of orders and 
warrants for evidence and extradition. Hence the unit constitutes a channel through which 
various instruments for cooperation in criminal matters are exchanged and coordinated among 
the national authorities competent for issuing and executing them. The establishment of such 
unit reflects the MR model’s break with ‘’outdated’’ diplomatic channeled and executive oriented 
cooperation system and the trend towards processes entirely managed by courts systems. 
Cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC too requires creating a structure for coordinating 
criminal justice actions. A respondent to the interviews for this thesis said in this regard: 
“…institutional set up should be there. … at least a regional center, a mechanism, a framework 
should be in place [to be able] to coordinate… … you need a regional center that could transmit 
information, coordinate, help settle differences that could arise” .1096 Like the regional police, the 
structure would be a permanent body of the Community. It would play a central role as the 
agency for criminal justice. The agency would operate like Eurojust in the EU, with similar 
attributions. In addition to coordinating cooperation actions in the Community, the agency would 
play an active role where states fail or where they are not willing to fulfil their obligations. It 
would also assist the implementation of the proposed warrants for evidence and extradition. 
Furthermore, the agency would review the Partner States’ requests for assistance and ensure 
they meet the standards and requirements in the proposed warrants. 
The mingling of national criminal justice actors into a common regional unit, in the EU, may also 
reflect the MR model’ s aim to provide a cooperation means that respects the differences in 
Member States’ legal systems. These differences were first acknowledged in the Liaison 
Magistrate mechanism established for promoting effective cooperation between national legal 
systems.1097 However, the mechanism is profoundly inscribed in the MLA model. It leaves the 
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choice entirely to Member States to enter bilateral or multilateral agreements to establish it and 
it essentially operates in the Member States. Although the mechanism’s overall impact is 
positively judged, its limited implementation means a limited impact too. Nevertheless, the 
mechanism’ s aim of promoting cooperation between officials specialized in the fight against 
organised crime signaled early manifestations of the trend towards dialogues between national 
criminal justice authorities in the EU member States. Such dialogues are described essentially in 
terms of the effects of globalization and the rethinking of the relationship between law and 
space, the emergence of new dimensions as well as the construction of legal structures and 
efforts to address common problems.1098 They are often referred to as ‘judicial dialogues’ and 
they encompass the interactions between not only judges but also prosecutors and other actors 
in the national court systems.1099 The dialogues were acknowledged by the respondents to the 
interviews for this thesis as a well-known practice at the EAC, that brings together the relevant 
national stakeholders to discuss among themselves, specifically the judiciaries, the prosecution 
offices and the police.1100 
Judicial dialogues operate above, across and below the states’ level. They occur in three ways: 
face-to-face interactions, IT-based communication and cross-citations.1101 Face-to-face direct 
interaction happens through meetings, usually international conferences, the exchange of 
judicial delegations or visits and opportunities for networking and sharing experiences.1102 IT-
based dialogue has been fostered by the Internet. It includes the use of legal data bases and 
online forums where judges and other lawyers can talk and write to each other directly.1103 Cross-
citation involves comparative analysis-citation and discussion of foreign legal precedent.1104 We 
can speak of vertical, semi-vertical and horizontal dialogues, depending on the hierarchy of the 
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courts engaged in the dialogues, for example dialogues between international or regional courts 
and national courts, or between higher and lower national courts, between national courts at the 
same level, as well as dialogues between foreign courts.1105 The latter, dialogues between foreign 
courts across borders, referred to as transnational judicial dialogues or transjudicial dialogues,1106 
is described as a distinctive feature of the present age.1107 It is applied, in this chapter, as a 
criterium for determining the relevance of institutions discussed above. Transnational dialogues 
involve emerging transnational issues, such as transnational crimes, and they are based on a 
sense of common enterprise in addition to other dimensions defining a region.1108 It can be said 
that the establishment of the EJN, particularly its aim of promoting direct contacts between 
judges and prosecutors and links between national central authorities marked a step forward in 
furthering transnational judicial dialogues in the EU. However, like the Liaison Magistrate, the 
EJN operates in the Member States, does not have a legal personality and is essentially anchored 
in intergovernmentalism, giving space to states and structures more than individuals and actual 
actors. 
While this thesis recognizes the important effects of transnational judicial dialogues in enhancing 
cooperation in criminal matters, it argues that the dialogues must be organised in the same 
institution responsible for coordinating actions in criminal justice cooperation, in the case of the 
EAC the proposed agency for criminal justice. Such orientation naturally fits in with the kind of 
cooperation conducted directly between competent national authorities as proposed in this 
research. The concentration of various functions in a single agency in the EAC will prevent 
unnecessary multiplication of institutions. Above all, it will cast all cooperation efforts under the 
banner of a single supranational institution and avoid the divide observed in the EU model. The 
EAC agency for criminal justice would coordinate not only cooperation actions, but also dialogues 
between national authorities in respect of transnational organized crimes. It would serve as a 
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platform for discussing cooperation requests to avoid possible hindrances. The agency would also 
hold periodical and regular meetings of national authorities for exchanging experiences and 
practices in the investigation and the prosecution of transnational organized crimes, and in the 
handling of related cases. It would facilitate information exchange between national authorities, 
for a better knowledge of foreign legal systems and for promoting mutual understanding and 
trust. The agency would also constitute a means for multidirectional dialogues and joint meetings 
between national authorities in their various professions. 
Supposing the EAC adopts a MR model of cooperation in criminal matters, the Partner States will 
be required to grant assistance and extradition requests as an obligation imposed on them with 
limited possible grounds for refusal. In this case, the agency for criminal justice would monitor 
and report the Partner States’ compliance with this obligation to execute, including compliance 
with time-limits for responding to requests. The Partner States would be answerable to the 
agency for any breach of the obligations above.  
Transnational proceedings are naturally complex. The involvement of more than one state raise 
practical issues, such as conflicts of jurisdiction, on which states may not compromise. The agency 
for criminal justice in the EAC may be given supranational attributes to settle conflicts arising 
between national courts of the Partner States. The conflicts may essentially be twofold. Positive 
conflicts of jurisdiction involve two or more states with competing jurisdiction over the case and 
willing to exercise their jurisdiction, whereas negative conflicts of jurisdiction involve two or more 
states with jurisdiction over the case but neither state is willing to exercise it.1109 In the first case, 
the agency for criminal justice may be empowered to decide which national court has jurisdiction 
over the case and to enforce acceptance of its decisions. This assignment of jurisdiction means 
the choice of the forum and the applicable law as well as the assignment of the power to 
investigate, prosecute and adjudicate. It has several implications on the suspects, accused and 
witnesses who may be exposed to a foreign court, legal system and language they are not familiar 
with. The interests of the defence must be taken care of at this instance of decision-making, for 
equality of arms with the prosecution. The power of the agency for criminal justice must ensure 
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the defence is associated in the decision-making process and heard in all decisions affecting its 
interests.  
In the second case, the agency may be empowered to formally request a state to investigate and 
prosecute a case. This supranational power to trigger investigations and prosecutions in the 
states is much needed to prevent impunity for transnational crimes. However, the enforcement 
of the power to deter transnational crimes and the consequent increase of states’ jus puniendi 
must not be done to the detriment of the rights of the accused and suspects. On this aspect, the 
EU criminal justice attracted criticisms for being driven by states’ interests and for solely focusing 
on the prosecution and increasing its power with specialised networks.1110 The criticisms deplore 
the lack of a corresponding network for defence lawyers.1111 Much as scholarly debates advocate 
the establishment of such network for defence lawyers and put forward proposals such as 
Eurodefence1112 for ensuring the rights of the defence are respected and procedures and laws 
are properly applied in instances such as Eurojust, the experience of the EU reveals a divided 
opinion among defence lawyers and an opposition to the involvement of states, and the EU, in 
matters of the defence.1113 This is not to dismiss the idea of a similar network for the defence in 
the EAC. Rather, this research acknowledges the need to ensure the defence is represented 
before the agency for criminal justice in respect of proceedings and decisions affecting its rights. 
As argued in chapter four, a great deal of transnational crime involves officials, especially those 
in position of power. The situation can be particularly exacerbated in countries with a high level 
of corruption, such as those of the EAC. Corrupt official and those involved in transnational 
networks may obstruct investigations and prosecutions of specific cases. It is argued that a great 
effort of police in national jurisdictions, in the 1990s, focused on ordinary suspects of 
transnational crimes, leaving wide scope for many transnational networks actors, especially 
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those in power.1114 Empowering the agency for criminal justice with supranational attributes to 
trigger investigations and prosecutions of transnational crime cases in the EAC will remedy the 
deficiencies associated with poor knowledge of transnational crime and flawed investigations 
and prosecutions in the region.  
As a body entrusted with the coordination of cooperation actions, the agency for criminal justice 
in the EAC would be given access to national criminal records to prevent multiple prosecutions 
and convictions of the accused in the same cases. The rights of suspects and accused, particularly 
the protection against double jeopardy, may be seriously compromised where transnational 
proceedings are uncoordinated. This question and overall human rights issues are examined in 
the next section as essential conditions for effective cooperation in the EAC. 
5.4. Requirements for the EAC  
The cooperation model, the mechanisms and the institutions proposed in this research would be 
meaningless if they were not embedded in a criminal justice system understood as a crime 
control system with protection for those affected against the abuse of investigatory and 
prosecution powers. 
5.4.1. A transnational criminal justice 
Cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC requires a criminal justice system beyond the classic 
concepts of national jurisdictions, to establish new competences in respect of the mechanisms 
proposed in this research and to enable collaboration between national criminal justice 
authorities across borders.  The research views transnational crime as the starting point for both 
cooperation and the constitution and the imagining of a transnational criminal justice system1115 
in the EAC. 
Although this research finds necessary the establishment of a transnational crime justice system 
in the EAC, it also recognizes the implications of such system in terms of a complicate governance 
as transnational crime is at same time considered an issue in domestic criminal justices. The 
complications stem partly from the procedural dilemmas generated by transnational crime in 
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respect of its investigations and prosecution. Transnational crimes transcend more than one 
country in their planning, execution and impact, and because of their multinational 
characteristics, they are different from national and international crimes.1116 Further 
complications relate to the lack of a unified body of transnational criminal law. The are no 
international or supranational criminal laws or codes of criminal procedure to guide the EAC in 
this endeavor.1117   To date there has been no agreement on what the general principles for 
transnational criminal proceedings should be.1118 The lack of a comprehensive set of rules 
governing transnational criminal justice is essentially explained by the fact that national l aws 
have not been designed to cope with the transnational aspects of criminal justice.1119 Besides, 
there have been controversies on the scope and application of transnational law, in particular 
whether all laws, national and international law regulating actions and events that transcend 
national borders would be part of it, or whether transnational law is conceptually different from 
national and international law.1120 Another controversy is whether the content of transnational 
law should emphasize substance or procedure. Harfield notes that what would be a governance 
void in the transnational context is particularly filled with instruments, if not of governance, at 
least of facilitation.1121 This can be illustrated by the plethora of legislative instruments for 
facilitating cooperation between national authorities, that the EU has come up with in the last 
two decades. 
Despite the lack of general principles of transnational criminal law, this research argues that a 
transnational criminal justice in the EAC can be drawn on the European criminal justice as a 
particular form of transnational criminal law. Accordingly, a transnational criminal justice in the 
EAC will have to preserve national jurisdictions and competence in criminal law. This means 
adjudication in the East African criminal justice would be the exclusive competence of the Partner 
 
1116 Coffey, G. (2013). Op.Cit., p.61-62. 
1117 See, Harfield, C. (2011). “Transnational Criminal Investigation and Modes of Governance”. Policing 5(1), pp.3-
14, p.6. 
1118 Bachmaier Winter, L. (2013). “Transnational Criminal Proceedings, Witness Evidence and Confrontation: 
Lessons from the ECtHR’s Case Law”. Utrecht Law review 9(4), p.128. 
1119 Gless, S. and J.A.E. Vervael (2013). “Law Should Govern: Apsiring General Principles for Transnational Criminal 
Justice”. Utrecht Law Review 9(4), p.1, 4. 
1120 Cotterrell, R. (2012). “What Is Transnational Law?”. Law & Social Inquiry 37, p.500. 
1121 Harfield. C. (2011). Op.Cit., p.6 
214 
 
States.1122 Consequently, all prosecutions and trials would be national.1123 These attributes of 
transnational criminal justice are influenced by the understanding of law, since the Treaty of 
Westphalia in the 17th century and the rise of sovereign states, as an essential element of 
national construction.1124 In particular, criminal law and police matters are perceived as intrinsic 
to national sovereignty.1125  Paradoxically, it is also argued that we now live in an age of 
transnationalism1126 and that law has spilled out beyond the borders of the nation states in 
various fields1127 including International Criminal Law.1128 Transnational crime is essentially the 
driving force behind transnationalism, in International Criminal Law, giving rise to various forms 
of crime control at the transnational level. Sperling attributes the contrast between the collective 
action and the resistance to surrender significant sovereign policing or judicial preroga tives in 
transnational criminal justice to the post-Westphalian evolution of states which he describes as 
both cause and symptom of states’ difficulty to cope with transnational crime.1129 
The principle of MR supposes the existence of a common criminal law or policy, at least in respect 
of offences that would be subject of extradition and evidence warrants proposed in this research. 
In the absence of a unified body of transnational criminal law, harmonization or the requirement 
that all states have same laws, produces equivalent laws in national criminal justices and 
therefore facilitates cooperation.1130 Harmonisation has been recognized by the respondents to 
the interviews for this thesis as a crucial means for minimizing differences in the national legal 
systems in general and the criminal justices in particular. E.g., a respondent said “We should now 
be looking on how to harmonize the legal systems in East Africa so that we are not operating 
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using different legal systems…”.1131   Another respondent recalled that harmonisation is applied 
as a principle in the EAC Common Market.1132   One of the justifications put forward in support 
of harmonization is the issue of death penalty that a respondent explained in the following terms: 
“What happens if a suspect is apprehended in Rwanda and through that cooperation we have to 
extradite him to Kenya where they have death penalty, what would happen, does Rwanda say 
“no” and would this be regarded as cooperation?”.1133 Harmonization of criminal and procedural 
laws as well as core procedural rights fosters mutual trust. However, how far national criminal 
and procedural laws should be harmonized has been a subject of controversy. Harmonization 
needs not to be understood as full-scale unification.1134 Instead, it means approximation or 
coordination of laws or systems by eliminating major differences. The approximation of criminal 
laws, particularly in respect of transnational crime, means adjustment to a common standard.1135 
It transpires from the respondents’ reference to terms such as approximation, that 
harmonisation as understood in the EAC too does not mean equalization. A respondent to the 
interviews recalled that “even in the United States which is a political federation, their laws are 
not equal. Some states have death penalty other don’t, but at least they have something which 
is a bit more uniform”.1136 Harmonization or approximation simplifies the application of laws 
since more or less same laws would apply throughout the region.  Furthermore, harmonization 
helps to agree on the criminalization at least of the most serious offences and to arrive at similar 
definitions of offences as well as sentences. In the EU, Articles 82 and 83 TFEU, respectively, 
provide explicit legal bases for the approximation of criminal procedural laws and the 
establishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions for 
serious crimes with cross-border dimensions. Legal texts have been adopted on trafficking in 
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human beings,1137 exploitation of children and child pornography,1138 terrorism,1139 money 
laundering1140, computer crime,1141 environmental crime1142, fraud and counterfeiting1143, etc., in 
order to arrive at similar definitions of offences and harmonise the level of penalties.1144  
A common understanding of legal concepts, such as transnational crime, serious crime, organized 
criminal networks, participation in a criminal organization, proceeds of crime or predicate 
offences, for example, would provide solid and essential grounds for cooperation in the EAC. In 
respect of sentences, harmonization could be achieved through common minimum rules on the 
types of sentences, for example, custodial sentences, financial penalties, disqualifications -such 
as prohibitions on entering a country or exercising specific occupation-, and confiscations of 
assets derived directly from or substituted to the offences. Equally, the modes of enforcement 
of sentences should be standardized, specifically, the threshold for custodial sentences in terms 
of maximum and minimum imprisonment, different forms of remission and provisional release 
including conditional release, suspended sentences, etc. 
There would be the need to address core aspects related to the commission of offences. 
Specifically, theories related to the level of participation and completion of offences should at 
best be harmonised. Similarly, the common forms of participation, namely aiding and abetting 
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and complicity should be harmonised too. The approximation of sentencing practices for main 
offenders, accomplices, joint offenders or instigators may ensure that transnational crime is 
equally prosecuted and punished in the region. Furthermore, the approximation of sentencing 
practices means a common system in which criminal law theories that have an impact on the 
sentence, such as attempt, aggravating and mitigating or exonerating circumstances, recidivism 
and concurrent offences are evenly applied to avoid excessive disparities between the national 
legal systems and ensure equivalent punishment of transnational crimes offenders in the region.  
The criminal liability of legal persons (corporate liability) too presents many challenges in 
international cooperation. Corruption and various other crimes can be committed by a company 
or by criminal organizations acting under the cover of a legal entity. Regional efforts in the EAC 
should be directed towards suppressing or at least minimizing the variations in national laws’ 
definitions and regulations of corporate liabilities.  
A common approach to offences, sentences and related theories would give the public a shared 
sense of justice.1145 It would signal that certain conducts such as trafficking in human beings, in 
drugs, or other forms of transnational crimes are unacceptable and equally punished across the 
region.1146 It would also reduce criminal networks’ attempts and hopes to evade prosecution or 
enforcement of sentences since similar regimes would apply throughout the region. 
Furthermore, a standardized approach across the region would provide citizens with effective 
and equivalent protection against acts that violate the principles and values shared by the Partner 
States. The objective of a common criminal law or policy must be to ensure there are no safe 
havens for criminals in the EAC. In view of the freedom of movement in the EAC, the criminal law 
or policy must reconcile efficiency and respect of such principle as ne bis in idem. 
5.4.2. Ne bis in idem  
The ne bis in idem principle, or the prohibition against double jeopardy, is recognized in most 
national criminal justices. The principle has also been codified as a constitutional right in many 
criminal justices, including those of the EAC. Ne bis in idem means a person should not be 
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punished or prosecuted twice by the court or the prosecution authorities of the same state and 
for the same offences if the case has been finally decided.1147 There is no rule of International 
Law imposing ne bis in idem.1148 Its application is purely conventional.1149 The main sources of ne 
bis in idem in Public International Law are found in International Human Rights Law (For example, 
article 14 ICCPR), the law regulating international criminal tribunals and multilateral treaties on 
cooperation in criminal matters.1150 
Despite its Public International Law legal basis, ne bis in idem was conceived to apply nationally 
in domestic settings, and not internationally.1151 This means that, in theory, individuals can be 
tried and punished for the same offence by the courts of more than one country. This raises 
concerns in the context of transnational criminal justice. With the free movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital in the EAC, a domestic ne bis in idem would not protect individuals 
against the risk of being tried or punished more than once for the same offences, since national 
courts may not be bound or willing to test the ne bis in idem dimension in transnational 
proceedings. 
Concerns over ne bis in idem in a transnational setting also stem from the variances in the 
national criminal justice systems’ interpretation of the substantive meaning of the principle, 
whether it prohibits double punishment and double investigation and prosecution.1152 
Particularly, the focus on res judicata in the classic formulation of the ne bis in idem principle has 
been the subject of debate on the scope of the principle, as to whether it includes out of court 
settlements too.1153 Consequently, the lack of a common standard on ne bis in idem leaves 
individuals without an adequate and equivalent protection, especially in the regional context 
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such as the EAC with its single territory and related freedoms of movement. 
 The FD EAW contains a ne bis in idem provision. By contrast, neither the EU 2000 MLA 
Convention nor its additional protocol of 2001 contain a similar provision. While a ne bis in idem 
provision is included in the EIO, it remains an optional ground for refusal. This contrast in the 
applicability of the ne bis in idem between extradition and MLA perhaps suggests that the 
principle is more accepted in extradition and the deprivation of liberty than in MLA even with the 
possibility of coercive measures.1154  
The first time ever ne bis in idem was established as an individual right erga omnes with an 
international or transnational effect was the adoption of the 1990 CISA  (Chapter 3, Articles 54-
58), following the creation of the Schengen area among the EC states and consequent abolition 
of internal border controls.1155 The incorporation of the Schengen agreements into the EU law by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, entered into force in 1999, created a transnational ne bis in idem 
principle1156 for the twenty six  participating states, of which twenty two EU Member States and 
four members of the EFTA who have association agreements with the Schengen area, namely 
Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The transnational ne bis in idem principle is also 
stated in Article 50 CFREU, entered into force in 2009, and it constitutes, therefore, a binding 
fundamental right.1157 The ne bis in idem provisions of the CISA (Article 54) and the CFREU (Article 
50) appear similar in most respects, their difference being the ‘enforcement clause’ added in 
Article 54 CISA and which is omitted in Article 50 CFREU. This difference raises questions about 
the relationship between the two provisions, that is between primary and secondary law, when 
interpreting them.1158 The pre-Lisbon acquis of Article 54 CISA is part of secondary European law 
while the CFREU and the rights contained therein constitute primary European law.1159 
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The question for the EAC is how best the Community can establish a transnational ne bis in idem 
principle to protect citizens against double jeopardy and to enable them to fully enjoy the 
freedoms provided in the Common Market Protocol. A lesson learned from the EU cooperation 
system is that, firstly, a ne bis in idem principle with a transnational reach must be established as 
a constitutional legal principle in the Community. The freedom of movement in the EAC would 
seriously be undermined if convicted persons who have served their sentences had to fear 
prosecutions in other Partner States. The multiplicity of legal bases for ne bis in idem in the 
European cooperation system posed a considerable challenge, in so far as all of them, except the 
CFREU’s provision, suffer exceptions, derogations, or reservations formulated by Member States 
against their application. Secondly, the transnational ne bis in idem must be recognized as a 
binding fundamental right in a human rights framework, which the EAC does not have of its own 
until now. This concern and broader human rights issues are further discussed in the next section. 
5.4.3. Human rights considerations  
Respect for fundamental rights was not prominent in the traditional MLA model of 
cooperation1160 historically rooted in an era prior to strict consideration of human rights.1161 The 
MLA model does not consider the individual as a subject but as the object of cooperation 
between states.1162 As compliance with human rights became subject of greater scrutiny, 
concerns have been raised about their application to the various processes by which states assist 
each other in fighting transnational crime.1163 These processes, including legal mechanisms such 
as warrants and orders, and institutional means for the investigation and prosecution of 
transnational crime, are viewed as part of a governance system, the transnational  criminal 
justice, with considerable implications on the rights of individuals, natural and legal persons alike. 
The system came about from what is seen as the legitimate interest of states to fight 
transnational crime through joint efforts.1164 It aims at ensuring perpetrators may not evade 
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1162 Ibid. 
1163 Currie, R.J. (2000). “Human rights and international mutual legal assistance: Resolving the tension". Criminal 
Law Forum 11, p.143. 
1164 Wade, M. L. (2015). Op.Cit., p.156. 
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justice as a result of the contrast between their mobility and the traditional territorial boundaries 
of agencies pursuing them.1165 This resulted, in the EU cooperation, in a focus on the prosecution 
first before due consideration could be given to defence rights. The situation attracted strong 
criticisms about inequality of arms between the prosecution and the defence and the weakening 
of the structural position of the defence.1166 In particular, providing the prosecution with 
specialised networks and supranational measures to which the defence had no access1167 or the 
possibility to contest, let alone influence, decisions affecting its interests or even its constitutional 
rights lead to conclusions that transnational criminal justice sidelines defence rights and is more 
concerned with efficiency of prosecution than defence rights.1168 These developments need to 
be put in perspective with the nature of transnational criminal law, as a specialized form of 
criminal law in which sovereignty is still a dominant value.1169 Hence rights and safeguards in 
transnational criminal justice are strongly related to domestic processes.1170 However, the effects 
of transnational crime cannot be dealt with properly at national level. Transnational proceedings 
are different in nature to domestic one and potentially bigger. They involve the bundled powers 
of many states often supported by supranational institutions and drawn upon intelligence from 
the constituent states.1171 Besides, international and national human rights laws were not made 
to cope with the transnational aspects of criminal justice.1172 They cannot provide sufficient 
protection at transnational level. The constitutional values in national rights protection systems 
derive from global or international human rights instruments although the opposite too is the 
case, e.g. the provisions of the ECHR were developed from national systems and, as Article 6(3) 
TEU records, fundamental rights in EU law may derive from "the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States ". As far as these instruments are concerned, their primary 
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function is to secure human rights in the justice systems of the contracting states.1173 
Consequently, differences in national human rights protection systems are totally acceptable as 
long as protection is provided in a balanced way within the logic of a country’s legal system.1174 
Nevertheless, differences in national human rights regimes make them incompatible and may 
cause defendants to lose rights. The drafting of the CFREU, in the EU, indicates the desire for 
Member States to adopt a more concrete rights protection standard for the Union. However, it 
is surprising that the CFREU, drafted amid today’s challenges of cooperation in transnational 
crime and significant developments in the EU criminal justice, does not make specific provisions 
for transnational rights and guarantees, except the provision on ne bis in idem (Article 50), which 
in itself constitutes an acknowledgment of the transnational aspects of justice in the EU.1175 The 
Charter sets out a range of rights of European citizens and all residents in the EU. While Article 
50 is not specifically directed at transnational criminal proceedings, it extends the ne bis in idem 
principle throughout the Union, making it operate between the courts of the Member States. 
In order to remedy the deficiencies in human rights protection at the transnational level, the EU 
adopted, in 2009, the Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings.1176 The document identified six rights areas for regulation: 
translation and interpretation, information on rights and information about the charges, legal 
advice and legal aid, communication with relatives, employers, and consular authorities, special 
safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable, and pre-trial detention. The 
Roadmap is a schematic model that proposed a one step at a time approach which resulted in 
the adoption of directives on each of the six areas so far. Nevertheless, it is criticized for basing 
on the rights guaranteed in the ECHR and thus falling short of addressing the specificities of 
transnational proceedings.1177  
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The need to agree on common values accepted by all and a common standard in a transnational 
setting is particularly important in the EAC in view of the current lack of a minimum level of 
fundamental rights and procedural safeguards throughout the Community. Such deficiency calls 
to question the political will of the Community’s leadership in matters of human rights, since 
neither a human rights instrument for the Community has been agreed upon, nor has the 
jurisdiction of the EACJ been extended to human rights, both matters having been tabled for 
discussion at the highest level of the Community for many years. Article 6 EAC Treaty prescribes, 
as a fundamental principle, the recognition, promotion and protection of human rights in 
accordance with the provision of the ACHPR. However, none of the six EAC Partner States 
recognizes the competence of the ACtHPR to receive cases from individuals and NGOs. While 
Rwanda and Tanzania previously made the declaration under Article 34(6) of the African Court’s 
Protocol accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases from individuals and NGOs, the 
two states withdrew their declaration in February 2016 and November 2019, respectively. 
Without a judicial power to scrutinize the EAC Partner States’ respect for human rights at the 
regional level, the Community’s ’commitment’ to human rights remains a dead letter and 
citizens’ rights and freedoms unprotected. The need for a human rights instrument specific to 
the EAC is even greater since the ACHPR cannot provide a sufficiently tight protection in respect 
of transnational proceedings, should the Community trigger cooperation in criminal matters. The 
human rights deficiencies in the EAC could actually be turned into an opportunity to agree on 
common values in the Community and legislate on a human rights instrument applicable both in 
national and transnational settings. The ACHPR, drafted in the context of decolonization and 
liberation of Africa, had in mind the protection of human rights nationally.  Cooperation in 
criminal mater requires rethinking rights anew in light of structural changes in the region and 
regional challenges, specifically transnational crime.  
If the EAC opts to criminalize transnational crime, facilitate coercive measures in evidentiary 
matters and the arrest of criminals and the surrender of individuals for trial and imprisonment in 
the Partner States, it must effectively protect the rights of those affected. The mechanisms 
proposed in this research cannot be viewed in isolation. Legislating for arrest as well as the 
collection and exchange of evidence to become effective across the borders, and the transfer of 
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repressive powers to supranational institutions must be accompanied by an appropriate right 
securing system.1178 The EAC can achieve this only if it recognizes that transnational proceedings 
put individuals at greater, not lesser, risks than national proceedings. Care must be given to 
defense rights and procedural safeguards. In particular, fair trial must be guaranteed. A 
defendant’s right to fair trial may be jeopardized if they do not understand or speak the foreign 
language in a transnational proceeding, or should they not benefit assistance in interpretation 
and translation of both oral and written statements. Crucial for fairness in transnational 
proceedings is the right to legal assistance and access to a lawyer, given the exposure of the 
defendant to a foreign legal system and possibly to the power of many national criminal justice 
agents working together. The requirement of equality of arms too must be preserved, especially 
the opportunity for the defense to challenge evidence gathered abroad, including confronting 
witnesses residing abroad. An essential notion of fairness, the adversarial character of the 
proceedings, must be guaranteed in transnational proceedings, to avoid what Ricard Vogler calls 
the fall of the adversarial criminal process in reference to international criminal justice.1179 There 
must be due process for transnational investigation, prosecutions and consequent trials. 
5.5. Adverse consequences of transnational criminal justice on the EAC 
While transnational criminal justice can have beneficial aspects, there are also potential 
downsides. The primary challenges to the establishment of transnational criminal justice are 
linked to the following main issues: sovereignty and financial cost. 
The sovereignty challenge to transnational criminal justice stems from the perception of criminal 
law and police matters as intrinsic to national sovereignty. The same perception was deplored by 
the respondents to the interviews for this thesis who identified sovereignty as one of the main 
challenges to developing cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. E.g., a respondent said: 
“…the biggest problem is the whole idea of sovereignty”.1180  Another said: “The first and most 
difficult thing is the question of sovereignty”.1181  Another one said: “…the first major challenge 
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is the issue of sovereignty”.1182 As argued in section 5.1 above, criminal law has long been 
attributed a national character and it has been considered as the exclusive competence of 
sovereign states. It is still argued today that criminal law is strictly connected to state sovereignty 
and that national policies and legal traditions are closely related to the state’s monopoly to 
impose punishment.1183   This is not unproblematic for transnational criminal justice. Firstly, its 
complex nature is such as the supranational legal order and the national legal orders are highly 
intertwined.1184 Secondly, and more importantly, transnational criminal justice requires states to 
cede or pool their sovereignty or the control of their international activities to supranational 
bodies.1185   This may raise concerns about loss of national sovereignty and identity,  given the 
uniqueness of national traditions and the friction that legitimate political choices such as death 
penalty, trials in absentia, or the prosecution of juvenile offenders may cause among the criminal 
justice systems involved.1186 The proposed mutual recognition instruments, specifically the arrest 
and evidence warrants, would facilitate the enforcement across the EAC’s internal borders of 
decisions that are a product of Partner States’ domestic criminal justice systems. This situation 
too may raise more concerns about the scope of the future EAC criminal law.  Another source of 
potential public concerns on sovereignty could be transnational dialogues and their perceived 
influence on judges’ constitutional decisions.1187   
Establishing transnational criminal justice in the EAC requires thinking coherently about 
questions of financial costs and the impact of the Community’s involvement in criminal justice 
sphere.  As argued by Estella Baker, criminal justice cannot be delivered without financial cost.1188   
The model proposed in this research, namely MR, and subsequent mechanisms and measures all 
bear a price. Starting with the proposed institutions so fundamental to a functional transnational 
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criminal justice in the EAC, the police and the agency for criminal justice, their establishment 
would require the Community committing significant amount of money from tax revenues to 
build and fund them as part of its supranational apparatus. As for the proposed arrest and 
evidence warrants, their issue and execution would rely on national agencies’ resources, which 
cannot be deployed without minimum expenditure. In a way, implementing the warrants would 
constitute a claim on domestic budget to fund transnational law enforcement responses. It is 
evident that both the issuing and the executing states would bear the cost of the warrants. While 
the cost would be justified for the issuing state, it would be perceived, from the perspective of 
the executing state, as imposed upon it and obliging its taxpayers to pay for decisions that have 
been taken in the issuing state, therefore financing foreign criminal justice policies. The same 
effect could result from the differences in the criminal justice traditions of the Partner States. For 
example, unlike the opportunity principle in common law jurisdictions, the legality principle 
prevalent in French civil law traditions could facilitate an excessive issue of the warrants, which 
would cause disproportionate financial costs to their counterparts, a situation which may lead to 
contempt not only for the warrants but for the EAC too, in general, and its proposed criminal 
justice in particular. 
Another aspect that would need consideration in the proposed transnational criminal justice, in 
terms of financial impact upon the Partner States, is the introduction of minimum rules 
concerning offences and sentences. On this, Estella Baker argues that there is a causal 
relationship between decisions about criminalization, punishment and the subsequent calls upon 
resources in national criminal justice budget to enforce them.1189 In fact, there would be 
budgetary implications to the Partner States in the implementation of all other measures and 
legislative requirements proposed in this thesis in support of transnational criminal justice in the 
EAC, whether harmonization of substantive and procedural laws, and core procedural rights, or 
data protection mechanisms such as electronic databases of criminal records and information on 
persons wanted for arrest or extradition, witnesses or persons under surveillance.  
An important question that would need to be addressed is the distribution of the costs, to 
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prevent asymmetrical pressure on the Partner States.1190  Firstly, it would be necessary to ensure 
equity in the allocation, between richer and poorer countries, of input costs of the proposed 
criminal justice mechanisms, specifically the police and the criminal justice agency. Secondly, 
explicit provisions on costs should be included in relevant regulations that the EAC may need to 
take, especially those safeguarding rights in criminal proceedings, to establish the Partner States’ 
responsibility in terms of costs incurred at all stages of criminal proceedings, for example in 
relation to interpretation and translation, legal advice and aid, or support to the most vulnerable 
suspects, accused or witnesses. 
It would be essential to ensure the proposed mechanisms and measures are evidence – based1191  
in terms of sufficient information and research on their externalities, in order to establish their 
legitimacy and capability, and to balance against their cost.  Evidence is also required to prove 
the effectiveness of the transnational criminal justice system. For example, the proposed 
mechanisms and measures’ effectiveness in achieving their aim should be confirmed by scientific 
evidence,1192 such as expert groups’ opinions or commissioned external studies, before they 
could be adopted and imposed on the Partner States. Furthermore, it would be important to 
make sure the proposed police and the agency for criminal justice are acceptable to local 
populations. Given their supranational nature, there would be risks of lack of transparency and 
accountability to taxpayers,1193 and dominance of the two institutions’ agenda by the most 
powerful Partner States.1194 This should be avoided by ensuring a democratic control over the 
actions of the institutions and by making them accountable to the communities they serve, 
including with respect to their budgetary expenditure. 
Conclusion 
A model for cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC must allow efficient and effective 
provision of assistance among the Partner States both in the investigations of transnational 
crimes and the arrest as well as the extradition of persons suspected or accused of the crimes to 
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stand trial or to serve their sentences in the Partner States. The MR model, invented and currently 
applied in the EU, can provide the efficiency and effectiveness required, if adopted in the EAC. In 
particular, the simplification and expedition of procedures, and the reduction of grounds for 
refusal to grant a request for assistance reduce political and technical hindrances to the lowest. 
More importantly, the obligation to cooperate established in MR compels states to grant 
cooperation requests within an agreed framework. Like Article 4(3) TEU which lays down the legal 
obligation of the EU Member States to cooperate, Article 8(1) EAC Treaty provides a comparable 
basis for similar obligation in the EAC. 
The framework for cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC will need creating legal and 
institutional mechanisms to accommodate MR and to enable national competent authorities to 
request assistance and to respond to requests made by other authorities across borders. The 
cooperation machinery will constitute a distinct criminal justice above the national criminal 
justices, and the expression of states’ willingness to join efforts and collectively fight 
transnational crimes for their common interests. Such transnational criminal justice is justified 
by the expansion of transnational crimes across the region as a result of the region’s economic 
policies, particularly the Common Market’s freedom of movement.  
There are no agreed principles of transnational criminal justice; different regions worldwide have 
established their own criminal justices to suit their particular needs. The EU criminal justice, 
discussed in this chapter as a model for the EAC, consists of a patchwork of measures and 
instruments designed to be enforced at national level. All investigations, prosecutions, 
adjudications and trials in the transnational criminal justice are domestic.  
The differences in the national procedural and substantive laws as well as evidentiary rules pose 
a great challenge in the transnational criminal justice modelled on MR. In order to remedy the 
disparities in the national laws and the lack of a unified body of transnational law, the 
transnational criminal justice applies harmonisation of the laws and the adoption of minimum 
rules concerning offences and sentences. Similarly, it regulates key fundamental rights areas 
considered essential in transnational proceedings as a distinct sphere, to remedy the limitations 
of traditional human rights instruments to national proceedings. 
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Human rights protection is a prerequisite for cooperation in criminal matters. The MR model is 
premised on mutual trust and the assumption that national legal systems provide an equivalent 
protection of rights and should therefore trust each other. This has been proved wrong in the EU, 
despite the Member States’ signature of the ECHR and the vast case law of the ECtHR. The state 
of human rights in the EAC is more complicate and mutual trust far from being achieved as none 
of the EAC Partner States, except Tanzania, recognizes the competence of the ACtHPR though all 
are signatories of the ACHPR. MR cooperation system in the EAC will require guarantees and 
safeguards against abuses before it could be adopted. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to propose mechanisms for cooperation in criminal matters in 
the EAC. The idea was born of a concern, as an EAC citizen, over local media frequent reports and 
increasing public discourse on transnational crimes in the EAC Partner States. 
The materials that were discussed in the theoretical chapter are related to the new regionalism, 
as opposed to the old regionalism that was essentially based on trade and security. The wider 
scope of the new regionalism is the factor that determined the selection of regiona lism as a 
theory that informs this thesis. It allowed engaging with other fields than economy and security, 
specifically transnational crime in the EAC. Although most of the materials discussed in the 
theoretical chapter was written in the context of the EU, the chapter considered a few other 
materials on regional organisations in other parts of the world too, specifically Latin America, 
Asia and Africa, for a more balanced account of the regionalism phenomenon and to avoid the 
criticism about a certain Eurocentric approach to regionalism in some studies on regional 
organisations. The flagrant absence, in the theoretical chapter, of materials on the EAC is due 
mainly to the dearth of academic literature on the EAC, particularly in the legal field except in 
respect of human rights. Furthermore, many materials on the EAC that I came across either lack 
a clear theoretical framework or they are based on different theories. 
The thesis analyses transnational crime in the EAC in order to establish the need for the 
Community to cooperate in criminal matters regionally. The thesis focuses on transnational crime 
because of its complexity as crimes which planning, execution and impact transcend the borders 
of more than one country.1195 As transnational crime is committed in the territories of several 
countries, by several accomplices of different citizenships or residing in different countries, each 
state affected may claim jurisdiction over the case.1196 Moreover, the investigation and 
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prosecution of such crime require assistance of the states affected to accede to evidence that is 
lying in their territories, to seize proceeds of crime or to arrest and extradite suspects.  
The thesis establishes, from various reports from the UNODC, independent organisations and the 
EAC, that transnational crime in the EAC is on rise and is expanding, and that the region is now 
an active transit, source and destination for illicit goods. The amount of illicit goods seized, the 
variety of transnational crimes identified, their frequency and the networks intercepted are 
evidence that the threat of transnational crime in the region is non-negligible. It is arguable 
whether the expansion and proportions of transnational crimes in the region are enough to 
justify establishing cooperation mechanisms as proposed in this research. However, 
transnational crime is used in this research as a starting point for arguing for cooperation in 
criminal matter in the EAC, as the phenomenon is little known, poses great challenges compared 
to national crimes, and its gravity and expansion raise global concern. This thesis does not 
preclude the extension of cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC to all other serious crimes 
and international crimes. It would be unacceptable that suspects of any serious crime take 
advantage of the free movement in the EAC to frustrate justice. While the interviews conducted 
for this thesis point out that transnational crime is damaging the economies of the Partner States 
and is undermining the regional integration efforts, the present thesis could not investigate the 
social and economic impact of transnational crime in the EAC, which it recommends for future 
research. 
The thesis recommends MR as an effective model of cooperation in criminal matters, for the 
obligation to cooperate that it imposes. The proposal for the model was supported by the 
respondents to the interviews who recommended, in addition, that the competent authorities in 
the Partner States are given a margin of appreciation on the appropriateness of a request for 
assistance. This thesis could not agree more with the respondents’ opinion since even in the EU, 
MR does not mean a blind execution of requests. It is applied on the basis of mutual trust and 
the assumption that the legal systems of the Member States provide equal protection of human 
rights.1197 The assumption is based on the fact that all Member States are signatories of the 
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ECHR1198 although it has been proved wrong to the extent that some scholars advanced that the 
application of MR to the field of criminal justice turns it from liberal to authoritarian effects and 
enables the most punitive criminal systems to be executed in Europe.1199 This is particularly 
relevant in the EAC considering death penalty is still applicable in the criminal justice systems of 
some Partner States, specifically Kenya,1200 South Sudan and Uganda.  
The respondents to the interviews for this thesis identified death penalty as a challenge to 
cooperation in criminal matters. Death penalty is irreconcilable with MR and the abolition of 
traditional principles of cooperation in criminal matters, such as the nationality exception in 
extradition matters. No single state would extradite its citizens to another state where they risk 
death penalty. There are ways states manage death penalty in cooperation in criminal matters. 
Particularly, states apply conditional extradition or the guarantee that, if extradited, a person will 
not be subjected to death penalty.1201 Many criminal justice systems have inserted such provision 
in their laws.1202 A conditional extradition could provide a solution to the tensions between death 
penalty and cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC. 
Despite the obligation to execute it implies, MR allows provisions for grounds for refusal which 
may include absolute grounds for refusal and optional grounds for refusal, like in the EAW. It also 
provides for grounds for non-recognition or non-execution of requests, the possibility for a 
proportionality test, and the option for the executing state, in assistance in evidence, to 
substitute a requested measure in certain circumstances. It is safe to say that all the measures 
above alleviate, to some extent, the negative effects of MR. Nevertheless, MR has been praised 
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too, by other scholars, as enabling effective cooperation in criminal matters1203 and expediting it 
significantly, particularly in extradition matters.1204 
Effective cooperation in the EAC can also be achieved if requests (or warrants) are sent directly 
between national competent authorities in the criminal justice systems. This is another feature 
of the MR model which, essentially, aims at removing political, administrative and practical 
barriers to cooperation in criminal matters. Such direct cooperation requires excluding the 
executive power from involving in the execution of requests and concentrating cooperation in 
criminal matters in the criminal justice systems, strictly speaking. 
The MR model abolishes traditional principles that govern international cooperation in criminal 
matters, such as the nationality exception (or non-extradition of nationals), the political offence 
exception, or the specialty rule. These principles were established to strengthen the sovereignty 
of nation states and their power on citizens considered as the subjects of the states.1205 The 
principles were meant to protect the citizens against foreign powers; they represent a lack of 
trust in foreign legal systems.1206 The respondents to the interviews for this thesis expressed 
support for the political offence exception, particularly, and the nationality exception to some 
extent. However, the thesis suggests that the structural changes and new governance models 
brought by regionalism in the EAC, the construction of a polity with symbols such as a flag and 
an anthem which the citizens increasingly identify themselves with, and the making of the East 
African citizenship with a passport render the principles above irrelevant. 
The thesis analyses legal mechanisms established in the EU’s cooperation system, in respect of 
extradition and assistance in evidence. It anticipates possible conflicts between the abolition of 
the nationality exception with the Constitutions of the EAC Partner States as was the case with 
 
1203 Allegrezze, S. (2014). ‟Collecting Criminal Evidence Across the European Union: The European Investigation 
order Between Flexibility and Proportionality”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural 
Inquiries in Europe. Springer. London, p.55. 
1204 Bonasera, J. (2017). ‟Brexit and the European Arrest Warrant: The United Kingdom’s Chance to Curtail abuse of 
the Surrender System”. Arizone Journal of International and Comparative Law 34(3), p.650-651. 
1205 Pirlac, A. (2011). ‟General Framework for the Implementation Decision no.2002/584/JAI on the European 
Arrest Warrant”. The Annals of The “Stefan cel Mare” University of Suceava  1(13), p.350. 
1206 Ibid. 
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the EAW in some EU Member States. The thesis suggests that the Partner States may have to 
amend their Constitutions to accommodate the change that such abolition may introduce.  
The thesis considers the broad scope of the EAW and the EIO as a risk factor for their 
disproportionate use for petty offences. It suggests limiting the application of the mechanisms to 
transnational crimes and other serious crimes as the Partner States may define. It also suggests 
limiting the issue and execution of the mechanisms to the judiciary, strictly speaking, and 
providing for a proportionality test to avoid their misuse and to safeguard individual rights.  
The thesis recommends the establishment, in the EAC, of East African police and an East African 
agency for criminal justice, similar to the Europol and Eurojust in the EU, for supporting 
investigations and prosecution of transnational crime and for coordinating cooperation requests. 
The proposal for the two institutions considers the need for an integrated criminal justice system 
in the EAC to respond effectively to the expansion of crimes in the region, as the result of the 
policies of the Community, particularly the freedom of movement, and the mobility of criminal 
networks. If the latter can easily move across the borders of the EAC Partner States, so should 
police and investigators too be able to operate in networks across the borders. This argument 
reflects the view that we now live in an age of transnationalism1207 as a consequence of new 
modes of governance, particularly regionalism, encouraged by globalization and increased 
interdependence between states. Accordingly, law too, including criminal law, is increasingly 
becoming transnational, in response to transnational phenomena such as crime.1208  
The thesis views the creation of networks among authorities in the national criminal justice 
systems as essential for enabling dialogues on the practice and the law regarding transnational 
crime and other criminal issues of shared concern. However, the thesis argues that the creation 
of such networks must not compromise equality of arms with the defence and affect its structural 
position in transnational criminal proceedings as a particular form of justice above the states’ 
level. The realization of a transnational criminal justice, the adoption of the mechanism proposed 
in this thesis, and indeed the establishment of cooperation in criminal matters will be achieved 
 
1207 Shaffer, G. (2012). ‟Transnational Legal Process and State Change” Law & Social Inquiry 37, p.229. 
1208 See Turner, J. L. (2007). Op.Cit., p.985. 
235 
 
only if the national criminal justice systems of the EAC Partner States provide equal and effective 
protection of fundamental and procedural rights but also if common standards for human rights 
are adopted at the regional level, in recognition that transnational criminal justice is different 
from national criminal justice systems and it puts individual rights at greater risk of infringement. 
At the moment, the EAC is far from reaching these goals. Except Tanzania, four Partner States 
who have ratified the ACHPR do not recognise the competence of the ACtHPR to receive cases 
from individuals and NGOs. Rwanda withdrew its declaration accepting the competence of the 
ACtHPR in February 2016, setting a bad precedence for the relevance of human rights in the 
Community. 
The respondents to the interviews for the thesis suggest that there is a common agreement in 
the EAC to cooperate in criminal matters, despite sovereignty challenge inherent to international 
cooperation, especially in criminal matters. The report on transnational crime commissioned by 
the EAC in 2015 is a positive sign of the Community’s concern about the crimes but it needs to 
translate into a meaningful action. 
The EAC Treaty provides an opportunity for cooperation in criminal matters. It defines 
cooperation in legal and judicial matters as one of the objectives of the Community (Article 5). It 
also specifically refers to cooperation in cross-border crimes and the provision of MLA although 
in terms of what is essentially bilateral arrangements between the Partner States (Article 124(5)). 
More opportunities are found in the provision of principles and theories similar to those used in 
the cooperation model proposed in this thesis, paving the way for their easy transfer to the field 
of criminal law. Examples include harmonization of the social and economic policies of the 
Partner States (Article 4(3) EAC Common Market Protocol), mutual recognition of academic and 
professional qualifications (Article 11 EAC Common Market Protocol), and mutual trust as a 
fundamental principle of the Community (Article 6 EAC Treaty).  
The time has come that the EAC addresses transnational crime. Cooperation in criminal matters 
must be taken seriously. It is as much important as trade and economy. 
 
 
236 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
ARTICLES 
1. Abbott, K. W. (2005). ‟Towards a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy.” 
Journal of International Law & International Relations 1(1-2), pp.95-123. 
2. Acharya, A. (2012). ‟Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time has Come”. The 
International Spectator. 47(1), pp.3-15. 
3. Aderbach, J. and B.A. Rockman (2002). Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews. PS 35(4), 
4. Alain M. (2001). ‟Transnational police cooperation in Europe and in North America: 
Revisiting the Traditional Border Between Internal and external Security Matters, or How 
Policing is being Globalized”. European Journal of crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice  
9(2), pp.113-129. 
5. Albanese J. (2012). ‟Deciphering the linkagesd between organised crime and 
transnational crime”. Journal of International Affairs 66(1), pp.1-16. 
6. Albanese, J. S. (2004). North American Organised Crime. Global Crime 6(1), 
7. Alegre, S. and M. Leaf (2004). ‟Mutual Recognition in the European Judicial cooperation: 
A Step Too Far Too Soon? Case Study- the European Arrest Warrant”. European Law 
Journal 10(2), pp. 200–217. 
8. Ambos, K. and S. Bock (2017). “Brexit and the European criminal justice system - An 
introduction”. Criminal Law Reform 28, 
9. Ansuateguiroig, F.J. (2016). ‟Human rights and judicial dialogue between America and 
Europe: Towards a new model of law?”. The Age of Human Rights 6, pp.24-41. 
10. Ayodeji Gafar, I. (2019). “Grand Corruption in Sub – Saharan Africa and the Feasibility of 
Establishing International Anti – Corruption Court”. AUDA 11(1), pp.5-24. 
11. Bachmaier Winter, L. (2013). ‟Transnational Criminal Proceedings, Witness Evidence and 
Confrontation: Lessons from the ECtHR’s Case Law”. Utrecht Law Review 9(4), pp.127-
146. 
237 
 
12. Bachmann, V. and J.D. Sidaway (2010), ‟African regional integration and European 
involvement: external agents in the East African Community”. South African Geographical 
Journal, 92(1), pp.1-6. 
13. Baker, E. (2016). “What price criminal justice in the EU”. European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24(2-3), pp.95-106. 
14. Barkin, S. J. (2003). “Realist Constructivism”. International Studies Review 5(3), pp. 325-
342. 
15. Basnett, Y. (2013). ‟Labour Mobility in East Africa: An Analysis of the East African 
Community’s Common Market and the Free Movement of Workers”. Development Policy 
Review 31(2), pp.131-148. 
16. Beeson, M. (2005). ‟Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative 
historical perspective". Journal of European Public Policy 12(6), pp. 969-985.  
17. Bell, S. (2011). ‟Do we really need a New ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ to Explain 
Institutional Change?”. British Journal of Political Science 41(4), pp.883-906. 
18. Bertrán de Felipe, M. and A. Nieto Martín (2012). ‟Post 9/11 Trends in International 
Judicial Cooperation”. Journal of International Criminal justice 10, pp. 581-604. 
19. Bickerton, C.J., D. Hodson and U. Puetter (2015). The New Intergovernmentalism: 
European Integration in the Post – Maastricht Era. JCMS 53(4), p.707. Also see, 
Schimmelfeninig, F. (2015), What’s New in ‘New Intergovernmentalism’? A Critique of 
Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter. JCMS 53(4), pp.703-722. 
20. Birzu, B. (2016). ‟Cooperation Agreement between the European Central bank and 
Europol for Combating Euro Counterfeiting. Some Critical Opinions”. Acta Universitatis 
Danubius (AUDJ) 12(2), pp.984-993.   
21. Bizimana S. (2017). ‟The Burundi Legal System and Research”. 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Burundi1.html, accessed on 20 May 2017.   
22. Blackstock, J. (2010).  ‟The European Investigation Order”. New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 1(1), pp.481-498. 
23. Blackstock, J. (2010). ‟The European Arrest Warrant Briefing and Suggested 
Amendments.” New Journal of European Criminal Law 1(1), pp.16-30. 
238 
 
24. Blakesley, C., L. (1981). ‟The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and 
the United States: A Brief History”. Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review IV (1), pp. 39-60. 
25. Bobic, M. (2014). ‟Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: Nexus needing a human 
security framework”. Global crime 15(3-4), pp.241-258. 
26. Bogojevíc, S. (2017). ‟Judicial Dialogue Unpacked: Twenty Years of Preliminary References 
on Environmental Matters Initiated by the Swedish Judiciary”. Journal of Environmental 
Law 29, pp.263-283. 
27. Bonasera, J. (2017). ‟Brexit and the European Arrest Warrant: The United Kingdom’s 
Chance to Curtail abuse of the Surrender System”. Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 34(3), pp.637-658. 
28. Boucher, A. (2017). Power in elite interviewing: Lessons from feminist studies for political 
science. Women’s studies International Forum 62, pp.99-106. 
29. Brennan, A.J. and J.K. Kalsi (2015). ‟Elephants poaching & ivory trafficking problems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: An application of O'Hara's principles of political economy”. Ecological 
Economics 120, pp.312-337. 
30. Burchard, C. and D. Brodowski (2010). Post-Lisbon principle of transnational ne bis in 
idem: On the relationship between article 50 charter of fundamental rights and article 54 
convention implementing the schengen agreement: Case note on district court aachen, 
germany, (52 ks 9/08 boere), decision of december 2010. New Journal of European 
Criminal Law, 1(3), 310-327. 
31. Bures, O. (2010). ‟Eurojust’s Fledging Counterterrorism Role”. Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 6(2), pp.236-256. 
32. Busuioc, M. (2013). ‟Beyond Design: The Evolution of Europol and Eurojust”. Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society 14(3), pp.285-304. 
33. Busuioc, M., Curtin, D. and M. Groenleer (2011). ‟Agency growth between autonomy and 
accountability: the European Police Office as a ‘living institution” . Journal of European 
Public Policy 18(6), pp.848-867. 
239 
 
34. Caeiro, P., Fidalgo, S. and J. Prata Rodrigues (2018). “The evolving notion of mutual 
recognition in the CJEU’s case law on detention”. Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 25(6), pp.689-703. 
35. Cafarelli, A. (2010). Extradition law- Criminal defendants extradited outside of treaties 
lack standing to assert rule of specialty- United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 f.3d 1171 
(11th cir. 2009). Suffolk Transnational Law Review 33(2), pp.377-390. 
36. Campos-Pardillos, M- Á. (2017). ‟Liaison magistrates” and “contact points” as a “remedy” 
against “high levels of mistrust”: Metaphorical imagery in scholarly papers on EU judicial 
cooperation”. Ibérica 34, pp. 231-256. 
37. Cantrell, C., L. (Spring 1977). ‟The Political Offence Exemption in International Extradition: 
A Comparison of the United State, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland”. Marquette 
Law Review 777 60(3), pp. 777-824. 
38. Castel, J.G. and M. Edwards (1975). ‟Political offences: Extradition and deportation- 
Recent Canadian developments”. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 13(1), pp.89-148. 
39. Christiansen, T. Jorgensen, K. E. and al. (1999). ‟The social construction of Europe”. 
Journal of European Public Policy 6(4), pp. 528–544. 
40. Cirera, X. (2013). Regional Integration in EAC Countries: Lessons and the Way Forward. 
TradeMark East Africa, 26p. 
41. Coffey, G. (2013). ‟Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings: Interpreting 
Ne Bis in Idem in Conjunction with the Principle of Complementarity”. New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 4(1-2), pp.59-79. 
42. Coninsx, M. and L.L. Da Mota (2009). ‟The International Role of Eurojust in Fighting 
Organised Crime and terrorism”. European Foreign Affairs Review 14, pp.165-169. 
43. Cotterrell, R. (2012). ‟What Is Transnational Law”. Law & Social Inquiry 37, p.500-524. 
44. Currie, R.J. (2000). ‟Human rights and international mutual legal assistance: Resolving 
the tension". Criminal Law Forum 11, pp. 143–181. 
45. Dandurand, Y. Colombo, G. and N. Passas (2007). ‟Measures and mechanisms to 
strengthen international cooperation among prosecution services”. Crime Law and Social 
Change 47, pp.261-289. 
240 
 
46. De Moor, A. and G. Vermeulen (2010). ‟The Europol Council decision: transforming 
Europol into an agency of the European union”. Common Market Law Review 47, 
pp.1089-1121. 
47. Durevall, D. (2011). ‟East African Community: Pre-conditions for an Effective Monetary 
Union”. Working Papers in Economics. School of Business, Economics and Law. University 
of Gothenburg, 39p. 
48. Dusabe, F. (2016). ‟Rwanda: Assessing the effectiveness of legal and policy responses to 
fight Money Laundering". Journal of Money Laundering Control 19(1), pp.21-31. 
49. Ebobrah, S.T. (2009). ‟Human Rights developments in sub-regional courts in Africa during 
2008”. African Human Rights Law Journal 9, pp.312-335. 
50. Elliot, L. (2012). ‟Fighting transnational environmental crime”. Journal of International 
Affairs 66(1), pp. 87-104. 
51. Erne, J. (2010). Primary and secondary law-making in the renewed EU. Trames 14(64/59), 
pp. 250-270 
52. Farooq, A. (2001). ‟International Cooperation to combat organized crime‟. UNAFEI, 
Resource material series nº 57, pp. 166-176. 
53. Fawcett, L. (2004). ‟Exploring regional domains: A comparative history of regionalism”. 
International Affairs 80(3), pp.429-446.  
54. Fawcett, L. (2013). ‟The history and Concept of Regionalism”. United Nations University. 
Comparative Regional Integration Studies. Working Papers, 18p. 
55. Fawn, R. (2009). ‟‘Regions’ and Their Study: Wherefrom, What for and Whereto?”. 
Review of International Studies. 35, pp.5-34. 
56. Forstein, C. (2015). Challenging Extradition: The Doctrine of Specialty in Customary 
International Law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 53(2), pp.363-395. 
57. Frishman, O. (2013). ‟Transnational Judicial Dialogue as an Organisational Field”. 
European Law Journal 19(6), pp.739-758.  
58. Garner, J. M. (1922). Book review. Introduction à l’Etude du droit Pénal International, by 
Donnedieu de Vabres, H. The American Journal of International Law 16(3), pp.493-494. 
241 
 
59. Gasamagera, W. (2007). ‟The Constitution making process in Rwanda: Lessons to be  
learned”. 7th Global Forum for Reinventing Government. Vienna, 9p. 
60. Gaspar-Szilogyi, S. (2016). “Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging human 
rights standards, mutual trust and a new ground for postponing a European Arrest 
Warrant”. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice  24(2-3), pp.197-
220. 
61. Gastorn, K. (2015). "The Inevitable Reforms of the Legislative Competencies of the East 
African Legislative Assembly”. Verfassung Und Recht in Ubersee VRU 48, pp. 28–48. 
62. Geyer, F. (2008). ‟European Arrest Warrant. Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. Judgment of 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW 
v. Leden van de Ministerraad”. European Constitutional Law Review 4, pp.149-161. 
63. Gless S. (2013). ‟Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Matters and the Guarantee of a 
Fair Trial: Approaches to General Principles”. Utrecht Law Review 9(4), pp.90-108. 
64. Gless, S. and J.A.E. Vervael (2013). ‟Law Should Govern: Aspiring General Principles for 
Transnational Criminal Justice”. Utrecht Law Review 9(4), pp.1-10. 
65. Gomez-Jara Diez, C. and E. Herlin-Karnell (2018). “Prosecuting EU financial crimes: The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office in comparison to the US federal regime”. German 
Law Journal 19(5), pp.1191-1220. 
66. Goodrich, L. M. (1949). ‟Regionalism and the United Nations”. The United States and the 
Atlantic Community 23(3), pp.47-56. 
67. Gossin. P. (2008). ‟International Mutual Legal Assistance in Switzerland”. UNAFEI, 
Resource material series nº 77, pp. 19-22. 
68. Gossmann, A. (2009). ‟Tusks and trinkets: An overview of illicit ivory trafficking in Africa”. 
African Security Review 18(4), pp.50-69. 
69. Goto, J. (2012). ‟Regional Integration in East Africa Diversity or Economic Conformity”. 
JICA Research Institute Working Paper 46, 26p. 
70. Green, R. H. (1978). ‟The East African Community: A Valediction forbidding Mourning”. 
The African Review 8(1), pp.1-27. 
242 
 
71. Griffith, G. and C. Harris (2005). Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition. 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 6(1). 
72. Grigorescu, A. and C. Baser (2019). The choice between intergovernmentalism and 
nongovernmentalism. Projecting Domestic Preferences to Global Governance. World 
Politics 71(1), pp.88-125. 
73. Haastrup, T. (2013). ‟Eu as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as Externa l relations Practices 
in EU – Africa Relations”. European Integration 35(7), pp.785-800. 
74. Haggenmüller, S., (2013). ‟The Principle of Proportionality and the European Arrest 
Warrant”. Oñati Socio-legal Series [online], 3(1), pp.95-104. 
75. Hall, A and C.R. Rosemary Taylor. (1996). ‟Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”. Public lecture. Max – Planck Institut Fur Gesellschaftsforschung MPIFG, 
Discussion Paper 96/6, 36p, at https://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp96-6.pdf, accessed 
on 15 May 2017.  
76. Hamran, L and E. Szabova (2013). ‟European Public Prosecutor’s Office – Cui Bono? New 
Journal of European Criminal law 4(1-2), pp.40-58. 
77. Hans-Georg, P. (2010). ‟Tax Systems and Tax Harmonisation in the East African 
Community”. Report for the GTZ and the General Secretariat of the EAC, 128p.  
78. Harfield, C. (2003). ‟A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance: Political 
Perspectives on International Law Enforcement Cooperation Treaties”. International 
Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 27(2), pp.221-241. 
79. Harfield, C. (2011). ‟Transnational Criminal Investigation and Modes of Governance”. 
Policing 5(1), pp.3-14. 
80. Hay, C. and D. Wincott (1998). ‟Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism”. Political 
Studies XLVI, pp.951–957. 
81. Heard, C. and D. Mansell (2011). ‟The European Arrest Warrant: The Role of Judges When 
Human Rights are at Risk”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 2(2), pp.133-147. 
82. Heine, J. (2012). ‟Regional integration and political cooperation in Latin America”. Latin 
America Research Review 47(3), pp.209-217. 
243 
 
83. Herrigel, H. (2005). ‟Institutionalists and the limits of institutionalism: a constructivist 
critique of two edited volumes from Wofgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura”. Socio – 
Economic Review 3(3), pp. 559–567. 
84. Hettne, B. and F. Söderbaum (2000). ‟Theorising the rise of Regionness”. New Political 
Economy 5(3), pp.457-472. 
85. Hills, A. (2009). ‟The possibility of transnational policing”. Policing and Society 19(3), 
pp.300-317. 
86. Holmes, P. and J. Rollo. (2012). ‟EAC Integration: Some lessons from the EU Experience”. 
Trade Mark East Africa, 21p. 
87. Hübschle, A. (2011). ‟From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organised Crime-Terror 
Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Perspectives on Terrorism 5(3-4), pp.81-95. 
88. Hurrell, A. (1995). “Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics”. Review of 
International Studies 21(04), pp.331-358. 
89. Hurrell, A. (2007). “One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study of 
international society”. International Affairs 83(1), pp.127-146. 
90. .  
91. Jetschke, A. and T. Lenz (2013). ‟Does regionalism diffuse? A new research agenda for the 
study of regional organisation”. Journal of European Public Policy 20(4), pp.626-637. 
92. Jordaan, A. (2014). ‟Regional integration in Africa versus higher levels of intra – Africa 
trade”. Development Southern Africa 31(3), pp.515-534.  
93. Joutsen, M. (2006). ‟The European Union and Cooperation in criminal Matters; the search 
for Balance”. HEUNI Paper 25, 43p.  
94. Kamala B., D. (2006). ‟The Achievements and Challenges of the New East African 
Community Cooperation”. Open lecture. Business School. University of Hull, 21p.  
95. Kaunert, C. (2010). ‟Europol and EU Counterterrorism: International Security Actorness 
in the External Dimension”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33(7), pp.652-671. 
96. Kielsgard, M., D. (2013). ‟The Political Offence Exception: Punishing Whistleblowers 
Abroad”. The European Journal of International law, at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
244 
 
political-offense-exception-punishing-whistleblowers-abroad/, accessed on 20 May 
2014. 
97. Kigabo R.T. and P.R. Masson (2013). ‟Design and Implementation of a Common Currency 
Area in the East African community”. African journal of Business Management 7(35), 
pp.3575-3590. 
98. Kirby, M. (2008). ‟Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and 
Australian Judges”. Melbourne Journal of International Law 9, pp.171-189. 
99. Kitipov, J. (2012). ‟African integration and inter – regionalism: The regional economic 
communities and their relationship with the European Union”. Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa 34(1), pp.21-44. 
100. Kofi Darbi, W.P. and C.M., Hall (2014). Elite interviews: critical practice and 
tourism. Current Issues in Tourism 17(9), pp.832-848. 
101. Kohler, M. (2014). European Governance and the European Parliament: From 
Talking Shop to Legislative Powerhouse. JCMS 52(3), pp.600-615. 
102. Koroma, S. Mosoti, V. et. al. (2008) ‟Towards an African common market for 
agricultural products”. FAO Review of Agricultural Commodity Policies 2, 219p. 
103. Kurian, A.L. and C. Vinodan (2013). ‟Regionalism and Regional Cooperation in 
International Relations: A conceptual Analysis”. Online International Interdisciplinary 
Research Journal III(VI), pp. 396 - 411. 
104. Lagony, O. and W. Schomburg (1994). ‟International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters and the Rights of the Individual from a Germany Perspective”. European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (4), pp.379-405. 
105. Law, D.S. and W-C. Chang (2011). ‟The limits of global judicial dialogue”. 
Washington Law Review 86, pp.523-577. 
106. Leal-Arcas, R. (2007). Theories of Supranationalism in the EU. The Journal of Law 
in Society 8(1), pp.88-113. 
107. Leroy, H. (March 1953). ‟International judicial assistance: Procedural chaos and a 
program for reform”. The Yale Law Journal 62(4), pp. 515-562. 
245 
 
108. LeSage, A. (2014). ‟The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist 
Militancy and Regional Threats. Strategic Forum 288, pp.1-16. 
109. Lilleker, D.G. (2003). Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential 
Minefield. Politics 23(3), pp.207-224. 
110. Luchtman, M. and J. Vervaele. (2014). ‟European Agencies for Criminal Justice and 
Shared Enforcement (Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office)”. Utrecht Law 
Review 10(5), pp.132-150. 
111. Mackarel, M. (2006). ‟Surrendering the Fugitive- The European Arrest Warrant 
and the United Kingdom”. The Journal of criminal Law 71, pp.362-381. 
112. Maguire, M. (2000). ‟Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and 
implications of intelligence-led crime control”. Policing and Society: An International 
Journal 9(4), pp. 315-336. 
113. Malecela, J.S. (1972). ‟What next for the East African Community? A case for 
Integration”. The African Review 2(1), pp.211-217. 
114. Mancano, L. (2016). ‟The Right to Liberty in European Union Law and Mutual 
Recognition in Criminal Matters”. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 18, 
pp.215-238. 
115. Mancano, L. (2018). “Mutual recognition in criminal matters, deprivation of liberty 
and the principle of proportionality. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
25(6), pp.718-732. 
116. Mangiaracina, L. (2013). ‟A New and Controversial Scenario in the Gathering of 
Evidence at the European Level: The Proposal for a Directive on the European 
Investigation Order”. Utrecht Law Review 10 (1), pp.113-133. 
117. Mann, G.J. (2007). ‟The European Arrest Warrant: A Short-Lived Mechanism for 
Extradition”. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce  34, pp.715-740 
118. Mann, M. Warren, I & S. Kennedy (2018) ‟The legal geographies of transnational 
cyber-prosecutions: extradition, human rights and forum shifting”. Global Crime 19(2), 
pp.107-124. 
246 
 
119. Mansfield, E. and H.V. Milner (1999). ‟The New Wave of Regionalism”. 
International Organisation 53(3), pp.589-627. 
120. Mansfield, E. D. and E. Solingen (2010). ‟Regionalism”. Annual Review of Political 
Science 13, pp.45-63. 
121. Marin, L. (2014). ‟Effective and Legitimate- Learning from the Lessons of 10 Years 
of Practice with the European Arrest Warrant”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 
5(3), pp.327-348. 
122. Marine, F.J. (1999). ‟The threats posed by transnational crimes and organised 
crime groups” UNAFEI Resource Material Series 54, Tokyo, pp.25-53. 
123. Markert, M. (2014). ‟Tacit procedural politics: institutional change and member 
states’ strategies in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 27(1), pp.106-126.   
124. Matambalya, F.A.S.T. (2011). ‟Building the East African Common market: 
Opportunities, Concerns, and Options”. CSAE Conference Discussion Paper ID-468, 29p. 
125. Mathisen, G. (2010). ‟Nordic Cooperation and the European Arrest Warrant: Intra-
Nordic Extradition, the Nordic Arrest Warrant and Beyond” . Nordic Journal of 
International Law 79, pp.1-33. 
126. Mattli, W. (1999). ‟Explaining regional integration outcomes”. Journal of European 
Public Policy 6(1), pp.1-27. 
127. Mattli, W. and A.S. Sweet (2012). “Regional Integration and the Evolution of the 
European Polity: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies”. 
JCMS 50 (S1), pp.1-17. 
128. Mbilinyi, S.M. (1973). ‟East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged 
European Economic Community‟. The African Review: a journal of African politics 
development and international affairs 3(1), pp.85-110. 
129. Mbogoro, D.A.K. (1978). ‟The East African Community: An Economic Analysis of 
the integration scheme”. African Review 8(1-2), pp.54-74. 
130. McEvoy, J. (2006). Elite Interviewing in a Divided Society: Lessons from Northern 
Ireland. Politics 26(3), pp.184-191. 
247 
 
131. Mcgarrell, E. F. (2004). ‟Global and Local policing: Common Principles for the 
Future of Policing”. International Journal of Comparative and Applied criminal justice  
28(1), pp1-14. 
132. McIntyre, M.A. (2005). ‟Trade Integration in the East African Community: An 
Assessment for Kenya”. IMF Working Paper WP/05/143, 26p. 
133. Mertenskoetter P. and S. Luak (2012). ‟An overview of the Legal System and Legal 
Research in the Republic of South Sudan” 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Sudan.html  
134. Michaels, R. (2009). ‟Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”. 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 13p.  
135. Miles, W. (2015). ‟The East African Community: “Is the level of Business Cycle 
Synchronisation Sufficient?”. Applied Economics and Finance 2(4), pp.115-125. 
136. Mngomezulu, B.R. (2013). ‟Why did regional integration fail in East Africa in the 
1970s? A historical explanation”. History and African Study seminar. 16p. 
137. Monaco, F. R. (1995). ‟Europol: The Culmination of the European Union’s 
International Police Cooperation Efforts”. Fordham international law journal 19, pp.247-
307. 
138. Monar, J. (2013). ‟Eurojust’s present and future role at the frontline of European 
Union criminal justice cooperation”. ERA Forum 14, pp.187-200. 
139. Moon, S. D. (2013). ‟‘Tissue on the Bones’: Towards the Development of a Post – 
structuralist Institutionalism”. Politics 33(2), pp.112-123. 
140. Moore, N. and P. Stokes (2012). Elite interviewing and the role of sector context: 
an organisational case from the football industry. QMRIJ 15(4), pp.438-464. 
141. Morris, H.F. (1970). ‟Some perspectives of East African legal history”. Crime in East 
Africa 3, 28p. 
142. Munyua, D. (2012). ‟Combating Terrorism: A Ugandan Perspective”. Combative 
Terrorism Exchange CTX 2(1), pp.213-236. 
248 
 
143. Musotso, C. (2010). ‟Harmonisation of EAC tax policies and laws”. CUTS GRC 
Research Paper, 46p. 
144. Mwaniki, M. (2010). ‟Language management and the East African Community”. 
Language Matters 41(2), pp.260-277. 
145. Nabudere D. W. (1978). ‟Tanzania and Regional Integration in East Africa. Old and 
New Patterns”. African Review 8(1-2), pp.124-155. 
146. Nieto, D. (2012). ‟Neoliberalism, Biopolitics and the Governance of Transnational 
Crime”. Colombia Internacional 76, pp.137-165. 
147. Nir, E. (2018). Approaching the bench; accessing elites on the judiciary for 
qualitative interviews. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, pp.77-89. 
148. Nsibambi, A.R. (1972). ‟Political Commitment and Economic Integration: East 
Africa’s experience”. Africa Review 2(1), pp.189-210. 
149. Nyanduga, B.T. and C. Manning (2016). ‟Guide to Tanzanian Legal System and 
Research”. http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania1.html   
150. Oba, I.B. (2015). ‟Evolution of Kadhi’s Courts in Zanzibar”. Journal of Law, Policy 
and Globalisation 37, 5p. 
151. Obokata, T. (2011). “Key EU principles to combat transnational organised crime”. 
Common Market Law Review 48, pp. 801-828. 
152. Obokata, T. (2017). “The Value of International Law in Combating Transnational 
Organised Crime in the Asia-Pacific”. Asian Journal of International Law 7, pp.39-60. 
153. Obydenkova, N. (2011). ‟Comparative regionalism: Eurasian Cooperation and 
European integration. The case for neofunctionalism”. Journal of Eurasian Studies 2, 
pp.87-102. 
154. Ogbonnaya U.M. and K. Ogujiuba (2015). ‟Regional Parliamentary Assemblies in 
Africa: Challenges of Legitimacy of Authority and Status of Operation. The Journal of 
Legislative Studies 21(4), pp. 553-573. 
155. Ojienda T. and L.O. Aloo (2011). ‟Researching Kenyan Law”, at 
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Kenya.html, accessed on 20 May 2017.   
249 
 
156. Onyango, J.O. (2015). ‟Human Rights and Public Interest Litigation in east Africa: 
A bird’s eye view”. The George Washington International Law Review 47, pp.763-823. 
157. Opertti, D. (May 1992). ‟Juridical Mutual Cooperation in Criminal Matters. The 
latest trends in the Inter – American System and the bilateral treaties between the United 
States and Latin American Countries”. Netherlands International Law Review 39(1), pp.89-
125. 
158. Ostropolski, T. (2014). ‟The Principle of Proportionality under the European Arrest 
Warrant - with an Excursus on Poland”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 5(2), 
pp.167-191. 
159. Ouko, R.J. (1969). ‟The East African Community”. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 35(1), pp.47–51. 
160. Paasi, A. (2011). ‟The region, identity, and power”. Procedia Social and 
Behavioural Sciences 14, pp.9-16. 
161. Padfield, N. (2007). The European Arrest Warrant: Between Trust, Democracy and 
the Rule of Law. The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in England and 
Wales. European Constitutional Law Review 3(2), pp.253-268. 
162. Pankratz, T. and M. Hanns (2012). ‟Understanding Transnational Organised Crime. 
A constructivist approach towards a growing phenomenon”. SIAK-Journal for Police 
Science and Practice 2, pp.41-50. 
163. Parcalabu, D.D., Modiga, G. and G. Gurita (2011). ‟Importance and necessity of 
International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. The 6th Edition of the 
International Conference European Integration Realities and Perspectives. Legal Sciences, 
pp.171-178. 
164. Patrone, I. (2013). ‟Conflicts of jurisdiction and judicial cooperation instruments: 
Eurojust’s role”. ERA Forum 14, pp.215-225. 
165. Peers, S. (2002). ‟The European Union and substantive criminal law: Reinventing 
the wheel?”. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law XXXIII, pp.45-73. 
166. Petrescu, O.M. (2013). ‟The European judicial cooperation in criminal matters in 
the light of the Lisbon treaty”. Challenges of the Knowledge Society, pp.1208-1226. 
250 
 
167. Piatttoni, S. (2016). The European Union between Intergovernmentalism and 
‘Shared and Responsible Sovereignty’: The Haptic Potential of EMU’s Institutional 
Architecture (The Government and Opposition? Leonardo Schapiro Lecture, 2016). 
Government and Opposition 52(3), pp.385-411. 
168. Pirlac, A. (2011). ‟General Framework for the Implementation Decision 
no.2002/584/JAI on the European Arrest Warrant”. The Annals of The “Stefan cel Mare” 
University of Suceava 1(13), pp. 348-354. 
169. Pirozzi, N. and A. Godsäter. (2015). ‟The EU and Africa: Regionalism and 
interregionalism beyond institutions”. Atlantic Future. Working paper 26, 26p. 
170. Plachta, M. (2003). ‟European Arrest Warrant: Revolution in Extradition”. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal law and Criminal Justice  11(2), pp.178-194. 
171. Possi, A. (2015). ‟Striking a balance between community norms and human rights: 
The continuing struggle of the East African Court of Justice”. African Human Rights Law 
Journal 15(1), pp. 192-213. 
172. Powell, W.W. and P. Bromley. (2015). ‟New Institutionalism in the Analysis of 
Complex Organizations”. In: Wright, J. D.  (Ed). International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition 16. Oxford: Elsevier. pp.764–769. 
173. Prost, K.  (2007). ‟Breaking down the barriers: International cooperation in 
combating transnational crime”. Information Exchange Network for Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters and Extradition, at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/can/en_can_prost.en.html, accessed on 15 March 
2014.    
174. Rackow, P. and C. Birr (2010). ‟Recent developments in legal assistance in criminal 
matters”. Goettingen Journal of International Law 2(3), pp. 1087-1128.   
175. Rademayer, J. (2016). ‟Beyond the Borders: Crime, conservation and criminal 
networks in the illicit rhino horn trade”. The Global Initiative Against Transnational 
Organised Crime. Geneva, 37p.  
176. Raffaelli, R. (2017). ‟Judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. Fact sheets on the 
European Union. www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en  
251 
 
177. Reith, S. and M. Boltz (2011). ‟The East African community. Regional integration 
between aspiration and realiy”. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Reports, pp.91-117. 
178. Richards, D. (1996), Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls. Politics 16(3) 
179. Richards,A. (2014). ‟Conceptualising Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
37(3), pp.213-236. 
180. Riedel, R. (2004). ‟Regionalism in the context of a political system”. 1st Danube 
Rectors Conference. Summer School on Regional cooperation, pp.49-54. 
181. Riggirozzi, P. (2010). ‟Region, regionness and regionalism in Latin America: 
Towards a new synthesis”. Latin American Trade Network. Working Paper 130, 17p. 
182. Riggirozzi, P. (2012). ‟Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: 
Towards a New Synthesis”. New Political Economy 17(4), pp.421-443. 
183. Rijken, C. (2010). ‟Re-balancing security and justice: Protection of fundamental 
rights in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. Common Market Review 47, 
pp.1455-1492. 
184. Riyanto, S. (2017). The Emergence of Universalism and the Decline of 
Supranationalism. Mimbar Hukum 29(2), pp.308-320. 
185. Roma Valdés, A. (2015). “The mutual recognition principle in criminal matters: a 
review”. ERA Forum 16, pp.291-303. 
186. Rosberg C. G. (1971). ‟National identity in African states.” African Review 1(1), 
pp.79-92.  
187. Ruggiero, V. (2000). ‟Transnational Crime: Official and Alternative Fears”. 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 28, pp.187-199. 
188. Rukanova, B., R.T. Wigand, E. van Stijn and Y-H Tan (2015). Understanding 
transnational information systems with supranational governance: A multi – level conflict 
management perspective. Government Information Quartely, pp.182-197. 
189. Sapir, A. (1992). ‟Regional Integration in Europe”. The Economic Journal 102(415), 
pp.1491-1506. 
190. Satzger, H. (2019). “Is mutual recognition a viable general path for cooperation?”. 
New Journal of European Criminal Law 10(1), pp.44-56. 
252 
 
191. Schallmoser, N. M. (2014), ‟The European Arrest Warrant and Fundamental 
Rights: Risks of Violation of Fundamental Rights through the EU Framework Decision in 
Light of the ECHR”. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice  22(2), 
pp.135-165. 
192. Schmid, A. P. (2012). ‟The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism”. 
Perspectives on Terrorism 6(2), pp.158-159. 
193. Schmidt, A. V. (2008). ‟Discursive Institutionalism: The explanatory Power of Ideas 
and Discourse”. Annual Review of Political Science 11, pp.303-326. 
194. Schmidt, A. V. (May 2008). ‟Bringing ideas and discourse back into the explanation 
of change in varieties of capitalism and welfare states”. Centre for Global Political 
Economy. University of Sussex, 25p. 
195. Schmitter, P.C. (2007). ‟Regional cooperation and regional integration.” Essay. 
The European University Institute, 27p. 
196. Schneider F and R. Caruso (2011). ‟The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and 
Transnational Crime Organisations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical 
Results.” Economics Security Working Paper 52, 34p. 
197. Schomburg, W. (2012). Criminal matters: transnational ne bis in idem in Europe- 
Conflicts of jurisdictions- transfer of proceedings. ERA Forum 13, pp.311-324. 
198. Schreuer, C. (1995). ‟Regionalism v. Universalism”. European Journal of 
International Law 6(1), pp.477-499. 
199. Sebalu, P. (1972). ‟The East African Community”. Journal of African Law 16(3), 
pp.345-363.  
200. Serzysko, A. (2011). ‟Eurojust and the European Judicial Network on a new legal 
basis”. ERA Forum 11, pp.585-600. 
201. Shaffer, G. (2012). ‟Transnational Legal Process and State Change”. Law & Social 
Inquiry 37, pp.229-264.  
202. Sheptycki, J. (2002). ‟Accountability Across the policing Field: Towards a General 
Cartography of Accountability for post-Modern Policing”. Policing and Society 12(4), 
pp.323-338. 
253 
 
203. Sheptycki, J. (2005). ‟Transnational Policing”. The Canadian Review of Polic ing 
Research 1, at www.crpr.icaap.org/index.php/article/view/31/48, accessed on 11 August 
2018.   
204. Sheptycki, J. W. E. (1995). ‟Transnational Policing and the makings of a 
Postmodern State”. British journal of criminology 35(4), pp.613-635. 
205. Shinyekwa, I.M.B. (2015). ‟Has the East African Community Regional Trade 
Agreement Created of Diverted Trade? A Gravity Model Analysis”. Journal of Sustainable 
Development 8(9), pp.129-138.   
206. Sieberson, S.C. (2010). Inching toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority 
Voting and Unanimity under the Treaty of Lisbon. Virginia Journal of International Law 
50(4), pp.919-996. 
207. Simma, B. and A.L. Paulus. (1998). “The “International Community”: Facing the 
Challenge of Globalisation”. European Journal of International Law 9, pp.266-277. 
208. Slaughter, A-M. Tulunello, A. S. and S. Wood (1998). ‟International Law and 
International relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship”. The 
American Journal of International Law 92(3), pp.367-397. 
209. Snaith, H. (2013). ‟Constructivist institutionalism, (multi – level) governance, and 
the Euro crisis”. Paper presented to BISA annual conference (Draft), Birmingham, 21p.  
210. Söderbaum, F. (2010). ‟With a Little Help From My Friends”: How Regional 
Organisations in Africa Sustain Clientelism, Corruption and Discrimination”. Swedish 
Political Science Association annual conference, 15p.  
211. Souminen, A. (2008). ‟The Past, Present and the Future of Eurojust”. Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 15(2), pp.217-234. 
212. Sperling, J. (2013) ‟EU police and judicial cooperation before the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Strengthening of the weakest link?”. European Security 22(2), pp.202-229. 
213. Spindler, M. (2002). ‟New Regionalism and the Construction of Global Order. 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation”. Working Paper No.93/02, 31p.  
214. Springer, J. P. (2001). ‟Obtaining Foreign Assistance to Prosecute Money 
Laundering Cases: A US Perspective”. Journal of Financial Crime 9(2), pp.153-164. 
254 
 
215. Staeger, U. (2015). ‟The European Union’s Regionalism Diplomacy in Africa: An 
English School Approach”. UNU-CRIS. Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance 
Paper 2/2015, 33p. 
216. Stahl, M. H. (2005). ‟Tariff Liberalisation Impacts of the Customs Union in 
Perspective”. Tralac Working Paper 4/2005, www.paulroos.co.za/wp -
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/20050919_WP4_Stahl.pdf   
217. Sterling – Folker, J. (2000). ‟Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? 
Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared”. International Studies 
Quarterly 44, pp.97-119. 
218. Summers, M. A. (2010). “Rereading Rauscher: Is it time for the United States to 
abandon the rule of specialty?”. Duquesne Law Review 48(1), pp.1-32. 
219. Suominem, A. (2017). “Brexit and EU criminal law- The Norwegian approach”. 
Criminal Law Forum 28(2), pp.251-273. Suominen, A. (2014). "Limits of Mutual 
Recognition in Cooperation in Criminal Matters within the EU - Especially in Light of 
Recent Judgments of Both European Courts." European Criminal Law Review 4(3), pp.210-
235. 
220. Sutherland, P. D. (1984). “The development of international law of extradition”. 
Saint Louis University Law Journal 28(1), pp.33-40. 
221. Sutherland, P.F. (1982). ‟The use of the letter rogatory for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence for proceedings in England and abroad.” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 31(4), pp. 784-839. 
222. Taguaba, L. (1978). ‟The Arusha Agreement: Origins, Meaning and Future of 
Association with the EEC”. African Review 8(1-2), pp.156-184. 
223. Tebaldi, M. and M. Calaresu (2013). ‟Level of Europeanization and Policy 
Outcomes: The Common Security Policy and the Case of Europol”. Sage Open, pp.1-9. 
224. The Common Law and Civil Law traditions. The Robbins Collection. School of law 
(Boalt Hall). University of California. Berkley. Accessed at 
www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html, on 15 May 
2017. 
255 
 
225. Thelen, K. (1999). ‟Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”. Annual 
Review of Political Science 2, pp.369-404. 
226. Thonke, O. and A. Spliid. (2012). ‟What to expect from regional integration in 
Africa”. African Security Review 21(1), pp.42-66. 
227. Tracogna, C. (2011). Ne bis in idem and conflicts of jurisdiction in the European 
area of liberty, security and justice. Lex et Scientia International Journal 18(2), pp.55-71. 
228. TradeMark East Africa (2013). ‟Making regional integration in the EAC work”. 
Policy Brief. Accessed at www.trademarkea.com/resource-center/publications/page/6/, 
on 25 June 2017.  
229. Turner, J.L. (2007). ‟Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice”. 
Michigan law Review 105(5), pp.985-1032. 
230. Valvis, A. I. (2008). “Regional Integration in Latin America”. Institute of 
International Economic Relations, 51p. 
231. Van Ballegooij, W., & Bard, P. (2016). “Mutual recognition and individual rights: 
Did the court get it right?”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 7(4), pp.439-464. 
232. Van Bockel, B. (2012). The ne bis in idem principle in the European Union legal 
order: between scope and substance. ERA Forum 13, pp.325-347. 
233. Van der Mei, A.P. (2017). ‟The European Arrest Warrant system: Recent 
developments in the case law of the Court of Justice”. Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 2017. 24(6), pp.882-904. 
234. Van Kleffens, E.N. (1949). ‟Regionalism and politics Pacts”. The American Journal 
of International law 43(4), pp.666-678. 
235. Van Sliedregt, E. (2007). ‟The European Arrest Warrant: Between trust, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law: Introduction. The European Arrest Warrant: Extradition 
in Transition”. European Constitutional Law Review 3(2) pp.244-252. 
236. Vandebroek, E and F Verbruggen (2013). ‟The EU and the death penalty abolition: 
The limited prospects of judicial cooperation in criminal matters as an external policy 
tool”. New Journal of European Criminal Law 4(4), pp.481-505. 
256 
 
237. Vayrynen, R. (2003). ‟Regionalism: Old and New”. International Studies Review 5, 
pp.25-51. 
238. Ventrella, M. (2013). ‟European integration or democracy disintegration in 
measures concerning police and judicial cooperation”. New Journal of European Criminal 
Law 4(3), pp.290-309. 
239. Vermeulen, G. (2006). ‟A. EU conventions enhancing and updating traditional 
mechanisms for judicial cooperation in criminal matters”. ERES Revue Internationale de 
droit pénal 1(77), pp.59-95. 
240. Vervaele, J., A. (2005). ‟The transnational ne bis in idem principle in the EU. 
Mutual recognition and equivalent protection of human rights”. Utrecht Law Review 1(2), 
pp.100-118. 
241. Vervaele, J.A.E. (2013). ‟Ne Bis In Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional 
Principle in the EU?” Utrecht Law Review 9(4), pp.211-229. 
242. Viano, E.C. (2010). ‟Globalisation, Transnational Crime and State Power: The Need 
for a New Criminology”. Rivista di Criminologia, Vittimologia e Sicurezza III (3), pp.63-85. 
243. von Danwitz, T. (2001). The charter of fundamental rights of the European Union 
between political symbolism and legal realism. Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, 29(4), pp.289-3-4. 
244. von Lampe, K. (2003). ‟The Use of Models in the Study of Organised Crime”. Paper 
presented at the Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research. Berlin. 
11p. 
245. von Staden, A. (2016). ‟Subsidiarity, exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the 
margin of appreciation in the human rights jurisprudence of African sub-regional courts”. 
The International Journal of Human Rights 20(8), pp.1113-1131. 
246. Wade, M. L. (2013). ‟General Principles of Transnational Criminal justice? 
Exploratory Reflections”. Utrecht Law Review 9(4), 165-183. 
247. Wade, M. L. (2015). ‟Securing Defence Rights in Transnational Proceedings”. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal law and Criminal Justice  23(2), pp.145-169. 
257 
 
248. Warchol, G. (2004). ‟The Transnational Illegal Wildlife Trade”. Criminal Justice 
Studies 17(1), pp.57-73. 
249. Waters, M.A. (2005). ‟Mediating Norms and identity: The Role of Transnationl 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law”. The Georgetown Law 
Journal 93, pp.487-574.  
250. Weyembergh, A. (2013). ‟Coordination and initiation of investigations and 
prosecutions through Eurojust”. ERA Forum 14(2), pp.177-186. 
251. William, J. and E. Sheptycki (2007). ‟Transnational crime and transnational 
Policing”. Sociology Compass 1(2), pp.485-498. 
252. Wilson, T.J. (2016). “Criminal Justice and Global Public Goods: The Prum Forensic 
Biometric Cooperation Model”. The Journal of Criminal Law 80(5), pp.303-326. 
253. Woliver, L.R. (2002). Ethical Dilemmas in Personal Interviewing. PS 35(4), pp.677-
678. 
254. Yalem, R. J. (1962). ‟Regionalism and the World Order”. International Affairs 38(4), 
pp. 460-471. 
255. Zagaris, B. (1989-1990). ‟Development in International Judicial Assistance and 
Related Matters”. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 18(3), pp.339-386. 
256. Zimmerbaum, K. and A. Paasi (2013). ‟When old and new regionalism collide: 
Deinstitutionbalisation of regions and resistance identity in municipality amalgamations”. 
Journal of Rural Studies 30, pp.31-40. 
257. Zimmermann, F. (2015). ‟Conflicts of Criminal Jurisdiction in the European Union”. 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Justice 3(1), pp.1-21. 
BOOK CHAPTERS 
1. Alemika Etannibi, E. O. (2013). “West Africa”. In: Boll – Stiftung, H. (Ed.). Transnational 
Organised Crime. Analyses of a Global Challenge to Democracy. Transcript Verlag, pp.127-
144. 
2. Allegrezze, S. (2014). ‟Collecting Criminal Evidence Across the European Union: The 
European Investigation Order Between Flexibility and Proportionality”. In: Ruggeri, S. 
258 
 
(Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, 
pp.51-67. 
3. Allot, A. (1976). ‟The Development of the East African Legal System during the Colonial 
Period”. In: Low, D.A. and A. Smith. (Eds). History of East Africa. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
pp.348-382. 
4. Alusa, D. (2013). ‟Multipolar Politics and Regional Integration in East Africa: Opportunities 
and Challenges for Nonstate Actors”. In: Omeje, K. and T.R. Hepner (Eds.). Conflict and 
Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region. Indiana. University Press, pp.65-82. 
5. Bachmaier Winter, L. (2014). ‟The Proposal for a Directive on the European Investigation 
Order and Grounds for Refusal: A Critical Assessment”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational 
Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, pp.71-90. 
6. Baert, F., Scaramagli, T. and Söderbaum, F. (2014). ‟Introduction: Intersecting 
Interregionalism”. In: Baert, F., Scaramagli, T. and Söderbaum, F. (Eds). Intersecting 
Interregionalism. Regions. Global Governance and the EU. The Netherlands. Springer, 
pp.1-12.  
7. Belfiore, R. (2014). ‟Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a European Investigation Order 
and Some Considerations on the Issue of Mutual Admissibility of Evidence”. In: Ruggeri, 
S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, 
pp.91-105.  
8. Bell, S. (2002). ‟Institutionalism: Old and New”. In: Summers, J. (Ed.). Government, 
Politics, Power and Policy in Australia. 7th ed. NSW Australia. Pearson Education, pp.1-16. 
9. Bøâs, M. (2001). ‟Regions and regionalisation: A heretic’s view”. In: Regionalism and 
Regional Integration in Africa. A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues. Nordiska Afrika 
institutet Discussion Paper 11, Uppsala, pp.27-39. 
10. Buric, Z. (2016). ‟Transnational criminal proceedings and the position of the defence‟. In: 
Z. Đurđević and E Ivičević Karas (Eds.). European Criminal Procedural Law in Service of 
Protection of European Union Financial Interests: State of Play and Challenges. Croatian 
Association of European Criminal Law, pp.63-90. 
259 
 
11. Buscaglia, E. (2013). Judicial and social Conditions for the Containment of Organised 
Crime: A Best Practice Account. In: Boll – Stiftung, H. (Ed.). Transnational Organised Crime. 
Analyses of a Global Challenge to Democracy. Transcript Verlag, pp.61-73. 
12. Cuyvers, A. (2017). The Institutional Framework of the EU. In: Ugirashebuja, E., Ruhangisa, 
J.E., Ottervanger, T. and A. Cuyvers (Eds). East African Community Law. Brill Nijhoff. 
Leiden, pp.79-102. 
13. Di Nicola, A. (2005). ‟Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of  migrants” In:  Reichel, 
P. (Ed). Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. London, Sage Publications, pp.181-
203. 
14. Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (2016). Organised Crime.  
15. Fawcett, L. (1995). ‟Regionalism in Historical Perspective”. In: Fawcett L. and A. Hurrell 
(Eds). Regionalism in world politics: Regional organisations and international order. 
Oxford. University Press, pp.9-36. 
16. Fawcett, L. (2005). ‟Regionalism from a Historical Perspective”. In: Farrell, M., B. Hettne 
et. al. Global politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice. London. Plutto Press, pp.21-37. 
17. Fawcett, L. (2008). ‟Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present”. In: Kosler, A. and M. 
Zimmek (2008). Elements of regional integration. A Multidimensional Approach. Baden-
Baden. Nomos, pp.15-28. 
18. Felsen, D. and A. Kalaitzidis (2005). ‟A Historical overview of Transnational Crime” In: 
Reichel, P. (Ed.). Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. London. Sage Publications, 
pp.3-20. 
19. Hettne, B. (1994). ‟The New Regionalism. Implications for development and peace”. In: 
Hettne, B. & A. Inotai. The New Regionalism. Implications for Global Development and 
International Security. The United Nations University. World Institute for Development 
Economics Research. Forssan Kirjapaino Oy, pp.1-49. 
20. Immergut, E. M. (2006). ‟Historical Institutionalism in Political Science and the Problem 
of Change”. In: Wimmer, A. and R. Kössler (Eds.). Understanding Change. Palgrave 
Macmillan. UK, pp.237-259. 
260 
 
21. Joutsen, M. (2005). ‟International Instruments on Cooperation in Responding to 
Transnational Crime”. In: Reichel, P. (Ed.). Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice. 
Sage Publications, pp.286-309. 
22. Joyce, E. (2005). ‟Expanding the International Regime on Money Laundering in Response 
to Transnational Organised Crime, Terrorism, and Corruption”. In: Reichel, P. (Ed.). 
Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice.  London, Sage Publications, pp.79-97. 
23. Kaahwa, W.T.K. (2017). ‟The Institutional Framework of the EAC”. In: Ugirashebuja, E., 
Ruhangisa, J.E., Ottervanger, T. and A. Cuyvers (Eds.). East African Community Law. 
Institutional, Substantive and Comparative EU Aspects. Leiden, Brill Nijhoff. pp.43-78. 
24. Matambalya, F.A.S.T. (2012). ‟The East African Community: Can it be a Model for Africa's 
Integration Process?”. In: Mengisteab, K & R. Bereketeab (Eds.). Regional Integration, 
Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa. Boydell & Brewer. pp. 195-236. 
25. Meyer, F. (2008, 2010). ‟Cooperation in Criminal Matters”  
26. Mniwasa, E.E. (2004). “Detection and Suppression of Money Laundering in Tanzania”. In: 
Goredema C. (Ed.). Tackling Money Laundering in East and Southern Africa: An Overview 
of Capacity. Institute for Security Studies Monograph 108, pp.37-94. 
27. Page, S. (2001). ‟Regionalism and/ or Globalisation”. In: Regionalism and Regional 
Integration in Africa. A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
Discussion Paper 11, Uppsala, pp.5-26. 
28. Puntigliano, R.A. (2013). ‟Geopolitics and Integration. A South American perspective”. In: 
Puntigliano, R.A. and J. Briceño Ruiz (Eds.). Resilience of Regionalism in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Hampshire. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 19-52. 
29. Rabatel, B. and O. Deparis (2015). ‟ ‘Liaison magistrates’: Their Role in International 
Judicial Cooperation and Comparative Law”. In: Andenas, M. and D. Fairgrieve (Eds.). 
Courts and comparative Law. Oxford University Press. 
30. Radaelli, C. M. and V. Schmidt. (2005). ‟Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: 
Conceptual and Methodological Issues”. In: Radaelli, C. M. and V. Schmidt (Eds.). Policy 
Change and Discourse in Europe. Routledge. Oxon. England, pp.1-28. 
261 
 
31. Rafaraci, T. (2014). ‟General Considerations on the European Investigation Order”. In: 
Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, 
Springer, pp.37-44. 
32. Ruggeri, S. (2014). ‟Introduction to the Proposal of a European Investigation Order: Due 
Process Concerns and Open issues”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and 
Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, pp.3-25. 
33. Ruggeri, S. (2014). ‟Transnational Investigations and Prosecution of cross-Border Cases in 
Europe: Guidelines for a Model of Fair Multicultural Criminal Justice”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). 
Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, pp193-
228. 
34. Ruhangisa, J.E. (2017). ‟The Scope, Nature and Effect of EAC Law”. In: Ugirashebuja, E., 
Ruhangisa, J.E., Ottervanger, T. and A. Cuyvers (Eds.). East African Community Law. 
Institutional, Substantive and Comparative EU Aspects. Leiden, Brill Nijhoff, pp.139-160. 
35. Schünemann, B. (2014). ‟Solution Models and Principles Governing the Transnational 
Evidence Gathering in the EU”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and 
Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, pp.161-180. 
36. Schünemann, B. (2014). ‟The European Investigation Order. A Rush into the Wrong 
Direction”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in 
Europe. London, Springer, pp.20-35. 
37. Shaw, M. (2005). ‟Organised Crime in Africa”. In: Reichel, P. (Ed.). Handbook of 
Transantional Crime and Justice. London, Sage Publications, pp.367-385. 
38. Slaughter, A. M. (2011). ‟International Relations, Principal Theories”. In: Wolfrum, R. 
(Ed.). Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford University Press. 
www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_201105
09zG.pdf  
39. Stein, A. A. (2008). ‟Neoliberal institutionalism”. In: Reus – Smit, C. and D., Snidal (Eds.). 
The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York. Oxford University Press, 
pp.201-221. 
262 
 
40. Steinmo, S. (2008). ‟What is Historical Institutionalism?”. In: Della Porta, D. and M. 
Keating (Eds.). Approaches in the Social Sciences. University Press. Cambridge, pp.150-
178. 
41. Steinmo, S. (2015). ‟Institutionalism”. International Encyclopedia of the Social & 
Behavioral Science. 2nd edition 12, pp.181-185. 
42. Vogler R. (2013). ‟Report on England.” In: Ruggeri S. (Ed.). Transnational Inquiries and the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal proceedings. Messina, Springer, pp.387-398. 
43. Vogler, R. (2011). ‟Making International Criminal Procedure Work: From Theory to 
Practice”. In: Henham, R. and M. Fimdlay (Eds.). Exploring the Boundaries of International 
Criminal Justice. Aldershot, Ashgate, pp.105-128. 
44. Vogler, R. (2014). ‟Criminal Evidence and Respect for Fair Trial Guarantees in the Dialogue 
Between the European Court of Human Rights and national courts”. In: Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). 
Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. London, Springer, pp.181-
192. 
45. Vogler, R. (2014). ‟The European Investigation Order: Fundamental Rights at Risks?”. In: 
Ruggeri, S. (Ed.). Transnational Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe . London. 
Springer, pp.45-49. 
46. Wennström, B. (2011). ‟In Search of a New lens”. In: Bergstrom, M. and A.J. Cornell (Eds.).  
Interests and Actors in European Police and Criminal Justice Cooperation. Uppsala Faculty 
of Law Working Paper 2011:6c, pp.171-178. 
BOOKS 
1. Bassiouni M. C. (2014). International extradition: United States Law and Practice. 6th 
Edition, Oxford, The University Press, USA, 1330p. 
2. Fletcher, M., Lööf, R. and B. Gilmore (2008). EU Criminal Law and Justice. Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, 235p. 
3. Gardini, G. L. (2012). Latin America in the 21st century. London, Zeb Books, 152p. 
4. Ibhawoh, B. (2013). Imperial Justice. Oxford, University Press, 240 Pages. 
5. Lucas, C.P. (1904). Geography of South and East Africa. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 169p. 
6. Morgan W. T. W. (1973). East Africa. London, Longman, 410p. 
263 
 
7. Obokata, T. (2010). Transnational Organised Crime in International Law. Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc, 258p. 
8. Shearer, I., A. (1971). Extradition in International Law. Manchester. The University Press, 
291p. 
9. Were, G.S. and Wilson, D.A. (1968). East Africa Through a Thousand Years. New York. 
African Publishing Corporation. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGISLATIONS 
1. Commission Regulation 2017/1939 of Oct. 12, 2017, Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation on the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 2017 O.J. 
(L 106). 
2. Commission Regulation 2017/1939 of Oct. 12, 2017, Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation on the Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 2017 O.J. 
(L 106) 1, 1-71. 
3. Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the council, of 20 May 2015, 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC. 
4. Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on 
the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law. 
5. Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 
on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and 
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. 
6. Directive (EU) 2019/713 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 April 2019, 
on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing 
Council Framweork Decision 2001/413/JHA. 
7. Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 19 November 
2008, on the protection of the environment through criminal law. 
264 
 
8. Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. 
9. Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
10. Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 
on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA. 
11. Directive 2014/41/EU on the EIO in criminal matters. 
12. FD 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures 
between the Member States. 
13. FD 2008/978/JHA on the EEW for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data 
for use in proceedings in criminal matters. 
14. Joint Action 96/277/JHA on a framework for the exchange of liaison magistrates, 
15. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986). 
16. The Arab League Agreement on Extradition and Judicial Cooperation (1983). 
17. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste 
and their Disposal (1989). 
18. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000). 
19. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
(1971). 
20. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970). 
21. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(1973). 
22. The Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the EU (2000). 
23. The Convention on offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963). 
24. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981). 
265 
 
25. The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of detection (1991). 
26. The Convention on the Prevention of and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973). 
27. The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security (2013). 
28. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950). 
29. The European Convention on Extradition (1958). 
30. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959). 
31. The Inter – American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992). 
32. The International Convention against the Taking of Hostage (1979). 
33. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). 
34. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
35. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (1966). 
36. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987). 
37. The Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East African Region (2001). 
38. The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Common Market (2009). 
39. The Protocol on the establishment of the East African Customs Union (2004). 
40. The Protocol on the establishment of the East African Monetary Union (2013). 
41. The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the states of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders and the subsequent Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement on 19 June 1990. 
42. The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991).  
43. The Treaty for East African Cooperation (1967).  
44. the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC (2000). 
45. The Treaty on EU (1992). 
46. The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (2007). 
47. The UN Charter (1945). 
48. The UN Convention against Corruption (2003). 
266 
 
49. The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988). 
50. The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984). 
51. The UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 (and the first Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children 
(2003) as well as the second Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air (2004). 
52. The UN Model Treaty on Extradition (1990). 
53. The UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1990). 
JUDGMENTS 
1. EACJ, Ref. Nº 1 of 2007) [2007] EACJ 3 (1 November 2007), Katabazi and 21 Others v. 
Secretary General of the East African Community and Another. 
2. EACJ, Ref. Nº 7 OF 2013 [2013]. Burundian Journalists Union v. The Attorney General of 
the Republic of Burundi. 
3. EACJ, Ref. Nº8 of 2010) [2010] EACJ & (APPEAL Nº1 OF 2012, Plaxeda Rugumba v. The 
Secretary General of the EAC and the Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda.  
4. ECJ, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
5. ECJ, Case C-303/05 [2007], Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad.  
6. ECJ, Joined cases C-187/01, Hüseyin Gözütok, and C-385/01, Klaus Brügge [2003].  
7. ECJ, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru [2016]. 
REPORTS 
1. CITES (2014). Interpretation and implementation of the Convention. Species trade and 
conservation. Elephants. Elephant conservation, illegal killing and ivory trade . 65th 
meeting of the Standing Committee. 38p. 
2. Commission of the European Communities (2004). Green Paper on the approximation, 
mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union. 
Brussels, 94p. 
267 
 
3. East African Community (2015). Study to assess transnational organised crime and 
terrorism in the EAC region. 59p. 
4. FATF (2012-2017). International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, 128p. 
5. IMF (2015). Rwanda. Detailed Assessment Report –Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of terrorism. 403p. 
6. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report INCSR II (2014). Money laundering and 
Financial Crimes. United States Department of State. 460p. 
7. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report INCSR II (2017). Money laundering and 
Financial Crimes. United States Department of State. 203p. 
8. OECD (2009). Money Laundering Awareness Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax 
Auditors. 49p. 
9. Society for International Development (2012). The State of East Africa. 90p. 
10. Society for International Development (2013). The State of East Africa. 114p. 
11. Society for International Development. The State of East Africa Report Series. Legal Status 
of Laws. Accessed at www.inequalities.sidint.net/soear/intergration-tracker/legal-status-
of-laws, on 15 May 2017. 
12. The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2019, 69p. 
13. The House of Lords and the House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011). 
The Human Rights Implications of the United Kingdom Extradition Policy. Report of the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights. 72p. 
14. The Sentry (2015). Country Briefs: South Sudan. 9p. 
15. The Sentry (2016). War Crimes Shouldn’t Pay. 43p.  
16. The Sentry (2017). Making Fortune While Making a Famine. 15p. 
17. United States Department of State (2016). Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, 407p. 
18. UNODC (2009). ‟Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa”. Paper. Regional 
Ministerial Meeting on Promoting the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa, 
Nairobi, 48p. 
268 
 
19. UNODC (2009). Manual on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters related to 
Terrorism. 259p. 
20. UNODC (2010). The Globalisation of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment. Vienna, 303p. 
21. UNODC (2011). Organised Crime and Instability in Central Africa. Vienna, 10p. 
22. UNODC. (2013). Transnational Organised Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment. 
Vienna, 48p. 
23. World Bank. East African Community Secretariat (2014). EAC Common Market Scorecard: 
Tracking EAC Compliance in Movement of Capital, Services and Goods. 106p. 
MEDIA ARTICLES 
1. Ainebyoona, E. “Uganda confiscates 4,000 kgs of ivory as trafficking increases”. Daily 
Monitor. 6 March 2016. Accessed at www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Markets/Uganda -
confiscates-4-000-kgs-of-ivory-as-trafficking-increases, on 10 October 2017. 
2. Anami, L. “Experts suggest models for EAC political union”. The Standard (27th November 
2012), p.1 (Online), https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000071581/experts-
suggest-models-for-eac-political-union, accessed on 12 May 2017.  
3. Dearden, L. “Isis: New terrorist group Jahba East Africa pledges allegiance to ‘Islamic 
State’ in Somalia” Independent. 8 April 2016. Accessed 
atwww.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-new-terrorist-group-jahba-east-
africa-pledges-allegiance-to-islamic-state-in-somalia-a6974476.html, on 4 October 2017.   
4. DeFreese, M. “New Fronts Emerge in Africa’s “Arc of Terrorism” . Huffpost. 5th August 
2016, at www.huffpost.com/entry/new-fronts-emerge-in-afri_b_9865112, accessed on 
4 October 2017. 
5. East Africa: Kenya Sees Progress in Counter-Terrorism Amid Reduced Attacks. All Africa. 
18 January 2017, at www.allafrica.com/stories/201701180003.html, accessed on 4th 
October 2017.  
6. Haenlein, C. “How severe is the terror or threat in East Africa?” . BBC Africa. 20 July 2015, 
atwww.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa, accessed on 4 October 2017. 
269 
 
7. Ligami, C. ‟Three countries renew push for EAC political federation by 2016.The East 
African. 14th March 2015, at www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Three-countries-renew-
push-for-EAC-political-federation-by-2016-/2558-2653442-10iy0uvz/index.html, 
accessed on 10 April 2015.  
8. Masinde J. ‟US State Dept thinks Africa’s leading mobile money platform is vulnerable to 
money laundering”. Quartz Africa. 6 March 2017, at www.qz.com/africa/924977/us-
state-dept-thinks-africas-leading-mobile-money-platform-is-vulnerable-to-money-
laundering/BOOK CHAPTERS, accessed on 15 September 2017.  
9. Muvunyi, F. “Tanzania’s Magufuli leads fight against corruption” . DW. 12 May 2016, at. 
www.dw.com/en/tanzanias-magufuli-leads-fight-against-corruption/a-19252614, 
accessed on 1st October 2017.  
10. Ng'wanakilala, F. “Tanzanian President sacks port chief in anti-graft campaign”. Reuters. 
8th December 2015, at www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-uk-tanzania-politics-, accessed on 
2nd October 2017.   
11. Nyakachunga, V. “Top 5 Corruption Cases that Remain Unsolved in Kenya” . 
Kenyans.CO.KE. 1st March 2016, at www.kenyans.co.ke/news/top-5-corruption-cases-
remain-unresolved-kenya, accessed on 1st October 2017.  
12. "Police arrest 10 over ivory trade”. The New Times. 20 August 2016, at 
www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/202770/, accessed on 13 October 2017.   
13. Ubwani, Z. “Poaching Poses Security Threat in East Africa. The Citizen. The Citizen. 13 
September 2016, at www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Poaching-poses-security-threat-in-E-
Africa--report, accessed on 10 October 2017.   
14. Ugandan authorities seize a tonne of ivory. New Vision. 21st February 2017, at  
www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1446682/ugandan-authorities-seize-tonne-
ivory, accessed on 10th October 2017.   
OTHER ELECTRONIC SOURCES  
1. African Union Peace and Security. The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the 
elimination of the LRA, at www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1, accessed on 
9th October 2017. 
270 
 
2. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, at 
www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016, accessed on 
10th July 2017.  
3. Fighting Wildlife Trade in Kenya (September 2014.) UN Chronicle LI(2). 
www.unchronicle.un.org/article/fighting-wildlife-trade-kenya, accessed on 10 October 
2017.  
4. Global Centre on Cooperative Security (2014). Tracking Progress. AML/CFT 
Developments in East Africa and the Greater Horn. https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/AML_CFT-Developments-in-East-Africa.pdf, accessed on 15 
July 2017.  
5. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/consultation_procedure.html, accessed on 
20th August 2019, accessed on 20th August 2019. 
6. https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/2017/12/14/kenyan-supreme-court-declares-
mandatory-death-penalty-unconstitutional/, on 1 November 2018.   
7. Karuhanga, J. (April 5, 2017). ‟Regional MPs weigh in on ratification of EAC Peace and 
Security Protocol”. The New Times. April 5, 2017, accessed on 10th May 2017. 
https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/210169KnowYOurCountry. South Sudan.  
www.knowyourcountry.com/southsudan1111, Consulted on 3rd October 2017.  
8. Open Society Justice Initiative (2013). Fact Sheet. East African Court of Justice. 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/fact-sheet-east-african-court-
justice-20130627.pdf, accessed on 18 July 2018.    
9. The European Investigation Order. www.app.college.police.uk/app-
content/investigations/european-investigations/european-investigation-order/,  
accessed on 25 May 2018.   
10. TRAFFIC. Sophisticated poachers could undercut bold Kenyan fight against wildlife crime 
in this key African transit country. www.traffic.org/home/2016/5/9/sophisticated-
poachers-could-undercut-bold-kenyan-fight-agai.html,  accessed on 10 October 2017.   
271 
 
11. Traffic. Uganda to return 2.9 tonnes of impounded ivory to ivory trafficking suspects. 27 
July 2014. www.traffic.org/home/2014/2/27/uganda-to-return-29-tonnes-of-
impounded-ivory-to-ivory-traff.html, accessed on 10 October 2017.  
12. United States Department of State. Tanzania 2016 Crime & Safety Report.  
www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19739,  accessed on 4 Oct 2017. 
13. UNODC. Eastern Africa: UNODC to address rising environmental crime. 20 November 
2009. www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/November/eastern-africa_-unodc-to-
address-rising-environmental-crime,  accessed on 10 Oct 2017.   
14. UNODC. Environmental crime: trafficking in wildlife and timber. 
http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/environmental-crime.html, accessed on 10 Oct 
2017. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 
 
APPENDIX  
 
APPENDIX 1 
FIELDWORK SHORT NARRATIVE 
 
My research qualitative methodology included fieldwork. The latter was mainly an elite 
interviewing of various leaders in the EAC. Initially, I planned to interview a broad range of leaders 
in senior position including top leaders at the EAC, Attorney General Offices, police Chiefs, as well 
as judges and prosecutors in the Partner States. However, having thought deeply about the 
objectives of the interviews and having considered my supervisors’ advices, I revised the plan and 
I narrowed down the list of the proposed interviewees.  I decided to focus essentially on the EAC 
itself and not the Partner States. After all, one objective of my research is to influence the EAC to 
adopt mechanism for cooperation in criminal matters. So, I decided to interview only top leaders 
at the EAC as follows: The Secretary General, the President of the EACJ (President of the Appellate 
Division), the Principal Judge of First Instance, the Speaker, 5 Members of Parliament 
representing each EAC Partner State, and the Head of Legal Department. The purpose of the 
interviews was to obtain the perception of the EAC leaders on my research assumptions, to hear 
their views on a possible mechanism for cooperation in criminal matters, to find out what the 
EAC has achieved so far and what it has planned in relation to my research questions, and to 
obtain any other important piece of information that may be useful to my research. The fieldwork 
was also a way for raising awareness for my PhD research at the EAC and attracting the interest 
of the institution as I hope my research findings contribute to develop a cooperation mechanism 
in the fight against transnational organized crime in the EAC.  
I was lucky enough to be able to interview the Speaker of the EALA who was enthusiastic about 
my research which he strongly supported. I also interviewed four Members of EALA each 
representing a Partner State. I managed to interview the President of the EACJ too, the Principal 
Judge of the First Instance and the Head of the Legal Department. Of the ten proposed 
participants, I have not been able to interview the Secretary General due to time constraints, and 
a member of the EALA representing Tanzania who did not respond to the interview invitation.  
Generally speaking, all participants to my interviews showed interest in my research. The 
President of the EACJ and the Speaker of the EALA noted the lack of legal research and 
particularly research on criminal matters in the EAC. They encouraged me to share my research 
findings and results with the Community.  
The interviews helped me collect useful data from the field. Through discussions with members 
of the Secretariat at the EAC, I gained a better understanding of the functioning of the institution.  
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I was able to draw a few tentative conclusions from my interviews. Firstly, the interviews 
confirmed my intuition and my research assumption that cooperation in criminal matters lacks 
in the EAC. All participants agreed that cooperation in criminal matters within EAC is of ultimate 
importance and timely. They all agreed that free movement of people requires a cooperation 
mechanism to ensure justice is done and to prevent criminals move freely across the national 
borders. So, they support the idea that the EAC moves from bilateral arrangements to a regional 
framework of cooperation in criminal matters. I was therefore informed that EAC has just 
adopted a Protocol on peace and security, which, was then pending ratification from one or two 
Partner States.  Secondly, several other themes emerged from my interviews such as 
transnational organized crime as a threat in the EAC and the basis for developing a cooperation 
mechanism; human rights and the need to develop a standard within EAC.  
One interesting aspect of the interviews was the differences in the backgrounds of the 
participants, which I could tell from their answers to my questions. I learned later some were 
lawyers, some other economists, sociologists, and one is even nutritionist with considerable 
career experience in politics. So, with such a multi-disciplinary experienced set of interviewees, 
the answers to my questions considered governance, law, politics and sociology. I found the 
opinions of the participants fascinating and useful to my research. The differences in their 
background were inspiring with regard to methodological approach for future researches. I was 
satisfied by the participants’ answers which helped to answer my research questions and to build 
good arguments. 
The field research was a great adventure and a learning experience from the challenges that I 
encountered. The challenges were twofold: organizational and logistical on the one hand, and 
technical on the other hand. My case study being the EAC which headquarters are located in 
Arusha, Tanzania, I had first to fly to my country of origin, Rwanda, to organize the interviews 
and, later on, fly to Arusha. The process is costly and time consuming. I realized that I could not 
expect to hear from the proposed participants until I met them in person. The point here is that 
organizing field work from distance is such a challenge that one cannot understand until they 
face it.  
One issue I particularly had to consider in planning the meetings is that some of the proposed 
participants to my interviews work at the EAC on full-time basis with a permanent residence in 
Arusha, for example, the Secretary General, the President of the Court, the Principal Judge at the 
First Instance Division and the Speaker, while others like the Members of the EALA work on a 
part-time basis and do not hold a full residence in Arusha. This means I had to be in Arusha at 
least when the EALA was sitting. The perfect period was the 6th meeting of the 3rd session of the 
3rdAssembly which was scheduled from 10th to 22nd May 2015. 
At this stage, the next challenge was the participants’ availability as they usually have very tight 
schedules. Members of the EALA were very busy attending the plenary and standing committees’ 
meetings during the 10 days of the session meeting. The only alternative I had was to interview 
them either at lunch break, in the evening after work, in the weekend or on the days they did not 
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have any plenary meeting.  So, it was challenging to interview them as they sometimes had other 
urgent matters to sort out in their free time. I was sometimes left hours and days before I 
managed to interview a participant.  
In addition to their tight schedules, EAC officials often travel away. Just as an example, the 
President of the Court travelled to Dar-es-Salam, to Poland and to Uganda just in a space of two 
weeks. When I interviewed him in office, he was back from Poland the day before and he was 
travelling to Uganda the following day. Similarly, I interviewed the Acting Head of Legal 
Department at EAC on Saturday after he arrived back from Rwanda on Friday and he was 
travelling to Dar-es-Salam on the following Monday. They both agreed to be interviewed despite 
their tight schedules. However, I was not lucky enough to interview the Secretary General who 
travelled to Dar-es-Salam and Brussels for meetings about the political crisis then in Burundi. 
 Participants’ consent to be interviewed and to be recorded was another challenge which I dealt 
with rather well for two reasons. Firstly, my research sounded appealing to the participants. 
Secondly, the EAC internal policies encourage information to public. The EAC is a people centered 
and private sector driven integration. So, it has got a strong customer care culture that facilitates 
access to information. However, I would certainly hardly reach the participants if I had not sent 
out my interview questions and my credentials to the Public Relations Officer at the EALA, who 
helped identify suitable participants and introduced me to them. That facilitated a positive and 
quick response to my interview invitation and a consent to be interviewed and recorded. 
Last and not least challenge I encountered was managing my field research data and adjusting to 
local resources. Having lived in the UK for a while, I forgot East African realities such as frequent 
power cuts. I lost a few interviews that I transcribed on my laptop while staying in Arusha, after 
an evening power cut at my hotel which caused my laptop battery run out before I had the chance 
to save the interviews. I had to find time to type the interviews again. Although that experience 
wasted my time, I learned from it for future field researches. Also, conducting elite interviews 
with limited fund can be challenging at times when the weather is not favourable. On a few 
occasions, sudden heavy rain was challenging, especially when I had to move to the EAC 
Headquarters on a motorbike, the cheapest common transport means in Arusha, and expect to 
keep smart and clean at my elite interviews, and not wet and muddy.  
The field research was overall rewarding, in terms of data and information I needed, and in terms 
of professional networking and awareness on my research. 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
  
I. THE EALA 
            - THE SPEAKER  
            - 5 MEMBERS REPRESENTING THE PARTNER STATES 
 
1. The United Nations stresses the need to fight transnational crime and it calls upon States to 
cooperate to that end as a matter of urgency. To what extent do you think the EAC needs to 
address transnational organized crime and develop mechanisms to confront it? 
2. What could be the challenges of international cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC? 
3. To what extent do you think the differences in the legal systems of EAC Partner States could 
hamper international cooperation in EAC and how could the situation be resolved? 
4. As an area of free movement and with regard to the ultimate political federation objective of the 
EAC, what do you think of a suggestion that the EAC becomes a legal area where cooperation 
would move from the domain of national foreign affairs to that of the judiciary? 
5. In a request for assistance, should the requested state apply its law, or should the law of the 
requesting state apply? 
6. Should a request for assistance entail an obligation to the requested state or should the latter 
have a margin of appreciation to accept or not the request? If yes, should that margin be absolute 
or relative? 
7. What is your opinion on our research’s assumption that the EAC, as a sub- regional organization 
with the ultimate goal of political federation, needs to develop a regional mechanism of 
cooperation among the Partner States in criminal matters?  
8. Given the complexity of transnational proceedings and the difficulty they engender in terms of 
enforcing human rights, to what extent do you think it would be worth setting human rights 
specific standard applicable to any possible EAC international cooperation instruments?  
9. Should transnational proceedings in EAC ignore any test of compliance with human rights 
standards or should Partner States adopt a mutual recognition of decisions as in the European 
Union? 
10. Would you support that an EAC instrument on mutual assistance in criminal matters provides for 
an explicit ground for refusal to cooperate in case a request violates human rights, e .g. in the 
enforcement of a judgment? 
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II. THE EACJ 
  
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION   
               - THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE OF THE FIRST INSTANCE  
 
1. What is your opinion on our research’s assumption that the EAC, as a sub- regional organization 
with the ultimate goal of political federation, needs to develop a regional mechanism of 
cooperation among the Partner States in criminal matters?  
2. What could be the challenges of international cooperation in criminal matters in the EAC? 
3. To what extent do you think the differences in the legal systems of EAC Partner States could 
hamper international cooperation in EAC and how could the situation be resolved? 
4. Considering the fundamental principles of the Community, particularly the promotion and 
protection of human and people’s rights, what fundamental rights should be guaranteed in 
transnational proceedings involving international cooperation? 
5. Given the complexity of transnational proceedings and the difficulty they engender in terms of 
enforcing human rights, to what extent do you think it would be worth setting human rights 
specific standard applicable to any possible EAC international cooperation instruments?  
6. How could a test of compliance with human rights standards be envisaged in transnational 
proceedings in EAC? 
7. Should transnational evidence gathering be subject to a test of necessity, proportionality and 
perhaps appropriateness? 
8. Should transnational proceedings in EAC ignore any test of compliance with human rights 
standards or should Partner States adopt a mutual recognition of decisions as in the European 
Union? 
9. How could issues such as legality and admissibility of obtained evidence in a transnational inquiry 
in EAC be addressed, considering the differences in national rules of procedure and evidence?  
10. Considering the need for protecting fundamental rights against possible infringements in 
transnational proceedings, do you think there should be limitations or safeguards, e.g. with regard 
to transmission of information from a state to another state and the right to privacy? 
11. Should safeguards against abuses operate prior to the execution of a request for assistance, e .g. 
by means of a judicial scrutiny approval, or should it be a control mechanism operating after 
execution of a request for assistance, e.g. a special legal remedy, or during the trial phase in the 
requesting state?  
12. What mechanism would you propose to ensure a judicial scrutiny approval of a request for 
assistance does not conflict with states sovereignty and the customary international law rule of 
non-inquiry?  
13. As an area of free movement and with regard to the ultimate political federation objective of the 
EAC, should the latter become a legal area where cooperation would move from the domain of 
national foreign affairs to that of the judiciary? 
14. What information would the requested state need if it has to test the legitimacy and 
proportionality of a request for assistance?  
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15. What other practical institutional mechanism supplementing the more classic extradition and 
mutual legal assistance would you suggest in order to facilitate international cooperation in the 
EAC and to overcome the challenge of the rule of non-inquiry? 
16. In a request for assistance, should the requested state apply its law, or should the law of the 
requesting state apply? 
17. Should a request for assistance entail an obligation to the requested state or should the latter 
have a margin of appreciation to accept or not the request? If yes, should that margin be absolute 
or relative? 
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III. THE COUNSEL (LEGAL ADVISOR)  
 
1. Considering the objective of the EAC to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and 
deepening cooperation among the Partner States in, amongst others, defence, security and legal 
and judicial affairs, to what extent is cooperation in criminal matters a perspective for the 
Community? 
2. With regard to regionalism as a way to respond to global and regional problems, and give n the 
ultimate objective of the EAC to become a political federation, how is the Community concerned 
by transnational organized crime?  
3. What is your view on our research’s assumption that EAC states should move from bilateral 
cooperation instruments to regional instruments that would apply to all Partner States in criminal 
matters? 
4. In your view, what political or legal obstacles could hinder legal cooperation in East Africa? 
5. To what extent do you think the differences in the legal systems of EAC Partner States could 
hamper international cooperation in EAC and how could the situation be resolved? 
6. Considering the fundamental principles of the Community, particularly the promotion and 
protection of human and people’s rights, what fundamental rights should be guaranteed in 
transnational proceedings involving international cooperation?  
7. What principles or values, in your view, should cooperation in criminal matters in EAC reflect?  
8. Given the complexity of transnational proceedings and the difficulty they engender in terms of 
enforcing human rights, to what extent do you think it would be worth setting human rights 
specific standard applicable to any possible EAC international cooperation instruments?  
9. Should transnational proceedings in EAC ignore any test of compliance with human rights 
standards or should Partner States adopt a mutual recognition of decisions as in the European 
Union? 
10. Would you support that an EAC instrument on mutual assistance in criminal matters provides for 
an explicit ground for refusal to cooperate in case a request violates human rights, e.g. in the 
enforcement of a judgment? 
11. How could EAC address issues such as legality and admissibility of obtained evidence in a 
transnational inquiry, considering the differences in national rules of procedure and evidence?  
12. Considering the need for protecting fundamental rights against possible infringements in 
transnational proceedings, do you think there should be limitations or safeguards, e.g. with regard 
to transmission of information from a state to another state and the right to privacy? 
13. Should safeguards and limitations apply in requests for assistance from non-EAC member States 
as well? 
14. Should safeguards against abuses operate prior to the execution of a request for assistance, e .g. 
by means of a judicial scrutiny approval, or should it be a control mechanism operating after 
execution of a request for assistance, e.g. a special legal remedy, or during the trial phase in the 
requesting state?  
15. In case the three scenarios in question 15 above are all provided for to guarantee a maximum 
protection of human rights, what could be the danger of leaving the option to states to require 
either a judicial approval or a control after the facts, bearing in mind divergences in the states’ 
practices? 
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16. If requests for assistance within the EAC had to be approved after a judicial scrutiny, what would 
you advise to avoid such scrutiny conflicts with states sovereignty and the customary international 
law rule of non-inquiry?  
17. As an area of free movement and with regard to the ultimate political federation objective of the 
EAC, what do you think of a suggestion that the EAC becomes a legal area where cooperation 
would move from the domain of national foreign affairs to that of the judiciary? 
18. What other practical institutional mechanisms supplementing the more classic extradition and 
mutual legal assistance would you suggest in order to enhance international cooperation in the 
EAC and to overcome the challenge of the rule of non-inquiry? 
19. In a request for assistance, should the requested state apply its law, or should the law of the 
requesting state apply? 
20. Should a request for assistance entail an obligation to the requested state or should the latter 
have a margin of appreciation to accept or not the request? If yes, should that margin be absolute 
or relative? 
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APPENDIX 3 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
PROJECT TITLE: 
International cooperation in criminal matters. A case study of the East African Community (EAC)  
 
Project Approval                                                                                                                                          Reference: 
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project ex plained to 
me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet. I understand that agreeing to take part means 
that I am willing to: 
- Be interviewed by the researcher  
- Allow the interview to be audio taped and transcribed  
I understand that the researcher will keep my identity anonymous and will not mention either my name 
or any other thing that will directly disclose my identity as the respondent. I also understand that, all 
records will be kept safely by the researcher and will be used strictly and reasonably for the purpose of 
this research and that all voice records or document emanating from me will neither be transferred to 
other persons or bodies outside the purpose of this research.  
AND 
I understand that, if I make a request, I will be given a transcript of data concerning me for my approval 
before being included in the write up of the research. 
I also understand that I can withdraw at any time from participating in this research and I can as well 
request that all information I have given to be excluded from any part of this research, and be destroyed. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the 
project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or disadvantaged in 
any way. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Name__________________________________________________________________ 
Signature_______________________________________________________________ 
Date____________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 4 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
STUDY TITLE: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS. A CASE STUDY OF THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY (EAC) 
 
INVITATION PARAGRAPH 
You are being invited to participate in this research. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important that you understand the rationale for this research, the objective behind doing the research 
and indeed what this research will involve. Please take time to read the following information which 
narrates the issues around the research and the procedure through which it is intended to be carried out. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
This study is conducted as part of a PhD at the University of Sussex. The study aligns itself with the 
objectives of the East African Community (EAC) to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening 
and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in, among other fields, defence, security and judicial 
affairs. It aims at proposing a legal and institutional mechanism for cooperation in criminal matters 
adapted to the needs and to the context of the EAC. In September 2013, an assessment conducted by the 
United Nations and focused on transnational organized crimes such as trafficking of people (migrants) and 
drugs (heroin), piracy and wildlife poaching revealed their threat to the region. Also, the international 
community recognizes international cooperation in criminal matters as an urgent necessity and a 
response to transnational crime. The study intends to explore regionalism as a device for cooperation in 
the EAC, drawing from the experience of other regional organizations like the European Union. The study 
will explain the reasons law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice actors in the EAC need to 
cooperate. The study will also analyse the legal systems within EAC to understand their specificity. An 
attention will be given to the understanding of the decision- making system of the EAC. It is hoped that 
the outcome of the study will encourage the EAC legislator to adopt mechanisms of cooperation in 
criminal matters. The study is scheduled to end in September 2016. 
WHY HAVE I BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
The study intends to interview elites who are in a decision making position in the EAC Partner States as 
well as at the EAC institutional level as to engage them in the project that we think benefits the East 
African Community and its members. The study also seeks to interview professionals and officials involved 
in the adjudication of transnational organized crimes in the EAC Partner States. The views, the opinions 
and the hands on experience of the interviewees are expected to be a great insight to the study. You have 
been chosen because you fall in any category of the interviewees described above. Your views and 
opinions are important for the whole purpose of this study.  
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? 
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It is absolutely your discretion whether or not to take part in this research. If you do decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep which will be accompanied with a consent form for you 
to sign. More so, you are at liberty to withdraw from participating in this research at any time and without 
giving a reason. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME IF I TAKE PART? 
In this research, it is intended to have some exclusive interview with you which will be audio taped then 
transcribed or by note taking. Putting into account your work and schedules, it is intended that some 
flexibility will be created that will fit in with your convenience. The research is an academic work. And in 
every circumstance, care will be taken not to do anything that will be detrimental to you, your family, your 
community, your work, your personality and your integrity. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF TAKING PART? (WHERE APPROPRIATE)  
It is expected that this research work will not have any risk or disadvantage on you. The main demand will 
be to have a face to face interview of an average of 45 minutes to 1 hour with you and where for any 
reason that becomes unlikely or inconvenient, then an alternative request will be made for a telephone 
interview or a skype interview. This will entail calling you at your own time, in which case the interview 
will not last for more than 35 minutes. The choice of place for the interview is subject to your convenience. 
You are also at absolute liberty to decline taking part in this research without necessarily given any reason 
for your decline. 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TAKING PART? 
Your participation to this study will help understand the decision making system of the EAC, the 
perception of EAC about the subject of the study, the problems of transnational organized crime in East 
Africa or the implications of cooperation among the criminal justice systems of the EAC Partner States. 
This study has been inspired by a citizenship desire to contribute to the building up of the EAC, since little 
has been written and researched on the Community and much is written by outsiders who do not always 
understand the local context. Your participation will be a great support and encouragement to the 
academic and scientific information that the study will generate to the public.  
WILL MY INFORMATION IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
Recording 
It is intended that all interviews will be recorded on audio and every part of such interview conducted will 
be transcribed and used exclusively during the analysis of data. Likewise, every part of such recorded data 
shall be kept on a secure computer and will not be shared with any other person or for any other purpose 
but this study; and such information will be completely deleted from any storage within one year of the 
interview. 
Confidentiality 
Every effort will be made to be honest with you on the reason and objectives of the study. This is also 
followed by the assurance of confidentiality of information. This study will ensure that everything you 
disclose remains anonymous and not linked directly to your identity. After transcribing the interview, the 
confidential transcript will be sent to you for approval. 
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Safety of participants 
In the cause of this study, nothing will be done directly or indirectly which is capable of putting your name, 
family, community, work, contact, discussions, recordings, and opinion in jeopardy. Likewise nothing will 
be included in this study which will affect job, integrity or safety of you or anyone directly or indirectly 
involved. 
WHAT SHOULD I DO IF I WANT TO TAKE PART? 
If you intend to take part, you can email me, write a letter to me or inform me via any means of 
communication. 
My contacts details are as follows: 
Sibo Yves Gahizi 
Email: S.gahizi@sussex.ac.uk 
Telephone: +447884750666 
15A, Langdale road 
BN3 4HQ 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? 
The result of this research will be submitted as a PhD thesis to the School of Law Politics and Sociology of 
the University of Sussex. Subject to academic information dissemination of the University of Sussex, the 
findings of the research will be published by the School and will be available in the school’s data base 
subject to regulation on access of information. You can obtain a published copy of this desertion through 
the University of Sussex. 
WHO IS ORGANISING AND FUNDING THE RESEARCH? 
I am conducting this research as a PhD candidate in the School of Law at University of Sussex. The research 
is funded by NUFFIC/NFP through NICHE/RWA/008 “Strengthening the human resource capacity of the 
Institute of Legal Practice and Development (ILPD)”, in Rwanda.  
WHO HAS APPROVED THIS STUDY? 
The research has been approved through the School of Law, Politics and Sociology Ethical Review Process. 
 
CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Richard Vogler  
Professor of comparative criminal law and criminal justice  
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Sussex Law School, University of Sussex 
R.K.Vogler@sussex.ac.uk  
Telephone number: +44(0) 1273 678839  
FAX: +44(0) 1273 873162 
 
Dr. Michael Kearney 
Lecturer in Law 
Sussex Law School, University of Sussex 
Email: M.G.Kearney@sussex.ac.uk 
Telephone number: +44(0) 1273 678580 
FAX: +44(0) 1273 873162 
 
Thank you very much and look forward to working with you on this project.  
 
DATE 
30 September 2014 
 
